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ABSTRACT
Mallatt, Justine A. PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. The Eﬃcacy and Secondary Eﬀects of Pharmaceutical Legislation. Major Professor: Jillian B. Carr and
Kevin J. Mumford.
This dissertation examines the eﬀects of pharmaceutical policies on various behavioral, health, and economic outcomes.
The ﬁrst chapter is The Eﬀect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on
Opioid Prescriptions and Heroin Crime Rates. In response to growing abuse of prescription opioid painkillers, 50 U.S. states have implemented electronic prescription
drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) that record patients into a state-wide registry
when a prescription opioid is received. This paper uses a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression framework and interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor models to identify the eﬀect
of PDMPs and two related programs on the types and strengths of opioid painkiller
prescriptions ﬁlled and on rates of heroin crimes. This paper is the ﬁrst to identify diﬀering policy eﬀects on opioid prescriptions by dosage of pill, and the ﬁrst to
ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant link between PDMPs without usage mandates and heroin
outcomes. The implementation of PDMP databases caused an 8% decrease in the
amount of oxycodone shipments, with results from Medicaid prescription data pointing to larger decreases within high dosage pills. PDMPs have heterogeneous eﬀects
on heroin crime incidents across counties depending on the county’s pre-policy level
of prescription opioid milligrams per capita, with an 87% increase in heroin crime
within the most opioid-dense counties. I ﬁnd that non-Mandated PDMPs decrease
access to high-dose oxycodone pills and cause an increase in heroin crime within the
most opioid-dense counties.

xv
The second chapter details a paper entitled The Eﬀect of Pharmacist Refusal
Clauses on Contraception, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Birthrates. Emergency
contraceptive drugs like Plan B are controversial, and there have been cases within
at least 25 states of pharmacists refusing to provide the drug to patients. In response
to pressure from activist groups on both sides of the debate, some states passed “Expand” laws which expand access to emergency contraception and protect patients’
rights to receive prescribed drugs regardless of pharmacists’ personal beliefs. Other
states passed “Restrict” laws that restrict access to emergency contraception and favor
pharmacists’ rights of refusal. This paper emphasizes substitution behavior among
contraception spurred by the policies, and is the ﬁrst study to examine the eﬀects
of pharmacist refusal clauses on contraceptive outcomes, rates of sexually transmitted infections, and birthrates. I ﬁnd that the laws cause a 12-26% increase in the
prescibing rate of regular birth control pills purchased through Medicaid, and cause
decreases in purchases of condoms as well as over-the-counter Plan B. There is not
evidence that the policies have eﬀects on rates of sexually transmitted diseases, however the states that pass the Restrict policy (favoring pharmacists’ rights of refusal)
realize a statistically signiﬁcant and robust 1.16% decrease in the birthrate among
black mothers. While I am not able to measure the eﬀect of the policies on actual
rates of pharmacist refusal, my ﬁndings suggest that thousands of cautious women
change their behavior in response to the policies by adopting the birth control pill.
The third and ﬁnal chapter is comprised of the paper The Eﬀect of Opioid SupplySide Interventions on Opioid-Related Business Establishments. In response to climbing opioid abuse and overdoses, states passed several types of programs that target the
supply side of the prescription opioid market, including Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) which track patient histories, mandates that doctors use the
programs, “Pill Mill Bills” that target over-prescribing oﬃces, and abuse-deterrent
versions of prescription opioids. This paper is the ﬁrst to investigate the eﬀects of
these policies on opioid-related business establishment counts nationwide, and examines how the policies aﬀect rehabilitation facilities, doctors’ oﬃces and clinics, and
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pharmacies. I ﬁnd that Pill Mill crackdowns reduce the number of establishments in
a widely-deﬁned category which includes pain management clinics. States that implement the Pill Mill Bills notice a statistically signiﬁcant 6-7% reduction in the rate of
clinics per capita in this category. The Pill Mill Bills are associated with fewer pharmacies, a 2.6% decrease, but this result is only statistically signiﬁcant within counties
that receive a high concentration of opioids. “Must Access” mandates are associated
with a 1.5-2.5% rise in the rate of residential rehabilitation establishments. The policies are not found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect inpatient rehabilitation hospitals, outpatient
rehabilitation clinics, doctors’ oﬃces, medical labs, or drug wholesalers. While the
eﬀect of opioid policies on patient and physician behavior has been well-investigated,
this paper provides evidence that policies have spillover eﬀects on medical business
establishments.
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1. THE EFFECT OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
MONITORING PROGRAMS ON OPIOID
PRESCRIPTIONS AND HEROIN CRIME RATES
1.1

Introduction
The United States is in the midst of an opioid drug epidemic, which the Center for

Disease Control has classiﬁed as a top public health concern, calling it “the worst drug
epidemic in US history.” An estimated 2 million Americans suﬀer from a prescription
painkiller abuse disorder and 470,000 suﬀer from heroin abuse.1 Skyrocketing overdose
deaths have surpassed fatal car accidents as the leading cause of accidental death and
have contributed to the recent historic reversal in mid-life mortality among nonHispanic white Americans documented in Case and Deaton (2015).
In response to rising rates of opioid abuse and overdoses, lawmakers have legislated many interventions designed to limit the supply of prescription opioids to those
who would abuse them while preserving access for legitimate users. Among these
policies are prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs); statewide systems that
record patient controlled substance prescription histories into an online database accessible to prescribers. Using PDMPs, doctors can identify patients who receive many
overlapping prescriptions from several prescribers, a practice called doctor shopping.
The non-mandated PDMPs were available to prescribers but did not legally require
doctors to query them. A number of states later pass additional usage mandates
(referred to as “Mandates” from here on) to existing PDMPs, which require practi1

National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings. Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration 2013.
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tioners to query the PDMPs in certain circumstances. This paper focuses primarily
on the eﬀects of PDMPs in general, and controls for mandates.

2

Heroin is an inexpensive, chemically similar substitute for prescription opioid
painkillers. When opioid-addicted patients face additional obstacles in obtaining
prescription opioids, they may initiate heroin use. Heroin transition and substitution
is an important secondary-eﬀect of supply-side interventions for policymakers to consider because in recent years heroin is often laced with fentanyl, a powerful synthetic
opioid which is the cause of many unexpected overdoses (Gladden, 2016). This paper
examines the eﬀect of the PDMPs on prescription opioids, disaggregating by dosage
strength of pill and examines heroin transition caused by the PDMPs measured by
heroin crime rates. I exploit staggered timing of PDMP implementation across states
in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework to identify causal eﬀects of the programs on
prescription and heroin crime outcomes.
This paper contributes to the literature on opioid supply-side interventions by
showing that PDMPs have large, signiﬁcant eﬀects on heavy opioid-abusers. I accomplish this by using more disaggregated data than has yet been used in the PDMP
literature, which allows me to identify heterogeneous eﬀects of the PDMPs on the
dimension of dosage strength of opioid pill and on the dimension of ﬁner geographic
detail on heroin outcomes. First, I provide evidence that PDMPs signiﬁcantly decrease access to strong prescription opioids. Past work has shown that PDMPs reduce
prescription oxycodone, but this paper is the ﬁrst to disaggregate prescription opioids
by dosage of pill. I ﬁnd that PDMPs decrease oxycodone in the Medicaid population
by 25%, which is driven by a 35% decrease in oxycodone in the form of high-dose pills.
Secondly, I show that heroin abuse, as measured by heroin crime rates, increases signiﬁcantly due to the PDMP in counties with high rates of opioids per capita. While
PDMPs dont have signiﬁcant eﬀects on heroin crime rates in the aggregate, they
2

Much of the recent PDMP literature– Buchmueller and Carey (2018), Dave et al. (2017), Deza and
Horn (2017), Meinhofer (2017)– focuses on usage mandates.
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increase the rate of heroin crime incidents by 87% in counties within the top 10% of
oxycodone per capita.

1.2

Background
Opioids are a class of natural and synthetic morphine-like drugs and include

opium, morphine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, fentanyl, and heroin. Opioid molecules
bind to opioid receptors in the body, relieving pain and sometimes creating a feeling of relaxation, well-being, or euphoria. Opioids also slow breathing and heart
rate, sometimes to the point of respiratory failure in the event of an overdose. The
most common prescription opioids are oxycodone (the active ingredient in Percocet,
OxyContin, and MS Contin) and hydrocodone (the active ingredient in Vicodin and
Lortab).3

1.2.1

History of the Opioid Crisis

The opioid crisis is commonly explained by increased access to prescription painkillers,
beginning with the dramatic rise of Purdue Pharmaceutical’s OxyContin in the mid1990s. OxyContin was marketed to prescribers as safe and non-habit-forming due to
its slow-release mechanism which prevented a sudden high and crash cycle that fosters
withdrawal and dependence. OxyContin was also unique because of Purdue Pharmaceutical’s aggressive marketing approach, which heralded massive revenue growth
from $48 million in 1996 to $3.1 billion in 2012. Purdue painted Oxycontin as a
miracle drug for the common American with chronic, non-cancer pain. Other opioidproducers followed suit, and the marketing was so eﬀective that a medical ﬁeld formerly characterized by “opiaphobia” that sometimes went so far as to deny opioid
treatment to terminally ill patients now considers pain“the 5th vital sign,” asking
3

Oxycodone and hydrocodone make up the bulk of all opioid shipments in DEA’s Automation of
Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) dataset, which tracks the universe of opioid
shipments. Oxycodone and hydrocodone also have the highest reported rates of abuse within the
NSDUH.
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patients to rate their pain on a scale of one to ten after taking their blood pressure,
temperature, breathing and pulse.4
OxyContin contains the active ingredient oxycodone and pills range anywhere
from a low dose of 10 milligrams to a high dose of 80 milligrams (as well as the
now-discontinued 160 milligram pill). The continuous-release mechanism of the pill
was a patented wax coating, but determined opioid abusers could dissolve away the
coating or crush the pills into powder in order to swallow, snort, smoke or inject a
large immediate hit of the morphine-like drug.
With a rise in demand for opioids and doctors’ increased willingness to prescribe
these drugs, prescriptions for opioid pain killers increased as well. In 2012, 217 million
opioid prescriptions were written in the US–a 150% increase from 1995, which realized
87 million opioid prescriptions.

1.2.2

Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs

As of 2017, 50 states have implemented PDMPs that track patients’ prescription
histories of controlled substances. Some states have tracked such histories for decades
on paper, often for use by law enforcement agencies, but this paper focuses on the
establisment of online, electronic drug histories that can be easily accessed by doctors.
States set up online databases between 2004 and 2016, and Table 1.1 shows the precise
dates when states allowed prescriber access. Many states began data collection 1-12
months before prescribers could access the electronic PDMPs, creating a possible
announcement eﬀect.5
4

In 2001 the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations added the pain scale.
Dates were obtained by searching the internet for eﬀective dates of electronic, online PDMPs by
state. Most dates were veriﬁed using several sources, including news articles, the Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center website, the National Alliance for
Model State Drug Laws website, state legislative laws and bills, government newsletters, various
articles from peer reviewed journals, and pharmacy board websites.
5
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Due to low prescriber use of the PDMPs, 12 states6 implemented usage mandates
on top of existing non-mandated PDMPs that require prescribers to query the PDMPs
under certain circumstances. In addition, eight states7 have passed packages of laws
designed to stop over-prescribing at unscrupulous “pill mills”: pain clinics that are
typically cash-only and both prescribe and dispense opioid pills on site. These “Pill
Mill Bills” often include requirements that prescribers of painkillers register with state
Departments of Health, licensing requirements for pain clinics, or restrictions on inoﬃce dispensing of painkillers.8 I control for the usage mandates and “Pill Mill Bills”
in all of my models. Table 1.1 displays dates of the usage mandates and “Pill Mill
Bills.” There is not evidence to suggest that states systematically implement both a
PDMP and another policy like a Mandate or “Pill Mill Bill” in the same quarter.

1.2.3

Substitution to Heroin

Heroin and opioids are nearly identical at the chemical level9 and produce similar
eﬀects in the body, acting as powerful pain suppressants and creating feelings of
wellbeing and euphoria in large doses. Ways of taking heroin have changed, with
an increasing prevalence for smoking and snorting because drug purity is now so
high that injecting is not required for an intense euphoria. Since many prescription
opioid users previously crushed and snorted or smoked oxycodone pills to get high,
smoking or snorting heroin is an easy transition (Frank, 1999; Hines et al., 2017).
The heroin of the 2010s is produced in Mexico and South America, is often nearly
100% pure, and costs $10 for a small 10 milligram capsule ﬁlled with white powder.
Disconcertingly, to improve potency most heroin is now laced with a strong synthetic
opioid called fentanyl, which is 50-100 times stronger than morphine. Inconsistent
6

Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia
7
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia
8
For an excellent study on the Florida pill mill crackdown, see Meinhofer (2016).
9
Diﬀerent opioids have real chemical diﬀerences but have similar eﬀects in the body, binding to the
same mu-opioid receptors (Drewes et al., 2013).
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amounts of fentanyl (or yet-more-potent fentanyl analogs) within heroin doses is the
cause of many unexpected overdoses.
According to the Center for Disease Control, only 3% of prescription opioid abusers
initiate heroin abuse, but 75-80% of heroin users report that they transitioned from
abusing prescription drugs. Partially due to the prevalence of users who transition
from opioids to heroin, the opioid crisis is now a socio-demographically wide-spread
phenomenon, with the most concentrated eﬀects among white non-Hispanic Americans (Cicero et al., 2014). In contrast, past drug crises like the heroin crisis of the
1970s and the crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s had been concentrated among
urban and minority populations. Prescription opioid overdoses increased in the 2000s
among middle-aged non-Hispanic white Americans, and heroin and fentanyl overdoses
skyrocketed in the 2010s among non-Hispanic white Americans between ages 20 and
35 (Unick and Ciccarone, 2017). The opioid crisis is also geographically widespread,
aﬀecting suburban and rural areas nationwide.
The transition from opioids to heroin is widely documented in small-scale research
samples and surveys in the health and addiction literature (Lankenau et al., 2012;
Siegal et al., 2003), and wide-scale empirical studies linking prescription opioids and
heroin have just recently emerged (Alpert et al., 2017; Evans and Power, 2017; Kilby,
2015; Meinhofer, 2017). This paper is unique among these in that I link non-mandated
PDMPs to heroin transition, use heroin crime rates rather than heroin overdose deaths
or treatment admissions as a measure of heroin abuse, and perform my heroin analysis
at the county level instead of the usual coarser state level, with an emphasis on
heterogeneous eﬀects of the policy on heroin transition in diﬀerent types of counties.

1.2.4

Related Literature

Existing studies in the health literature draw varying conclusions regarding the
eﬃcacy of PDMPs, with studies ﬁnding zero eﬀects as often as signiﬁcant reductions
in opioid abuse measures. However, one typically corroborated result is that PDMPs
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decrease prescription oxycodone shipments (Kilby, 2015; Paulozzi et al., 2011; Reisman et al., 2009; Simeone and Holland, 2006). Several authors ﬁnd PDMPs without
mandates aﬀect Schedule II opioids (oxycodone) and not Schedule III-V opioids (hydrocodone).10 Few studies that examine the eﬀect of the initial implementation of
PDMPs use detailed prescription data, and most use aggregated opiate shipments
tracked by the DEA. One exception is Kilby (2015), who uses a dataset of prescription claims from Truven Health Analytics that covers 59% of the U.S. population.
She ﬁnds that non-mandated PDMPs cause a 10% reduction in oxycodone prescriptions, and also ﬁnds a 10% decrease in oxycodone shipments from the DEA’s ARCOS
dataset, which tracks aggregate shipments of opioids. Buchmueller and Carey (2018)
utilize a claims-level subsample of the universe of Medicare claims, and ﬁnd no eﬀect
of non-mandated PDMPs on abuse outcomes, likely because those 65 and up exhibit
lower rates of opioid abuse than the younger general population.
Results for the eﬀect of non-mandated PDMPs on outcomes outside of prescription
oxycodone are mixed. Some studies ﬁnd a reduction in overdoses or poisonings in
response to PDMPs (Patrick et al., 2016; Reiﬂer et al., 2012; Simoni-Wastila and
Qian, 2012), whereas other studies ﬁnd no response in opioid abuse outcomes. (Brady
et al., 2014; Buchmueller and Carey, 2018; Dave et al., 2017; Bachhuber et al., 2016;
Meara et al., 2016; Paulozzi et al., 2011)). Deza and Horn (2017) ﬁnd that nonmandated PDMPs established between 2007 and 2012 reduce crime rates.11 Because
recent papers often ﬁnd weak eﬀects of non-mandated PDMPs, the opioid literature in
economics has turned its attention to PDMP mandates that require doctors to access
already-established PDMPs. Several recent studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of PDMP
10

Drugs receive a Schedule I-V rating based on medical usefulness and possibility of dependence,
with higher numbers meaning more benign and lower numbers more dangerous. Illicit drugs like
heroin and cocaine are Schedule I with little medical beneﬁt and high potential for abuse. Some
opiate painkillers (fentanyl, oxycodone, morphine) are Schedule II; hydrocodone was Schedule III
in the time period relevant to this paper. Schedule III drug prescriptions can be reﬁlled without
making an appointment with a doctor; Schedule II drugs cannot be reﬁlled.
11
Deza and Horn (2017) ﬁnds the eﬀects of PDMPs and their Mandates on crime rates, with an
emphasis on violent crime and property crime. My paper focuses on drug crime, namely incidents
involving the seizure of heroin or diverted opioids.
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usage mandates that require doctors to check already-existent PDMPs (Buchmueller
and Carey, 2018; Dave et al., 2017; Deza and Horn, 2017; Meinhofer, 2017). Mandates
are eﬀective at reducing many abuse outcomes, including doctor shopping through
Medicare, substance abuse facility admissions, crime rates and fatal drug overdoses.
The economics literature has also begun to connect opioid abuse and heroinsubstitution outcomes. Studies by Alpert et al. (2017) and Evans and Power (2017)
examine heroin substitution in response to the 2010 reformulation of OxyContin.
The reformulation made OxyContin more diﬃcult to crush, which is a primary step
to snorting, smoking, or injecting it to obtain a more intense high. Both sets of
authors ﬁnd dramatic increases in heroin overdose deaths in the most opioid-dense
states consistent with the timing of the reformulation. In the PDMP literature, Kilby
(2015), Meinhofer (2017), and Radakrishnan (2014) have studied the eﬀect of PDMPs
on heroin overdoses and treatment admissions. All three studies ﬁnd limited eﬀects
of the non-mandated PDMP on heroin abuse outcomes, but do not account for the
possibility of heterogeneous eﬀects within the population.
In contrast to other PDMP papers that focus on eﬀects of the added mandates,
I focus on non-mandated PDMPs among high-abuse populations and geographical
areas, and I ﬁnd evidence that suggests that non-mandated PDMPs have large eﬀects
among high-abuse populations. In this paper I examine prescription outcomes in the
Medicaid population, whereas other papers have focused on the general population
or Medicare populations.12 The CDC has long stated that the Medicaid population is
at higher risk for opioid abuse disorders, and this paper is among the ﬁrst to focus on
Medicaid prescription outcomes in response to the PDMP. Past studies have shown
that doctors who have patients from high-abuse populations access and query nonmandated PDMP databases at higher rates (Goodin et al., 2012; Irvine et al., 2014;
12

A 2017 paper in the health policy literature by Wen et al. uses the same Medicaid dataset,
using years 2011-2014. The authors do not include robustness checks or test diﬀerent speciﬁcation
strategies of their diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, nor do they provide evidence that parallel trends
is supported. It is not clear if standard errors were cluster-bootstrapped, which is likely necessary
due to few states implementing PDMPs between 2011 and 2014.
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Ross-Degnan et al., 2004), and my results suggest these PDMPs have eﬀects of a
similar magnitude to mandated PDMPs among the Medicaid population.
This paper also contributes to the recent economics literature covering opioid-toheroin substitution, by treating PDMPs as a source of exogenous variation in abusers’
access to prescription opioids. Other studies estimate heroin use by admissions to
substance abuse treatment facilities or by death rates from heroin. I use a more
detailed and informative measure, namely an incident-level dataset of reported crimes,
aggregated by county and month, to measure the eﬀects of PDMPs on heroin crime
rates. Since other recent studies only found weak or inconsistent links with heroin
outcomes, I use more granular geographic data to examine heterogeneous eﬀects across
counties, using the counties’ levels of pre-policy opioid abuse, proxied by oxycodone
milligrams per capita. To the extent that residents in more opioid-dense counties are
more likely to be heavy opioid users, an increase in heroin crime within these counties
would suggest that PDMPs are highly inﬂuential in the transition to heroin use by
those who heavily abuse prescription opioids.

1.2.5

Predictions of Policy Eﬀects

PDMPs act as a negative supply shock for legally-obtained prescription opioids by
making it more diﬃcult for abusers to obtain prescriptions. Former doctor-shoppers
may turn to the black market for diverted opioid prescriptions13 because illegally
diverted opioids are a substitute for legally prescribed opioids. The PDMP should
therefore cause an increase in demand for diverted illegally-obtained opioids. However, the supply of diverted opioids available for purchase on the black market should
also be aﬀected by the PDMP because much of the supply of diverted opioids is
obtained by doctor shopping, which the PDMP targets. Since the PDMP causes a
decrease in supply as well as an increase in demand in the black market for illegally13

In the NIBRS, an opioid is considered illegal or “diverted” when the individual in possession of
the opioid does not possess a prescription.
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diverted opioids, quantity eﬀects are ambiguous and it is not clear whether police will
encounter fewer or more illegal opioid crime incidents.
Heavy abusers who rely on doctor shopping to obtain their prescription opioids
may turn to another substitute, heroin, in response to the additional obstacles to
prescriptions posed by the PDMP. An increase in demand for heroin should mean
police encounter more incidents where heroin is involved after the PDMP is passed.

1.3

Data

1.3.1

Prescription Data: Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data

Table 1.2 lists summary statistics on frequency of prescription opioid and heroin
abuse from self reports in the National Survey on Drug Use and Health 1990-2014.
The table is divided into non-Medicaid respondents and Medicaid-enrolled respondents. I further divided the data into all respondents, and respondents who report
having ever used hydrocodone non-medically, used oxycodone non-medically, and used
OxyContin non-medically. Hydrocodone, oxycodone, and OxyContin are presented
in ascending order of potency and abuse potential. Hydrocodone is a relatively weak
Schedule III opioid typically prescribed for acute temporary pain, and oxycodone
is a stronger Schedule II substance used to treat moderate to severe chronic pain.
Most opioid crackdowns have focused on limiting oxycodone. About a third (0.348)
of oxycodone abusers report having used OxyContin, the slow-release formulation of
oxycodone that comes in large doses.
Within the survey, Medicaid respondents are more likely to abuse opioids; and
among groups of hydrocodone, oxycodone and OxyContin abusers, Medicaid enrollees
use opioids more frequently than their non-Medicaid counterparts. The ﬁrst column
lists summary statistics for the entire Non-Medicaid and Medicaid subsets of the
data, including respondents who do not abuse opioids. 11% of survey respondents
not on Medicaid report having ever abused opioids, and the average respondent in
the non-Medicaid group reports abusing opioids 2.029 times in the past year. Within
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the respondents who are Medicaid enrollees, 12.7% have ever abused opioids and the
average respondent has abused opioids 3.30 times in the past year. The second column
restricts both the Non-Medicaid and Medicaid groups to those who reported having
ever abused hydrocodone. The average non-Medicaid abuser of hydrocodone has
misused opioids 20.19 times in the past year, compared to 28.89 abuses for the average
Medicaid counterpart. Abusers of oxycodone and OxyContin show the highest rates
of reported abuse: oxycodone abusers report misusing opioids 22.82 and 32.41 times a
year, in the non-Medicaid and Medicaid subsets respectively, and OxyContin abusers
report using 40.45 and 52.10 times respectively. Medicaid have both higher rates
and frequencies of reported heroin abuse than the non-Medicaid respondents. Those
who abuse hydrocodone, oxycodone and OxyContin are much more likely to report
heroin use as well, with increasing odds (8.4%, 11.4%, and 19.7% in the non-Medicaid
population, and 10.8%, 14.6% and 23.4% in the Medicaid-enrolled population) across
opioid-strength categories.
Since Medicaid enrollees are more likely to abuse opioids than the general population, and abuse increases across drug-strength categories, the Medicaid dataset used
for this paper is advantageous in revealing the true eﬀects of the PDMP. I expect
PDMPs disproportionately aﬀect heavy-abusers of opioids, so the Medicaid population provides a good chance of ﬁnding large and signiﬁcant policy eﬀects.
Medicaid tracks the universe of prescriptions the program pays for and compiles
the information into aggregated reports on the Medicaid website in the Medicaid
State Drug Utilization Data. The Medicaid dataset on opioid pills covers 7-15% of
all prescription painkillers in the United States. The National Drug Code (NDC)
is a unique product-identiﬁer that identiﬁes each drug by its manufacturer, active
ingredient, and dosage amount, among other details. The Medicaid data report the
state-by-quarter counts of each NDC prescribed. I use the NDC to merge the Medicaid data to detailed information from the Food and Drug Administration.14 For
14

Many of the NDCs for opioids found in the Medicaid data are outdated, so I manually searched
for records by NDC and obtained dosage and strength information on outdated NDCs from many
diﬀerent websites.
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my analysis, I restrict my observations to tablets15 of oxycodone and hydrocodone
painkillers, the most commonly abused opioids. Patients typically receive take-home
opioid prescriptions in the form of tablets.16
Because the Medicaid data are reported at the NDC level, I aggregate milligrams
by both drug type and strength, diﬀerentiating drug milligrams that come in the
form of low-dose pills from those in high-dose pills. Opioid active ingredients have
varying potencies, so I use diﬀerent milligram cutoﬀs for hydrocodone and oxycodone
drugs. Oxycodone is 1.5 times as strong as hydrocodone. I deﬁne a low-dose pill
as a hydrocodone pill with 15 or fewer milligrams of hydrocodone or an oxycodone
pill with 10 or fewer milligrams of oxycodone. A high-dose oxycodone pill contains
greater than 10 milligrams of oxycodone, and a high-dose hydrocodone pill contains
more than 15 milligrams of hydrocodone. Hydrocodone is typically not found in
pills with more than 15 milligrams.17 The 10 milligrams oxycodone/15 milligrams
hydrocodone cutoﬀs were chosen because commonly-abused Percocet and Vicodin
have 10 or fewer oxycodone milligrams and 15 or fewer hydrocodone milligrams,
respectively. More dangerous pills like OxyContin, whose abusers exhibit more severe
abuse characteristics, have more than 10 milligrams of oxycodone.18

1.3.2

Drug Enforcement Agency ARCOS Data

The Drug Enforcement Agency tracks aggregate shipped amounts of controlled
substances through the Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (AR15

Tablets account for 79% of the NDCs in the opioid prescription dataset, and 69% of all quantities
of opioids given out. In addition to tablets, opioids come as solutions, syrup, and patches, mostly
in the form of codeine, a relatively weak form of opioid.
16
Oxycodone and hydrocodone are the most commonly abused opioids (NSDUH) and the only opioids the Drug Enforcement Administration has tracked for the entire time period between 2000 and
2015. There is not evidence that PDMPs aﬀect other less-commonly abused opioids like oxymorphone, hydromorphone, meperidine, tramadol, tapentadol, morphine, or methadone. The unresponsiveness of the more uncommon opioids is consistent with ﬁndings in Kilby (2015). Results available
upon request.
17
In the Medicaid data, only 0.2% of hydrocodone comes in higher-dose, extended release capsules.
18
Eﬀects disaggregated on pill strength are robust to using diﬀerent milligram cutoﬀs for “strong”
pill classiﬁcation. Results are driven by 30, 40, and 80 mg oxycodone pills, as covered in C.
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COS). These data are recorded by state and quarter and by zipcode and quarter. I
use the shipped quantites of oxycodone and hydrocodone between 2000 and 2014 to
supplement my Medicaid results with data from the general population, as well as
for comparison to other studies in the literature that also use the ARCOS (Kilby,
2015; Reisman et al., 2009). The ARCOS data provides more ﬁne-grained geographical information at the zipcode and county level than dos the Medicaid data, which
is at the state level. I use ARCOS county oxycodone per capita to obtain a proxy
measurement for pre-policy opioid abuse within counties. The ARCOS data are not
at the NDC level of speciﬁcity, so I am not able to decipher dosage amounts (strong
versus weak doses) nor dosage form (tablets versus solutions usually given under medical supervision) of the oxycodone and hydrocodone within the aggregate population
data.
Table 1.3 displays Medicaid drug milligrams in tablet form per enrollee and ARCOS drug milligram shipments in all forms per population in the data. The oxycodone per capita rate from the ARCOS and the oxycodone tablet milligrams per
Medicaid enrollee19 from the Medicaid data appear similar at around 55 morphine
units per quarter per person, which is approximately 6-8 low dose pills or 1-2 highdose pills per capita. In the Medicaid data, where oxycodone can be broken down
into high dose (> 10 mg) and low dose (≤ 10 mg), the bulk of prescribed oxycodone
is dispensed in high dosage tablet form. Hydrocodone comes in nearly exclusively
low-dose tablets, often in combination with acetaminophen, as is the case with brand
name Vicodin. It is unknown wheter the proportions of weak dose versus strong
dose tablets of oxycodone (or hydrocodone) in the Medciaid data is the same as in
the general population because the ARCOS data lacks this information. I assume the
Medicaid information is representative and explore it because policy eﬀects on dosage
strength are an interesting and potentially important contribution to the literature
on opioid supply-side interventions.
19

I classify capsules and tablets as tablets.
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1.3.3

NIBRS

The National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) is an incident-level dataset
of crimes committed in 6,251 law-enforcement jurisdictions across 38 states and 1,634
counties. For the purpose of this paper, I use a complete monthly panel of 735 counties in 26 states from 2004-2014. A map of the 735 counties is documented in Figure
1.1, which shows that coverage is nationally widespread, including some states with
near-complete coverage. The NIBRS is a more-detailed subset of the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) system, and the 2004 NIBRS covered police districts in areas
containing 20% of the United States population and accounted for 16% of the UCR
crime statistics data collected by the FBI. Reported crimes include information about
the location where the incident occurred, details about the nature of the crime, and
demographic characteristics of the oﬀender (among other information).
For my analysis, I focus on drug crimes involving the purchase, sale or possession
of heroin or illegally obtained prescription opiates. I collapse the NIBRS incident-level
data to obtain a panel of the number of crimes per 100,000 population per month in
each covered county. Dependent variables include incidents where heroin or opiates
are seized, and incidents involving possible drug dealers, as deﬁned below.
I divide counties based on their density of oxycodone, revealed by the ARCOS
data, for the year 2004, prior to the timing of most electronic PDMPs. My rationale is
that PDMPs should have a larger impact and cause more opioid abusers to transition
to heroin in areas with a larger stock of opioid abusers prior to the PDMP. I proxy the
number of existing opioid abusers with the recorded numbers of oxycodone milligrams
per capita, matching zipcode-level ARCOS data to county-level crime data in order
to obtain ﬁne geographic measures of oxycodone density. I use each county’s mean
per-quarter amount of oxycodone per capita in 2004 to proxy the initial stock of
opioid abusers susceptible to the PDMP. The 2004 level is late enough that the
opioid crisis was beginning to aﬀect counties diﬀerently, but early enough that most
PDMPs had not been implemented. The distribution of oxycodone density across
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diﬀerent counties is plotted in Figure 1.2. Most counties receive 10-50 milligrams
per person in oxycodone shipments, but the ﬁgure suggests that there are “outlier”
counties that receive many more opioids per capita. I split the counties on the 90th
percentile of oxycodone density, at 63.15 milligrams of oxycodone per capita. The
10% of counties that are above this cutoﬀ are the “high oxycodone density” counties
and the bottom 90% that are more centered around 25 mg/capita are classiﬁed as “low
oxycodone density” counties.20 Figure 1.3 shows oxycodone-density for the counties in
the NIBRS data, with the most oxycodone dense counties appearing in New England,
the Appalachian regions of Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, and a few counties
in Ohio, which are all known to be high-abuse areas.
Table 1.4 displays summary statistics of drug crimes from the NIBRS data. The
table is split into 3 panels: crime rates across all 735 counties in the NIBRS, crime
rates within the lower 655 (counties that make up the bottom 90%) of the oxycodoneper-capita distribution, and crime rates within the 80 counties (counties that make up
the top 10%) with the highest oxycodone-per-capita. The typical county realizes 1.3
heroin incidents and 2.2 incidents of illegally diverted opioids per 100,000 population
per month. The less oxycodone-dense counties experience a mean of 1.124 heroin incidents and 1.866 diverted-opioid incidents per month, whereas the highly-opioid-dense
counties experience 2.342 and 4.009 heroin and diverted-opioid incidents, respectively.
Thus, the rates in the most oxycodone-dense counties are twice as high.
To identify possible heroin dealers in the NIBRS dataset, I count the individuals
per county and month who 1.) are carrying more than 2 grams21 of heroin, 2.) Are
20

Results are robust to diﬀerent cutoﬀs. B includes ﬁgures that plot coeﬃcient estimates when
using cutoﬀs other than the 90th percentile, and suggest that the heroin results are signiﬁcant among
the top 30% of counties in terms of oxycodone density.
21
1 gram of heroin is 100 doses of 10 mg each. States have varying levels of heroin amounts that
create the assumption of “traﬃcking,” with Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Vermont
considering 2 grams an important cutoﬀ for traﬃcking, assigning harsher punishments to those
carrying above 2 grams of heroin. Other states typically have cutoﬀs ranging between 1 and 5
grams, but laws diﬀer drastically across states.
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carrying between 1 and 2 grams of heroin and a large amount of another drug22 , or
3.) Are carrying any heroin and were entered in the data as selling any drug. A
probable opiate dealer is someone who 1.) is carrying more than 5 grams or 250 pills
of opiates, 2.) is carrying between 2 and 5 grams or between 100 and 250 pills and are
carrying a large amount of another drug, or 3.) is carrying opiates and are entered
as selling any drug.
In Table 1.4, the average county realizes 0.502 incidents per month involving possible heroin dealers, and 0.523 involving possible dealers of diverted opioids. The low
oxycodone counties experience about 0.4 incidents of each type per month, whereas
the high oxycodone counties experience about 1 heroin and diverted-opioid incidents
per month which involve a possible dealer. Again, the crime ratio for the two sets of
counties is about two to one.

1.4

Empirical Methods
For the main analysis of this paper, I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression

framework on a state-quarter panel and a county-month panel weighted by population, using the diﬀerent implementation dates by state of PDMPs, Mandates and Pill
Mill Bills as a source of exogenous variation in treatment. The identifying assumption of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation is the parallel trends assumption that
treated and untreated states follow similar growth paths prior to the treatment and
would have continued to do so in the absence of treatment. This approach identiﬁes
changes in trends within the treated geographies that correspond to the timing of
the implementation of the policy. I adapt the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models into
an event-study framework with policy lags and leads to test the parallel trends assumption. I later supplement the analysis with interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor models
(IFE), as detailed in Bai (2009), which are explained later in the paper.
22

More than 1 gram of crack cocaine, more than 1 gram of cocaine, more than 500 grams of marijuana
(about 17 oz–enough to be charged with a felony in most states), more than 2 grams of opioids, or
more than 1 gram of methamphetamine.
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1.4.1

The Eﬀect of PDMPs on Prescription Data and ARCOS Shipments

Models for ﬁnding the eﬀect of the policies on the amount of opioids used by
Medicaid recipients and ARCOS shipments are at the state and quarter level. The
model is as follows:

RxOutcomeit = α + βP DM Pit + ηM andateit + φP illM illBillit + ΨXit + ιi + γt + it
Where RxOutcomeit is logged milligrams of Medicaid oxycodone or hydrocodone per
Medicaid enrollee, or logged total ARCOS shipped amounts of oxycodone or hydrocodone per population in state i in quarter t or earlier.23 P DM Pit is an indicator
that is equal to one if state i has established an electronic Prescription Drug Monitoring Program by quarter t. M andateit is an indicator equal to one if a state has
mandated that prescribers must check the PDMP under certain circumstances by
time period t. P illM illBillit is an indicator equal to one if a state has passed a menu
of laws targeting “Pill Mills.”24 γt is a set of time period ﬁxed eﬀects that ﬂexibly
capture the average national time path of the outcome variable. ιi is a set of geography ﬁxed eﬀects that control for the average level of the outcome variable in a state
and the eﬀects of time-invariant state characteristics. it is a stochastic, normally
distributed error term.
Event-study graphs (for example, graphs in Figures 1.4 and 1.5) are based on the
following models:
RxOutcomeit = α+Σ10
p=−5 βp P DM Pi,t+p +ηM andateit +φP illM illBillit +ΨXit +ιi +γt +it
P DM Pi,t+p is an indicator equal to one if the policy started in state i in the time
t + p. The coeﬃcients βp capture the measured eﬀect of the PDMP at p periods
23

Logged linear models are used for prescription outcomes, but results on Medicaid oxycodone,
strong Medicaid oxycodone, and ARCOS oxycodone are robust to the removal of the log and are
available upon request. Prescription results are also robust under a Poisson model, also available
upon request to the author.
24
A state with more than one policy, like Kentucky, which has a PDMP, a usage mandate, and a pill
mill crackdown by July 2012 will have all three indicator variables equal to one, with the cumulative
eﬀect of the policies on the outcome equal to the sum of the variables’ coeﬃcients.
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after passage. For example, if p = 2, βi,t+2 would capture the eﬀect of the policy on
the outcome variable 2 periods after passage.25 Negative values of p correspond to
“leads,” which capture the eﬀect of the policy before it is implemented and should be
zero under the parallel trends assumption of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology.
Xit is a matrix of controls that capture changes within states over time in demographic characteristics and economic characteristics. State-level controls for the
prescription outcome models are summarized in Table 1.5. The matrix includes the
fraction of the population that is black, Hispanic, or of other non-white race, as well
as the poverty rate, unemployment rate, average weekly wage rate, average income
per capita, and the fraction of the population employed in the agriculture or manufacturing sectors. I include controls for the age composition of the population (fraction
of population in age groups 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69 and 70 years or
older) and the gender composition of the population. I control for the average number of pills of all drug types ﬁlled through Medicaid per Medicaid enrollee to capture
variation in the overall Medicaid-prescribing behavior within states over time. I also
control for the implementation of Medicare Part D, which increased elderly access
to prescription drugs, by controlling for the fraction of the population enrolled in
Medicare interacted with an indicator that turns on in 2006, when Medicare Part D
began.26 I control for state-varying Medicaid expansion under the Aﬀordable Care
Act, but the expansion occurs in 2014, 2015, and 2016 and is not driving results.27
Finally, I control for eﬀects of the abuse-deterrent reformulation of OxyContin
that became prevalent in 2010, because Alpert et al. (2017) and Evans and Power
(2017) ﬁnd a large impact of the OxyContin reformulation on heroin overdoses. Both
studies ﬁnd that states react diﬀerently to the OxyContin reformulation based on
their pre-policy rate of reported OxyContin abuse (in the NSDUH) (Alpert et al.,
25

Indicator variables P DM Pi,t+p are only equal to one in the time p period after passage, and equal
zero in all other time periods.
26
Since many opioid abusers obtain their drugs from friends and relatives, increasing senior access
to prescription drugs increases opioid abuse. See Pacula, Powell and Taylor (2015) for a time-study
analysis.
27
Regressions dropping data from 2013-2015 yield similar results, meaning the ACA is not driving
coeﬃcient estimates. Results available upon request.
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2017) and oxycodone per capita in the ARCOS (Evans and Power, 2017). Their
models control for heterogeneous eﬀects of the reformulation across diﬀerent states
by multiplying a post-reformulation indicator variable by the pre-reformulation proxy
for opioid abuse. Similarly, I control for diﬀering eﬀects of the reformulation across
states by multiplying a post-reformulation indicator by a state’s mean number of
OxyContin milligrams per Medicaid enrollee (in the Medicaid data) in 2004.28

1.4.2

The Eﬀect of the PDMPs on Crime Rates

Crime-rate models use the NIBRS panel data at the county and month level. The
main analytic-weighted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models are in the form:
CrimeRatect = α + βP DM Pct + ηM andatect + φP illM illBillct + ΨXct + ιc + γt + ct
CrimeRatect is the number of crimes per 100,000 people in the NIBRS-covered population in county c in month t.29,30 P DM Pct , M andatect , and P illM illBillct are
indicators equal to one if the PDMP, Mandate, or menu of “Pill Mill” legislation is in
eﬀect in county c’s state in month t, and β, η, and φ capture the eﬀect of the policies
on the outcome crime-rate. Xct is a matrix of county characteristics that vary over
time, and γt and ιc are time and county ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 1.6 lists county controls in matrix Xct . Controls include racial, age, and
gender demographics like in the prescription section, but instead at the county level.
I also control for the county-level unemployment rate and average weekly wage. I
control for the fraction of the county’s labor force that works in a manufacturing job
and use pharmacies per capita to control for changing access to prescription drugs. I
28

Alpert et al. (2017) use OxyContin abuse that is reported in the NSDUH as a measurement for
how states will experience the eﬀects of the OxyContin reformulation on heroin overdoses. When I
instead use OxyContin prescribing rates in the Medicaid data on heroin crime outcomes, my result
magnitudes are similar to the Alpert et al. (2017) eﬀects of NSDUH OxyContin abuse reporting on
heroin overdoses.
29
Outcomes for crime rates are not logged because 86% of county-month pairs report zero heroin
incidents. Heroin results are robust under a Poisson regression model, as documented in a later
section.
30
The NIBRS includes a variable that lists each reporting jurisdiction’s covered population. Jurisdiction populations within the same county are summed when aggregated to the county level.
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control for law enforcement oﬃcers per capita in each crime-reporting jurisdiction over
time to account for any enforcement changes within counties that may correspond
to the timing of the policies. I also control for the abuse-deterrent reformulation
of OxyContin and the enactment of Medicare Part D as I did for the models in
the prescription opioid models.31 I adapt the approach in Alpert et al. (2017) and
Evans and Power (2017) for measuring the eﬀect of the OxyContin reformulation
to the county level by multiplying a post-August 2010 indicator by counties’ prereformulation oxycodone density in the ARCOS data.32
To identify the eﬀect of the policies over time and support the identiﬁcation assumption of parallel trends, I create graphs with coeﬃcient estimates obtained from
the event study (as seen in Figures 1.6):
CrimeRatect = α + Σ12
f =−12 βf P DM Pi,t+f + ηM andatect + ΨXct + ιc + γt + ct
βf captures the eﬀect of the PDMP on the crime-outcome variable at f months
after passage. For example, β5 estimates the eﬀect of the PDMP 5 months after
passage. The βf coeﬃcients associated with negative, (pre-policy) time periods should
equal zero and will capture pre-policy eﬀects if the parallel trends assumption is not
satisﬁed.

1.4.3

The Interactive Fixed Eﬀects Factor Model

The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects (IFE) factor model as detailed in Bai (2009) accounts
for (possibly non-linear) geography-speciﬁc time trends while nesting ﬁxed eﬀects
of time and county (state), accomplished by adding a principal component analysis
31

Medicare enrollment by year is available at the state level, but not at the county level. At the
county level, I instead proxy by using fraction of the population who are aged 65 and up.
32
Medicaid data are not available at the disaggregated county level. To measure a treatment intensity
of the OxyContin reformulation at the county level, I use ARCOS oxycodone shipments per capita
from each county interacted with a post-August 2010 indicator. This method is almost identical to
the method in Evans and Power (2017), but at the county rather than state level. My estimates
of the county-level eﬀect of the reformulation (measured by ARCOS oxycodone density) on heroin
abuse (measured by heroin crime rates) are similar in magnitude to those in Alpert et al. (2017),
who also ﬁnd the eﬀect of the reformulation (measured by NSDUH OxyContin abuse reports) on
heroin abuse (measured by heroin overdoses).
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structure to the error term. The IFE factor model assumes that patterns in opioid and
heroin abuse within counties (states) can be modeled as a function of R unobserved
linear factors, Frt . The optimal number of factors, R, are chosen using criteria in Bai
and Ng (2002).

AbuseOutcomect = α + βP DM Pct + ΨXct + ΣR
r=1 λrc Frt + u
The above equation outlines the IFE factor model structure, where Frt is an
unobserved factor, common across all counties (states) in month (quarter) t, and λrc
is a county (state) factor loading, constant over time.
The factors, Frt , can be thought of as nationwide time trends in opioid or heroin
abuse to which diﬀerent counties (states) are either more or less susceptible, depending
on unobservable characteristics of those counties (states). The basic diﬀerence-indiﬀerence model accounts for national non-linear patterns in abuse, and the IFE
factor model extends this by accounting for additional non-linear time trends that
aﬀect areas to varying degrees. For example, when I apply the factor model to heroin
crime-rates, the factor model produces factors that plot out a gradual increase in
heroin crime from 2004-2010, which then increases exponentially from 2010-2014.
Counties experience the non-linear increase in heroin to diﬀering degrees, which is
accounted for in each county’s factor loading. In the case of heroin crime incidents,
a county’s factor loading is correlated with its 2004 level oxycodone milligrams per
capita, implying that more opioid-dense counties are more sensitive to the increase in
heroin crime. This is consistent with the original hypothesis that restricting opioids
causes more heroin use.
For factor model analysis on heroin incidents, the IFE factor model could in
theory be approximated by adding linear, quadratic, and cubic geography-speciﬁc
time trends to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression, but that comes at the cost of
eﬃciency and statistical power. In practice, however, rather than adding a linear,
quadratic, and cubic time trend for each of 735 counties, the factor model uses a
matrix structure based on principle components analysis to account for several ﬂexible
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time trends and assign factor loadings for each time trend by county. This factor
approach uses fewer degrees of freedom while controlling for ﬂexible time trends and
therefore results in more precisely measured-estimates. The IFE factor model serves
as a robustness check to my diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model, and the point estimates
are typically similar across both model speciﬁcations. Factor model results are covered
in detail in the results section.

1.5

Results

1.5.1

Eﬀect of the PDMP on Prescription Amounts

Table 1.7 shows the estimates for the coeﬃcients of interest in Equation 1.4.1,
measuring the eﬀect of the PDMP and related policies on the Medicaid prescription
and ARCOS shipments of oxycodone and hyrocodone amounts per capita. The model
speciﬁcation in Table 1.7 includes state and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects and state controls,
and weights observations and standard errors by either state Medicaid enrollees for
models run on Medicaid outcomes (Columns (1)-(4)) or state population for models
run on ARCOS data (Columns (5) and (6)). Columns (1)-(4) contain coeﬃcient estimates from the weighted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model run on Medicaid oxycodone,
weak oxycodone, strong oxycodone, and hydrocodone, respectively. Columns (5) and
(6) contain the estimates from the model run on ARCOS total oxycodone and hydrocodone, respectively.
The Medicaid outcome variables in Columns (1) through (4) are in logged morphine milligrams per Medicaid enrollee and the ARCOS outcome variables in Columns
(5) and (6) are in logged morphine milligrams per capita, meaning that table entries
are interpreted as proportional increases and decreases in the dependent variable in
response to the PDMP, Mandates, and “Pill Mill Bills.” Column (1) shows the PDMP
reduces Medicaid oxycodone per Medicaid enrollee by 24.6%, which is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. Column (2) shows neither a large nor signiﬁcant reduction in oxycodone
per Medicaid enrollee in the form of weak-dose (≤10mg) oxycodone pills; however,
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Column (3) shows a signiﬁcant 35% reduction in strong-dose (>10mg) oxycodone per
Medicaid enrollee in response to the PDMP. In Column (5), the PDMP is found to
reduce the aggregate amount of oxycodone shipped per capita by 8%, signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. Neither Columns (4) nor (6) suggest that the PDMP has an eﬀect on
hydrocodone use. See A for Medicaid prescription results across model speciﬁcations.
Figure 1.4 shows the accompanying event study graphs for the weighted diﬀerencein-diﬀerences model in Columns (1), (2), and (3) from Table 1.7, in which the dependent variables are Medicaid total oxycodone, weak oxycodone, and strong oxycodone
per enrollee. The vertical line in each graph marks the ﬁrst quarter of the PDMP.
Oxycodone begins trending downward at the time of the policy implementation, and
this eﬀect is driven by a reduction in strong oxycodone, which makes up the majority
of all oxycodone amounts dispensed through Medicaid. The leads of the oxycodone
and strong oxycodone graphs are close to zero until the policy takes eﬀect at quarter
zero, which supports the parallel trends assumption. The states with PDMPs had
similar growth paths to states without PDMPs prior to the implementation of the
policy. The parallel trends assumption seems to hold. The graphs show a break in
trend among the treated states at the time of the policy implementation, lending
evidence to the PDMP causing a decrease in oxycodone.
Figure 1.5 plots the event study coeﬃcient of the model on aggregate shipment
rates of oxycodone from the ARCOS data, and shows an 8% reduction among such
shipments per capita over time. This result is consistent with much of the PDMP
literature that uses ARCOS data as an outcome response to the systems, including
Kilby (2015), who ﬁnds a 10% reduction in ARCOS oxycodone in response to the
non-mandated PDMP. I ﬁnd larger oxycodone reductions for the Medicaid population
than for the aggregate population, which can be explained by several reasons. The
CDC states that people enrolled in Medicaid are more prone to opioid and heroin
abuse (see Table 1.2), meaning that if PDMPs aﬀect all opioid abusers similarly,
the eﬀect will be greater in the Medicaid data because opioid abusers make up a
larger fraction of the Medicaid population (Frank, 1999). Additionally, prescribers
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who interact with high-abuse populations are more likely to use a PDMP, even if it
is not mandated (Goodin et al. (2012), Ross-Degnan et al. (2004), and Irvine et al.
(2014)), so in areas with large abuse populations, PDMPs are perhaps eﬀective in
cutting usage despite not being mandated by law. In short, the Medicaid population
may be specially positioned for the PDMP to work well on it.
Although many of the models in Table 1.7 show signiﬁcant eﬀects of the Mandate
and Pill Mill Bill policies on drug amounts, all of the event study models fail the
parallel trends assumption, and are not remedied by the addition of trends. Both
Mandate and Pill Mill Bill results on prescription outcomes are volatile across model
speciﬁcations.33
A novel contribution of this study is that I ﬁnd the decrease Medicaid-prescribed
oxycodone is driven by reductions in prescriptions for the high-dosage oxycodone
pills (¿10mg). No other study has considered heterogeneous eﬀects of the PDMP on
oxycodone drugs of diﬀering strengths. For additional detail, C includes an analysis
of the PDMP eﬀect on Medicaid oxycodone at a further level of disaggregation, and
it ﬁnds that reductions in the 30, 40, and 80 milligram pills are driving the overall
reduction in strong-dose pills. I also ﬁnd that PDMP reductions among Medicaid
prescriptions are only prevalent among generic oxycodone pills, and not brand-name
OxyContin.34

1.5.2

Eﬀect of the PDMP on Drug Crime Rates

Table 1.8 shows the eﬀect of the PDMP on crime incidents in which heroin is
seized per 100,000 NIBRS-covered population in a county and month. Entries in
this table show the eﬀect of the PDMP, Mandate and “Pill Mill Bills” on number
33

See A for model estimates and graphs of Mandate event studies. This paper is restricted to
examining 12 Mandates passed between 2007 and 2015. Since 2015, 15 more states have passed and
or implemented Mandates to their PDMPs, and future work on the eﬀectiveness of Mandates may
beneﬁt from the additional states.
34
Hwang et al. (2015) and Meinhofer (2016) ﬁnd that only generic oxycodone is responsive to the
reformulation of OxyContin and Florida’s crackdown on pill mills, respectively. Additional results
on brand-name versus generic oxycodone are available upon request to the author.
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of heroin crime incidents per 100,000 population. These entries interpretable as the
change in heroin crime incidents per 100,000 per month caused by the policies. The
table is broken up into three panels, for models run on A.) all 735 counties, B.) on
the bottom 90% of counties by oxycodone density, and C.) on the top 10% of counties
by oxycodone density (all as determined from the ARCOS dataset).
Panel A shows the eﬀect of the policies across all counties in the NIBRS. Column (1) shows coeﬃcient estimates from a simple ordinary least squares model of the
heroin crime rate on the PDMP, Mandate and Pill Mill Bill. The signiﬁcant estimate
of 0.466 shows that PDMP-instigation is positively correlated with the rate of heroin
incidents. This correlation is likely due to an overall upward trend in heroin incidents
over time. Column (2) adds county and time ﬁxed eﬀects to the OLS speciﬁcation,
controlling for county levels and a national average trend in heroin incidents, and
the point estimate falls to 0.155 additional heroin incidents after the passage of the
policy, and this result is statistically insigniﬁcant. Column (3) adds county demographic and economic controls (as summarized in Table 1.6), and estimates do not
substantially change from the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation in Column (2). Column (4)
adds county-speciﬁc time trends, and estimates become larger in magnitude (0.384)
but remain insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Column (5) applies the IFE factor
model, as outlined in Section 1.4.3, which nests diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and time
trends while controlling for unobserved confounding variables at the county level.
The positive estimate and statistical signiﬁcance of the factor model’s estimate in
Column (5) suggests there is some meaningful heterogeneity not being addressed in
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach at the national level. However, this is only
signiﬁcant at the 10% level and demands conﬁrmation, which will be given below.
As in the state-level models on prescription outcomes, the results for the Mandate
and Pill Mill Bill eﬀects on crime rates are volatile across model speciﬁcations. In
Panels B and C in Table 1.8, Mandate eﬀects on heroin incidents switch signs between
the control and linear-time-trend model speciﬁcations. This is likely because the eﬀect
of the Mandate within the NIBRS-covered counties is identiﬁed using changes in the
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policy across only 8 states. The results for Pill Mill Bills also vary dramatically across
speciﬁcations, likely because eﬀects are identiﬁed using 6 treated states in the NIBRS
data. The small sample sizes of too few treated states could be confusing results.
Panel B in Table 1.8 shows that the PDMP has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the rate
of heroin incidents in counties that had a low oxycodone density prior to the policy,
and are therefore likely to be less susceptible to the policy. The IFE factor model ﬁnds
a small signiﬁcant increase (0.095 additional heroin incidents per 100,000 people per
month) in the rate of heroin incidents among the bottom 90% of counties, equal to an
11% increase. Since the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates and the IFE factor model
estimates are not consistent with one another, it is not certain that there was a change
in heroin incidents in the less oxycodone-dense counties. B shows insigniﬁcant, nearzero eﬀects of the PDMP in the bottom half of counties by oxycodone density when
the more oxycodone-dense half of counties are excluded from the model.
In contrast to the less oxycodone-dense counties, the counties in the top 10% of
the distribution, as shown in Panel C of Table 1.8, experience a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of 1.745, 1.69 or 0.972 additional heroin incidents per 100,000 population per
month under the specifations with controls and linear time trends, and the IFE factor
model speciﬁcatio, respectively. Police are encountering 47% to 84% more heroin
incidents in these highly susceptible counties, which experience a baseline of 2.07
heroin incidents per 100,000 NIBRS-covered population per month in the year prior
to the policy. This large, positive eﬀect of the PDMP in high-density counties is
robust across many diﬀerent estimation speciﬁcations.35
Figure 1.6 shows the eﬀect over time of the PDMP on the rate of heroin incidents
in all counties in the top graph, and in the counties with high oxycodone density
in the bottom graph. The event study graphs contain dashed vertical lines that
allow for a possible announcement eﬀect during a six month window leading up to
35

This result is robust to the removal of analytic weights, though somewhat less precise. This result
is also robust in poisson regressions and in the context of weighted and unweighted factor models,
and results from all models are available upon request.
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the eﬀective date of the policy.36 Consistent with Panels A and C of Table 1.8, the
graphs show an increase in heroin incidents after the implementation of the PDMP.
The leads on the graphs are close to zero, and support the identifying assumption
of the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model that states that treated counties are trending
similarly to untreated counties prior to the policy. Post-implementation, the graph
line trends upwards, meaning PMDP is causing more heroin incidents in the counties
with the highest oxycodone shipments per capita.
Table 1.9 contains estimated eﬀects of the policies on several diﬀerent drug-crime
outcomes, split on high and low oxycodone density. This table contains results from
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model speciﬁcation without county-speciﬁc linear time
trends (the “Controls” model from Table 1.8). Again, Panels A-C distinguish types of
counties by oxycodone density. Columns (1) through (4) document model coeﬃcient
estimates on the rates of heroin incidents (taken from Table 1.8), incidents that
involved possible heroin dealers (Column (2)), diverted opiate incidents (Column
(3)), and incidents involving possible dealers of diverted opiates (Column (4)).
Panel C shows that in the most oxycodone-dense counties, the incidents with possible heroin dealers increase signiﬁcantly: 0.324 additional incidents per 100,000 population after the PDMP, equal to a 37% increase from the pre-policy, pre-announcement
level of 0.880.
Figure 1.7 displays event studies of the PDMP eﬀect on possible heroin dealers
in all counties and in the most oxycodone-dense counties. There is a signiﬁcant
increase in possible heroin dealers in the most opioid-dense counties, but not across
all counties.37 Theory predicts an increase in demand for heroin and quantity traded
of heroin, because heroin is a substitute for prescription opioids. I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
36

Many states began documenting controlled substances in the PDMP system months before the
PDMP was accessible by prescribers (the eﬀective date of the policy), perhaps resulting in a slight
announcement eﬀect.
37
As shown in Panel C of Table 1.8 and discussed further B, the eﬀect of the PDMP on heroin
outcomes is driven by those counties in the top half of the oxycodone-per-capita distribution.
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84% increase in heroin incidents in the most susceptible areas, equal to about 1.75
additional incidents per 100,000 population per month, consistent with predictions.38
A crime involving diverted opioids is an incident in the NIBRS in which an oﬀender
is carrying prescription opioids for which he or she does not have a prescription. The
PDMP’s eﬀect on opiate incidents is noisy and has large standard errors, consistent
with predictions. It remains noisy and insigniﬁcant, often with point estimates near
zero, across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. Close examination of event study graphs
of opiate incidents over time do not reveal consistent eﬀects or anything of note for
all counties or for the more oxycodone-dense counties. Figure 1.8 shows such graphs.
The plotted coeﬃcient points come from the IFE factor model this time because the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences event studies do not satisfy the parallel trends identiﬁcation
assumption, even when accounting for linear county-speciﬁc time trends. That is, the
linear time trends are not enough to capture trends in illegal opioid seizures in the
data. Regardless of the model used, the PDMP does not produce signiﬁcant eﬀects on
the rate of diverted opioid incidents. Results on possible opioid dealers are similarly
noisy, insigniﬁcant, near zero and are not discussed.
Simple theory predicts PDMPs cause an increase in the demand for illegal prescription opiates, but a decrease in supply of illegal prescription opiates (diverted
from the market of legal prescription opiates). These opposing market forces lead to
a predicted increase in the street price of prescription opioids, but ambiguous eﬀects
on the predicted quantity traded. These imprecise, zero estimates of the eﬀect of
the PDMP on opiate incidents are not surprising in light of the uncertain theoretical
predictions.
38

The 84% increase estimate is obtained from the analytic-weighted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model
with county and month ﬁxed eﬀects and controls. The result that the PDMP causes a large increase
in heroin incidents in the most opioid-dense counties is robust across model speciﬁcations, including
additional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcations, factor model speciﬁcations, and a Poisson framework, all available upon request to the author.
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1.5.3

Results from the Interactive Fixed Eﬀects Factor Model

As explained in section 1.4.3, the IFE factor model from Bai (2009) ﬂexibly accounts for nationwide time trends that aﬀect diﬀerent counties based on unobservable
characteristics. Results calculated from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models and IFE
factor model are similar in regressions on prescription outcomes (as seen in A),
likely because trends at the state-level are mitigated with aggregation. In contrast,
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results and factor model results diverge more in the heroin
models because of non-linear time trends at the more disaggregated county-level.
When applied to the model on heroin incidents, the factor model produces time
trends that appear to ﬁt non-linear county-speciﬁc time trends that the diﬀerence-indiﬀerences model with county-speciﬁc linear time trends is not able to capture.
The factor model nests nationwide time trends, and Figure 1.9 graphs a polynomial ﬁt of the nationwide trend in race of heroin incidents by county. Diﬀerence-indiﬀerences models are able to pick up this non-linear common time trend in the ﬁgure
by including time ﬁxed eﬀects. The nationwide time trends in Figure 1.9 does not
account for diﬀerences in time trends across counties.
Figure 1.10 shows the “Factor 1” time trend from the IFE factor model. Factor 1
is a nationwide time trend experienced diﬀerently by individual counties depending
on county factor loadings. August 2010 is the month when Purdue Pharmaceutical released the abuse-deterrent reformulation of OxyContin. Notice that Factor 1
shows a non-linear pattern of heroin incidents over time, with a sudden acceleration
after 2010. During time periods 0 through 80, which corresponds to the period between January 2004 and August 2010, the rate of heroin incidents increases modestly,
and then dramatically after August 2010. In the county-level regressions, I control
for county-speciﬁc level responses to the tamper-proof reformulation by multiplying
a post-August-2010 dummy indicator by each county’s pre-reformulation oxycodone
density.39 Controlling for a level shift allows the abuse-deterrent reformulation to
39

Alpert et al. (2017) and Evans and Power (2017) use a similar method.
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aﬀect counties proportional to their likely abuse exposure. However, it appears that
controlling for the reformulation in this way does not ﬁt the curvature of heroin incidents after 2010 well, as the factor model’s ﬁrst factor and nationwide time ﬁxed
eﬀects trends pick up a dramatic increase in heroin incidents beginning in August
2010.40 Figure 1.11 contains a map of the NIBRS counties’ Factor 1 loadings. The
darkest-color counties in Delaware, Oregon, Ohio, West Virginia, and Virginia experience the steepest increases in heroin incidents after 2010.
Counties’ Factor 1 loadings are correlated with their 2004 density of ARCOS
oxycodone, meaning more opioid-dense counties experience greater heroin transition
after 2010. As an illustrative example, I have chosen two example counties, and
ﬁt lines to their heroin incident rates over time. Figure 1.12 displays the rate of
heroin incidents in Spotsylvania County, VA, which the IFE model had assigned a
large factor loading (90th percentile) and Florence County, SC which the IFE model
had assigned a typical factor loading (50th percentile). The rate in Spotsylvania
County shows more of a non-linear incident pattern, realizing a dramatic increase
in the 2010s. Figure 1.13 shows the heroin incident rate over time of the same
counties, after removal of the controls and the county and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The
ﬁgure approximates what the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model is left to ﬁt with countyspeciﬁc linear time trends after other covariates and ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for. A
linear trend ﬁt to Spotsylvania’s heroin incidents will provide a poor ﬁt, and it biases
the coeﬃcient estimates of the PDMP upward.41 The counties with large factor 1
loadings experience a sharp increase in heroin incidents in later time periods, and
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models with linear time trends will ﬁt linear trends to
counties partially based on the shallower slope in heroin incidents between 2004 and
2010. The increase in heroin incidents after 2010 will fall above the trend, and may
be falsely attributed to the PDMP.
40

Factor 1 is by construction orthogonal to the variable that proxies the OxyContin reformulation,
and is perhaps picking up additional unexplained variation across counties not captured by the
proxy.
41
Virginia’s PDMP was implemented in June 2016, corresponding to time period 30 and South
Carolina’s PDMP was implemented in June 2008, corresponding to time period 55.
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Table 1.10 compares the results of various diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models with
those of the IFE factor model. The coeﬃcients resulting from the diﬀerence-indiﬀerences models under linear time trends is 0.384, larger than the model without
time trends (0.239). Adding quadratic and cubic county-speciﬁc time trends for the
regressions on all counties results in a PDMP coeﬃcient estimate of 0.108 additional
heroin incidents per 100,000 population per month, which is very close to the IFE
factor model estimates (0.112) because the county-speciﬁc polynomials capture the
curvature in heroin incidents within counties.

1.6

Additional Robustness Checks

1.6.1

Placebo Test and Wild Cluster Bootstrap

Due to concerns about autocorrelation and few treated states in the panel data,
wild cluster bootstrapped p-values are used to draw inference for all main results.
Coeﬃcients on the PDMP remain signiﬁcant for regressions on Medicaid oxycodone,
Medicaid strong oxycodone, ARCOS oxycodone, and heroin incidents among oxycodonedense counties.
Table 1.11 displays rejection rates from a placebo test as suggested in Bertrand
et al. (2004). Concerns about autocorrelation are especially pertinent to diﬀerencein-diﬀerences regressions on addictive opioid drugs, which have a highly correlated
temporal pattern. Using the state-quarter Medicaid data and county-month crime
rate data, I randomly assign fake PDMP, Mandate and Pill Mill Bill laws to states
for any time between 2004 and 2014, with probability equal to the relative frequency
of the real policies in the data. I then run my models on the data with the placebo
policies to test rejection rates. Fictitious placebo laws should be signiﬁcant at the
5% level 5% of the time. Table 1.11 shows that diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences over-rejects
the null hypothesis of zero eﬀect for all policies, to varying degrees. The problem is
most acute for the Mandate policy and the Pill Mill Bill regulation, with rejection
rates around 20% and 35%, respectively, likely because of few treated states for either
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policy. Rejection rates of the placebo PDMP policy range from 6% to 30%, with the
main prescription results on oxycodone only slightly over-rejecting at the 6-8% level.
This may mean that in this study, diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are overly lax in
rejection.
To remedy the over-rejection problem, I use the Wild Cluster Bootstrap t-statisticpercentile procedure outlined in Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008).42 P-values obtained from this procedure are included in brackets for key results in Table 1.7, Table
1.8 and Table 1.9. IFE factor model results are cluster-bootstrapped as well.

1.7

Conclusion
Opioids are highly addictive and foster dependence among individuals taking high

doses. When abusers’ supply of prescription opioids is cut oﬀ, some may turn to
heroin or illegally diverted opioids to avoid the undesirable physical symptoms of
opioid withdrawal.
Every state established electronic prescription drug monitoring programs between
2004 and 2017 to limit prescribing of opioids to those with patterns of abuse. Nationwide, PDMPs cause an 8% reduction in prescription oxycodone quantities, and an
11% increase in heroin crime, although this result is statistically insigniﬁcant. Prescription monitoring has larger eﬀects on prescriptions in the Medicaid population
and causes a statistically signﬁcant 25% reduction in oxycodone prescribed, which is
driven by an even larger 35% decrease in high-dosage pills. Heroin crime results are
driven by the counties that have the highest pre-PDMP oxycodone per capita, which
42

This procedure involves taking the residuals of a model run without the independent variables of
interest (in my case, the PDMP, Mandate and Pill Mill Bill) and randomly reassigning them within
treated clusters. The residual randomization disrupts the autocorrelation in the error term within
clusters that causes over-rejection of the null. The procedure then runs the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
regression model on the data with the randomly-ordered residuals, and, bearing similarities to a
placebo test, obtains a distribution of t-statistics under the meaningless data. The real t-statistic
is compared to the distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics and is assigned a p-value equal to its
percentile within the distribution.
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is consistent with substitution to heroin in response to the policy. The PDMP causes
a 47% to 84% increase in heroin incidents within the most oxycodone-dense counties.
This paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of legislation that reduces
the supply of opioids, and ﬁnds evidence of substitution behavior in response to
PDMPs. The results show heterogeneous eﬀects of PDMPs within state populations,
a possible explanation for the mixed, often statistically insigniﬁcant results in the
PDMP literature. When focusing on the high abuse Medicaid enrollee subsection of
the population and disaggregating oxycodone by pill strength, evidence here supports
that PDMPs successfully limit the supply of opioids to the heaviest abusers.
Disaggregating Medicaid data on drug level allows me to identify heterogeneous
policy eﬀects on drugs with diﬀering amounts of oxycodone. Using county-month
level crime data, I am able to ﬁnd heterogeneity of PDMP eﬀectiveness within state
populations. Disaggregating outcomes to the county level allows for a better examination of high-abuse populations, because of diﬀerences in opioid abuse across counties
within states.
The opioid epidemic costs the U.S. an estimated $78.5 billion annually. Policymakers have primarily used supply-side policy levers in attempts to reduce the ﬂow
of new opioid addicts. However, supply-side policies haven’t properly accounted for
substitution responses among the stock of existing opioid-dependent individuals. Future supply-side interventions should provide alternative options for those already in
the throes of addiction, or simultaneously target alternate sources of opioids.
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Table 1.1.
Eﬀective Dates of Electronic PDMPs, Mandates, and “Pill Mill” Legislation
State
PDMP Date
Mandate Date
“Pill Mill” Bill Date
Alaska
January 2012
Alabama
August 2007
Arkansas
March 2013
Arizona
December 2008
California
July 2009
Colorado
February 2008
Connecticut
July 2008
Delaware
August 2012
March 2012
Florida
October 2011
July 2011
Georgia
July 2013
Hawaii
January 1982
Iowa
March 2009
Idaho
July 2008
Illinois
Janurary 2008
Indiana
July 2008
Kansas
April 2011
Kentucky
March 2005
July 2012
July 2011
Louisiana
January 2009
August 2014
July 2005
Massachusetts
December 2010 June 2013
Maryland
January 2014
Maine
January 2005
Michigan
March 2011
Minnesota
April 2010
Missouri
July 2017
Mississippi
March 2011
September 2011
Montana
October 2012
North Carolina October 2008
North Dakota
January 2007
Nebraska
April 2011
New Hampshire October 2014
New Jersey
January 2012
New Mexico
August 2005
September 2012
Nevada
October 2004
October 2007
New York
August 2013
August 2013
Ohio
October 2006
November 2011 May 2011
Oklahoma
July 2006
Oregon
September 2011
Pennsylvania
August 2016
Rhode Island
September 2012
South Carolina June 2008
South Dakota
March 2012
Tennessee
December 2006 January 2013
January 2012
Texas
August 2012
June 2009
Utah
January 2006
Virginia
June 2006
Vermont
April 2009
November 2013
Washington
January 2012
Wisconsin
May 2013
West Virginia
January 2004
June 2012
September 2014
Wyoming
July 2004
Dates obtained from the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, Brandeis
University’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical
Assistance Center, state legislative laws and bills, government newsletters, news
articles, articles from peer reviewed journals, and pharmacy board websites.
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Table 1.2.
Summary Statistics on Opioid Abuse of Individuals in the NSDUH
All Respondents

Hydrocodone
Abusers

Oxycodone
Abusers

OxyContin
Abusers

Non-Medicaid Population
Fraction Abused Opioids
Past Year Frequency Opioids
Fraction Abused Heroin
Past Year Frequency Heroin
Fraction Abused Hydrocodone
Fraction Abused Oxycodone
Fraction Abused OxyContin
Observations

0.110
2.029
0.011
0.174
0.077
0.056
0.019
915,123

1
20.190
0.084
1.766
1
0.481
0.226
70,637

1
22.822
0.114
2.426
0.663
1
0.348
51,222

1
40.453
0.197
5.616
0.897
1
1
17,837

Medicaid Population
Fraction Abused Opioids
Past Year Frequency Opioids
Fraction Abused Heroin
Past Year Frequency Heroin
Fraction Abused Hydrocodone
Fraction Abused Oxycodone
Fraction Abused OxyContin
Observations

0.127
3.303
0.015
0.289
0.078
0.057
0.022
163,528

1
28.889
0.108
2.636
1
0.503
0.257
12,756

1
32.41
0.146
3.847
0.688
1
0.400
9,323

1
52.100
0.234
7.143
0.879
1
1
3,725

The table displays summary statistics from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health 1990-2014.
For the Non-Medicaid and Medicaid Population, indicators for and frequency of opioid abuse are
reported for all survey respondents, survey respondents who report having ever abused hydrocodone,
oxycodone or OxyContin. Medicaid enrollees report higher rates of abuse than those not enrolled in
Medicaid, and respondents who report abusing OxyContin and oxycodone report more frequent misuse of
opioids.

Table 1.3.
Summary Statistics of ARCOS and Medicaid Drug Amounts
ARCOS Data
Morph. Units Morph. Units
(Millions)
Per Capita
Oxycodone
312.5
55.54
Oxycodone: Weak Dose
–
–
Oxycodone: Strong Dose
–
–
Hydrocodone
149.4
24.68
Hydrocodone: Weak Dose
–
–
Hydrocodone: Strong Dose
–
–
Observations
5100
5100

Medicaid Data
Morph. Units
Morph. Units
(Millions)
Per Capita
25.90
52.24
9.083
17.53
16.81
34.71
7.377
11.44
7.377
11.44
–
–
5100
5100

Panel Data is by state and quarter. Data is in morphine-equivalent milligrams of oxycodone and hydrocodone.
Strong dose pills are pills containing more than 15 morphine equivalent milligrams of the active opioid painkiller.
Hydrocodone does not come in tablets containing more than 15 morphine equivalent milligrams. The ARCOS
data contains information on aggregate shipped amounts of oxycodone and hydrocodone, and the Medicaid drug
data contains information at the drug level, which is aggregated by strength.
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Table 1.4.
Summary Statistics of Crime Rates Per 100,000 Population
All 735 Counties
Heroin Incidents
Opiate Incidents
Heroin Dealer
Opiate Dealer

N

Mean

Std. Error

93,742
93,742
93,742
93,742

1.299
2.175
0.502
0.523

2.716
4.533
1.290
2.604

655 Low Oxycodone Density Counties
Heroin Incidents 86,232 1.124
Opiate Incidents 86,232 1.866
Heroin Dealer
86,232 0.426
Opiate Dealer
86,232 0.432

2.481
3.792
1.199
2.202

80 High Oxycodone Density Counties
Heroin Incidents 10,548 2.342
Opiate Incidents 10,548 4.009
Heroin Dealer
10,548 0.949
Opiate Dealer
10,548 1.060

3.655
7.300
1.663
4.233

Panel Data is by county and month. 735 counties across 26 states have
complete monthly coverage within the NIBRS dataset during the entire
period of 2004 to 2014. Only counties with full coverage are used in the
crime rate analysis.
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Table 1.5.
Summary Statistics of Controls for State Level Models

N
Mean
Data: Census Bridged Population Estimates
Fraction Aged 10-19
3,204 0.1396
Fraction Aged 20-29
3,204 0.1383
Fraction Aged 30-39
3,204 0.1362
Fraction Aged 40-49
3,204 0.1445
Fraction Aged 50-59
3,204 0.1297
Fraction Aged 60-69
3,204 0.0885
Fraction Aged 70+
3,204 0.0916
Fraction Female
3,204 0.509
Fraction Black
3,204 0.1326
Fraction Hispanic
3,204 0.1484
Fraction Other Non-White
3,204 0.0627

Std. Error
0.0090
0.0093
0.0112
0.0101
0.0115
0.0150
0.0246
0.0056
0.0866
0.1271
0.0441

Data: BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
Fraction Employed Manufacturing
3,204 0.1236
Fraction Employed Agriculture
3,204 0.0116

0.0441
0.0108

Data: BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Unemployment Rate
3,204 0.0817

0.0405

Data: Census Historical Poverty Tables
Poverty Rate
3,204

0.1363

0.0293

Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Income Per Capita
3,204 $38,867

$7,867

Data: Medicaid Drug Utilization Data
OxyContin mgs per Enrollee (2004) 3,204
Medicaid Pills Per Enrollee
3,204

31.39
23.297

17.46
13.64

Data: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Fraction Medicare Enrolled
3,204 0.157

0.0221

Panel Data is by state and quarter. Income per capita is per year, and OxyContin
milligrams per capita and Medicaid pill per enrollee are quarterly.
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Table 1.6.
Summary Statistics of Controls for County Level Models

N

Mean

All 735 Counties
Data: Census Bridged Population Estimates
Fraction 10-19
92,292 0.1387
Fraction 20-29
92,292 0.1348
Fraction 30-39
92,292 0.1279
Fraction 40-49
92,292 0.1437
Fraction 50-59
92,292 0.1376
Fraction 60-69
92,292 0.0955
Fraction 70+
92,292 0.0925
Fraction Female
92,292 0.5087
Fraction Black
92,292 0.1181
Fraction Hispanic
92,292 0.0687
Fraction Other Non-White
92,292 0.0358
Fraction 65+
92,292 0.1288

Std. Error
0.0139
0.0357
0.0167
0.0174
0.0160
0.0202
0.0246
0.0127
0.1268
0.0629
0.0370
0.0389

Data: BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
0.0979
Fraction Employed Manufacturing 92,292 0.1479
$219.83
92,292 $790.70
Average Week Wage
0.738
1.64
92,292
Pharmacies per 1,000 pop
Data: BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Unemployment
92,292 0.0551

0.0224

Data: Drug Enforcement Administration ARCOS Files
Pre-2010 Oxycodone per capita
57,591 52.168
34.188
Data: FBI Uniform Crime Reporting LEOKA
Oﬃcers per 1,000 pop
92,292 17.93

0.041

Panel Data is by county and month. 735 counties across 26 states have
complete monthly coverage within the NIBRS dataset during the entire
period of 2004 to 2014. Only counties with full coverage are used in the
crime rate analysis.
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Table 1.7.
The Eﬀect of Policies on Logged Prescription Amounts per Capita
Medicaid Data
(1)

(2)
Weak
Oxycodone
Oxycodone

(3)
Strong
Oxycodone

ARCOS Data
(4)

(5)

(6)

Hydrocodone

Oxycodone

Hydrocodone

PDMP

-0.246∗
(0.128)
[0.087]

-0.0813
(0.146)
[0.286]

-0.350∗∗
(0.151)
[0.033]

-0.0530
(0.146)
[0.359]

-0.0814∗
(0.135)
[0.065]

-0.0041
(0.0263)
[0.519]

Mandate

0.342∗∗
(0.145)
[0.989]

-0.247
(0.164)
[0.844]

0.344∗∗∗
(0.145)
[0.992]

-0.208∗
(0.184)
[0.123]

0.157∗∗
(0.0589)
[0.99]

-0.165∗∗∗
(0.0390)
[0.001]

Pill Mill Bill

-0.190
(0.156)
[0.283]

-0.238
(0.110)
[0.422]

-0.185
(0.173)
[0.188]

0.0843
(0.192)
[0.653]

-0.176∗∗
(0.101)
[0.028]

-0.0129
(0.0506)
[0.558]

Observations

2714

2713

2692

2714

3070

3066

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Medicaid Weights
Population Weights
∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data is by state and quarter. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values in brackets.
The PDMP, Mandate, and Pill Mill rows contain coeﬃcient estimates for variables indicating the timing of Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs, a Mandate that requires practitioners to check the PDMP, or a “Pill Mill” Bill that imposes
many strict regulations on clinics that prescribe and dispense opioids on site.
Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) show the eﬀect of the PDMP on oxycodone, weak dose oxycodone, strong dose oxycodone, and
hydrocodone per Medicaid enrollee in the Medicaid data. Columns (5) and (6) display the eﬀect of the PDMP on ARCOS
aggregate oxycodone and hydrocodone shipments per capita.
Weak dose oxycodone has 10 or fewer milligrams per pill; strong dose oxycodone has greater than 10 milligrams per pill.
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Table 1.8.
The Eﬀect of Policies on Heroin Incidents Per Capita, Across Model Speciﬁcations
OLS
Panel A: All 735 Counties
PDMP
0.466∗∗∗
(0.0382)

FE

Controls

LTT

Factor

0.155
(0.230)

0.384
(0.361)

Mandate

3.774∗∗∗
(0.226)

1.337
(1.050)

Pill Mill Bill

-1.597∗∗∗
(0.181)

-0.519
(0.867)

Observations

92292

92292

0.239
(0.288)
[0.654]
0.945
(0.666)
[0.881]
-0.271
(0.702)
[0.365]
92292

0.112∗
(0.059)
[0.058]
0.123
(0.308)
[0.689]
0.111
(0.312)
[0.722]
92292

0.0919
(0.251)
0.169
(0.230)
92292

Panel B: Bottom 90% of Oxycodone Density Counties
PDMP

0.672∗∗∗
(0.0359)

-0.0767
(0.0700)

Mandate

1.689∗∗∗
(0.202)

0.178
(0.822)

Pill Mill Bill

0.623∗∗∗
(0.150)

0.752
(0.852)

Observations

82704

82704

-0.0306
(0.110)
[0.236]
-0.167
(0.623)
[0.449]
0.976
(0.763)
[0.794]
82704

-0.0256
(0.0889)
0.0674
(0.278)
0.333∗
(0.164)
82704

0.095∗∗
(0.045)
[0.036]
-0.023
(0.137)
[0.869]
0.136
(0.273)
[0.618]
82704

Panel C: Top 10% of Oxycodone Density Counties
1.745∗
(0.795)
[0.915]
1.115∗∗∗
(0.327)
[0.999]
-1.928∗
(0.858)
[0.026]
9588

1.690∗∗
(0.745)

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

PDMP

0.0462
(0.139)

1.249
(0.821)

Mandate

5.545∗∗∗
(0.312)

2.386∗
(1.062)

Pill Mill Bill

-6.104∗∗∗
(0.301)

-3.189∗∗
(1.295)

Observations

9588

9588

Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Time Trends
Population Weights
Factor Model
Cluster Bootstrap
∗

∗∗

X

X
∗∗∗

-0.497
(0.413)
-0.606
(0.726)
9588

0.972∗∗∗
(0.303)
[0.001]
2.003∗∗∗
(0.661)
[0.002]
-1.174∗∗
(0.551)
[0.033]
9588

h̄
X
X
X

p < 0.10,
p < 0.05,
p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered on the
treament level (state). Wild cluster boostrap p-values are listed in brackets.
Panel A shows coeﬃcients on policies when models are run on all 735 counties. Panel B and
Panel C show heterogeneity of policy eﬀects across counties depending on pre-policy
oxycodone milligrams per capita. Panel B shows the coeﬃcients of the models run on a
subsample of the data containing only the bottom 90% of oxycodone-dense counties, and
Panel C shows results from models run on the top 10% most oxycodone-dense counties.
Data source: NIBRS 2004-2014.
h̄: The IFE Factor Model nests ﬁxed eﬀects and county-speciﬁc linear time trends.
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Table 1.9.
The Eﬀect of the PDMP on Drug Crimes Per Capita
Heroin
Possible
Incidents
Dealers
Panel A: All 735 Counties
PDMP
0.239
0.013
(0.288) (0.0672)
[0.654]
[0.430]

Opiates
Possible
Incidents
Dealers
-0.162
(0.0956)
[0.243]

-0.0174
(0.0257)
[0.246]

Mandate

0.945
(0.106)
[0.881]

0.160∗
(1.050)
[0.925]

0.147
(0.195)
[0.589]

0.0781
(0.0685)
[0.721]

Pill Mill Bill

-0.271
(0.702)
[0.365]

-0.231∗
(0.110)
[0.062]

-0.325
(0.344)
[0.622]

-0.124
(0.0639)
[0.385]

Observations

24780

24384

24384

24384

Panel B: Low Oxycodone Density Counties
PDMP
-0.031
-0.0317
-0.651
0.014
(0.288) (0.0483) (0.0774)
(0.0248)
[0.236]
[0.237]
[0.441]
[0.514]
Mandate

-0.167
(0.623)
[0.449]

-0.224
(0.136)
[0.257]

0.437∗∗
(0.347)
[0.983]

0.224∗∗
(0.0964)
[0.964]

Pill Mill Bill

0.976
(0.763)
[0.794]

0.111
(0.127)
[0.688]

-0.284
(0.476)
[0.674]

-0.222
(0.0911)
[0.515]

Observations

21096

20964

20964

20964

Panel C: High Oxycodone Density Counties
PDMP
1.745∗
0.324∗
-0.547
-0.248
(0.795)
(0.140)
(0.213)
(0.0971)
[0.915 ]
[0.918]
[0.131]
[0.150]
Mandate

1.115∗∗∗
(0.327)
[0.999 ]

0.374∗∗
(1.050)
[0.978]

-0.378
(0.208)
[0.139]

-0.237
(0.103)
[0.204]

Pill Mill Bill

-1.597∗∗
(0.181)
[0.026]

-0.601∗∗
(0.235)
[0.010]

-1.160∗
(0.249)
[0.078]

-0.465∗
(0.329)
[0.096]

Observations

3684

3420

3420

3420

∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by state. Wild cluster p-values in brackets. Diﬀerence-indiﬀerences regression model speciﬁcation includes county and month
ﬁxed eﬀects, county controls, and population weights.
In Panel B and Panel C, the data are subdivided into the bottom 90%
of least oxycodone dense counties and the top 10% of most oxycodone
dense counties. Crime data: NIBRS 2004-2014. Oxycodone density
data: DEA ARCOS.
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Table 1.10.
Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents: Comparison of Models
Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerences
Controls
LTT
PTT

IFE Factor Model
Factor
Wt. Factor

Panel A: All Counties
PDMP
Mandate
PillMill
Observations

0.239
(0.228)
0.945
(0.666)
-0.271
(0.702)
92292

0.384
(0.361)
0.092
(0.666)
0.169
(0.230)
92292

0.108
(0.081)
-0.036
(0.143)
-0.036
(0.131)
92292

0.112*
(0.059)
0.123
(0.308)
0.111
(0.312)
92292

0.138**
(0.057)
0.485
(0.402)
0.114
(0.461)
92292

Panel B: Top 10% Oxycodone Density Counties
PDMP
Mandate
PillMill
Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Popln. Weight
Linear Time Trends
Quadratic Time Trends
Cubic Time Trends

1.745*
(0.795)
1.115**
(0.327)
-1.928*
(0.858)
9588
X
X
X

1.690**
(0.745)
-0.497
(0.413)
-0.606
(0.726)
9588
X
X
X
X

0.412
0.927*** 0.949***
(0.496)
(0.303)
(0.304)
-0.097 1.990*** 2.003***
(0.311)
(0.664)
(.661)
-0.598 -1.154*** -1.174***
(0.383)
(0.547)
(0.551)
9588
9588
9588
X
h̄
h̄
X
X
X
X
X
X
h̄
h̄
X
h̄
h̄
X
h̄
h̄

h̄: The IFE Factor Model nests ﬁxed eﬀects and county-speciﬁc polynomial time trends.
The “controls” speciﬁcation includes county demographic and economic controls,
as well as county and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The “LTT” speciﬁcation adds county-speciﬁc
linear time trends, and “PTT” adds county-speciﬁc polynomial time trends by controlling
for a quadratic and cubic time trend within counties.
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Table 1.11.
Rejection Rates Under Placebo Test at 5% Level

Policy:

PDMP Mandate

Pill Mill Bill

Medicaid and ARCOS Prescription Outcomes
Medicaid Oxycodone
Medicaid Weak Oxycodone
Medicaid Strong Oxycodone
Medicaid Hydrocodone
ARCOS Oxycodone
ARCOS Hydrocodone

0.084
0.118
0.079
0.137
0.058
0.147

0.163
0.236
0.160
0.227
0.155
0.222

0.321
0.352
0.315
0.389
0.317
0.360

0.089
0.083
0.303
0.091

0.150
0.119
0.123
0.082

0.389
0.334
0.349
0.380

Drug Crime Outcomes
Heroin Incidents
Heroin Dealers
Opiate Incidents
Opiate Dealers

The PDMP, Mandate, and Pill Mill Bill dates were randomly reassigned to take eﬀect in a pre-PDMP time period
The prescription regression model run includes state and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, Medicaid enrollment
weights and linear time trends. The drug crime regression models include county and month ﬁxed eﬀects and cont
and dont include county trends. Rejection rates are from regression models using cluster robust weighting.

Table 1.12.
Weighted Poisson Regression: Eﬀect of PDMP on Prescription Outcomes
Med Oxy
PDMP
Mandate
Pill Mill Bill
Observations

Med Weak Oxy Med Strong Oxy ARCOS Oxy

-0.212***
(0.058)
-0.239*
(0.134)
0.079
(0.110)

-0.074***
(0.024)
-0.304**
(0.135)
0.064
(0.073)

-0.275***
(0.073)
-0.148
(0.118)
0.026
(0.109)

-0.084**
(0.029)
-0.052
(0.037)
-0.051
(0.122)

3070

3070

3070

3070
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Table 1.13.
Poisson Regression: Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents
Panel A: All Counties
PDMP
Mandate
Pill Mill Bill
Observations

Count

Rate per 100,000

0.123*
(0.086)
-0.047
(0.104)
0.051
(0.212)
67,092

0.1833**
(0.092)
0.070
(0.138)
0.326
(0.277)
66,948

Panel B: Top 10% Oxycodone Dense Counties
PDMP
0.231**
(0.118)
Mandate
0.131
(0.093)
Pill Mill Bill
-0.450
(0.277)
Observations
8,088
Robust errors in parentheses.

∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01.

0.380
(0.278)
0.497***
(0.164)
-0.734**
(0.301)
8,076
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Fig. 1.1. A Map of NIBRS Data Coverage
Notes:The map shows the 735 counties for which there exists a complete monthly panel
dataset of counts of crimes from 2004 to 2014 within the NIBRS dataset.
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Fig. 1.2. The Distribution of Oxycodone Per Capita Across Counties
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the distribution of 2004 oxycodone density across 735 counties.
The top 10% most oxycodone dense counties have greater than 63.15 milligrams of
oxycodone per capita per month, equivalent to 6-12 weak dose pills or 2-3 strong dose pills
per month for each resident. The PDMP has larger eﬀects on counties that have higher
pre-policy (year 2004) oxycodone density. Heroin incident data: NIBRS. Oxycodone
density data: DEA ARCOS.
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Fig. 1.3. NIBRS County Oxycodone Density
The ﬁgure displays the NIBRS-covered counties colored by oxycodone milligrams per
person. Darker counties are more oxycodone dense. Oxycodone density data: DEA
ARCOS.

Fig. 1.4. PDMP on Medicaid Oxycodone Outcomes Over Time
Notes: The ﬁgures plot coeﬃcients on lag and lead policy indicators from
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models on logged amounts of oxycodone by Medicaid prescriptions
(milligrams per capita). The dependent variable is restricted to weak dose oxycodone in
the center graph and strong dose oxycodone in the right graph. The graphs correspond to
event-study adaptations of Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 1.7 and models include state
and time ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, population weights, and state-speciﬁc linear time trends.
Data spans 50 states plus the District of Columbia quarterly from 2000-2015. Prescription
Data: Medicaid SDUD
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Fig. 1.5. PDMP on Aggregate Oxycodone Shipments
Notes: Same as Figure 4, except using aggregate shipments of oxycodone from ARCOS.
The trends graphs correspond to Column (5) of Table 1.7 and includes state and time
ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, population weights, and state-speciﬁc linear time trends. The
dataset spans 50 states plus the District of Columbia quarterly from 2000-2015. Aggregate
Shipment Data: DEA ARCOS
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Fig. 1.6. PDMP on Heroin Incidents Over Time
Notes: Graphs plot the coeﬃcients on PDMP lags and leads indicators in a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression on heroin incidents per 100,000 in a county-month pair.
The top graph shows the event study of the PDMP on heroin incidents across all counties.
The lower graph shows the event study of the PDMP on heroin incidents in the most
oxycodone-dense counties. Event study regressions include month and county ﬁxed eﬀects,
controls, and county-speciﬁc linear time trends and population analytic weights. The
county data spans 735 counties over 26 states monthly from 2004-2014. Heroin incident
data: NIBRS. Oxycodone density data: DEA ARCOS.
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Fig. 1.7. The Eﬀect of the PDMP on Possible Heroin Dealers
The event study graphs plot the eﬀect of the PDMP on the rate over time of incidents
involving possible heroin dealers in all counties and in counties with high oxycodone
density. A possible heroin dealer incident is one where individuals 1.) are carrying more
than 2 grams of heroin, 2.) Are carrying between 1 and 2 grams of heroin and a large
amount of another drug, or 3.) Are carrying any heroin and were entered in the data as
selling any drug. Weighted regressions include county and time ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, and
county-speciﬁc linear time trends. Data source: NIBRS.
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Fig. 1.8. The Eﬀect of the PDMP on Opiate Incidents
The graphs display the event study of the PDMP on Opiate Incidents per 100,000
population. The factor model is used because diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcations do not
pass the parallel trends test, due to non-linear county-speciﬁc time trends that are
captured using the factor model.
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Fig. 1.9. The Nationwide Time Trend in Heroin Incidents, Obtained
from the IFE Factor Model
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the average time trend (time ﬁxed eﬀects) in the heroin incident
rate from the IFE factor model. Heroin incident data: NIBRS.

Fig. 1.10. Factor 1 From the Interactive Fixed Eﬀect Factor Model
on Heroin Incident Rate
Notes: The graph plots the IFE factor model’s factor 1 time trend. The red line marks the
OxyContin reformulation that made it harder to abuse. Within the IFE factor model,
Factor 1 is the time trend that accounts for the most residual variance.
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Fig. 1.11. Counties by Factor 1 Loadings
Notes: The map displays counties from the NIBRS data colored by each county’s
sensitivity to the Factor 1 time path from the interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model as
shown in Figure 1.10. Factor 1 seems to pick up diﬀerences in county responses to the
OxyContin reformulation, and the dark-colored counties perhaps have exceptional
sensitivity to the reformulation.
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Fig. 1.12. Heroin Incident Rate in Two Example Counties
Notes: The graph compares the raw heroin incident rate over time in 2 counties with
approximately 100,000 population. Spotsylvania County, VA is assigned a high factor 1
loading and Florence County, SC is assigned an average factor 1 loading under the IFE
factor model. The factor 1 time trend captures a non-linear increase in the heroin incident
rate over time, as seen in Figure 1.10, and Spotsylvania County’s data corresponds with
factor 1’s more dramatic exponential growth in the heroin incident rate over time.

55

Fig. 1.13. The Detrended Heroin Incident Rate in Two Example Counties
Note: The ﬁgure shows the heroin incident rate with the national time trends, county
ﬁxed eﬀects, and controls removed, for Spotsylvania County, VA and Florence County, SC,
which both have approximately 100,000 residents. The ﬁgure suggests that the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation alone does not capture the non-linear increase in the
heroin incident rate in Spotsylvania County and counties like it. Spotsylvania and similar
counties are assigned a high factor 1 loading under the IFE factor model, and factor 1
controls for a non-linear county-speciﬁc growth rate in heroin incidents. In contrast,
Florence County, SC follows the national time trend more closely and is not assigned a
high factor 1 loading.
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Fig. 1.14. Factor 2 From the Interactive Fixed Eﬀect Factor Model
on Heroin Incident Rate
The ﬁgure plots the second factor from the IFE factor model on the rate of heroin
incidents. The red line marks the reformulation of OxyContin, which made it harder to
abuse. Time periods 100-105 correspond to April to October 2012.
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2. THE EFFECT OF PHARMACIST REFUSAL CLAUSES
ON CONTRACEPTION, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASES, AND BIRTHRATES
2.1

Introduction
Emergency contraceptive drugs, such as Plan B, are controversial because many

groups equate taking the so-called “morning after” pill to a chemical abortion. Since
Teva pharmaceuticals launched the emergency contraceptive drug Plan B, there have
been instances in at least 25 states where pharmacists have refused to ﬁll prescriptions for the drug or provide the drug over-the-counter to patients based on personal
objections.1
In response to growing news coverage and public debate over patient access and
pharmacist rights, many states passed laws that explicitly regulate the extent of medical professionals’ rights to refuse to provide drugs and medical services. Some states
have passed laws or ruled in court cases that pharmacists must ﬁll valid prescriptions regardless of personal objections to the medications.2 Other states have taken
steps to protect pharmacists’ rights to refuse without providing transfers or other
accommodation to the patient. More states have lawed to allow refusal while requiring meaningful transfers to other pharmacies, balancing patients rights to drugs and
pharmacists’ personal beliefs. The eﬀects of pharmacist refusal clauses have not been
investigated. This paper is the ﬁrst to consider potential eﬀects of pharmacist refusal
legislation on contraceptive purchasing outcomes, sexually transmitted diseases, and
birthrates.
1

National Women’s Law Center Pharmacist Refusal Fact Sheet
For example, Wisconsin has speciﬁc legislation stating ”A pharmacy shall dispense lawfully prescribed contraceptive drugs and devices and shall deliver contraceptive drugs and devices restricted
to distribution by a pharmacy to a patient without delay.” (Wis. Stat. Ann. 450.095)
2
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This paper identiﬁes the eﬀect of “Expand” policies, which expand access to emergency contraception by prioritizing the rights of patients and require pharmacists to
ﬁll valid prescriptions, on multiple outcomes. I then investigate the eﬀect of “Restrict”
policies that restrict access to emergency contraception by emphasizing pharmacists’
rights of refusal without also providing patient protections in the case of a refusal. In
addition, this paper looks at the eﬀect of Collaborative Practice Agreements (CPAs),
which expand access to emergency contraception by allowing pharmacists to write
prescriptions for emergency contraception at the pharmacy counter.
This paper contributes to the literature on regulating contraception methods. It
is the ﬁrst to examine eﬀects of pharmacist refusal clauses that favor either religious
rights of pharmacists or patients’ rights to receive medication through the lens of legislation on emergency contraception. This paper also emphasizes substitution behavior
between contraceptives induced by such policies, as well as more commonly-studied
outcomes like sexually transmitted infections and birthrates. Collaborative Practice
Agreements (CPAs) have been addressed by other papers, but this paper is unique
because I consider possible substitution between contraceptive purchases and I ﬁnd
that CPAs increase birthrates, which is in contrast to other papers.
Even though Expand and Restrict pharmacist refusal policies favor diﬀerent agents
in the controversy surrounding emergency contraception, they have similar eﬀects on
behavior. I ﬁnd evidence that both types of pharmacist refusal policy induce a small
fraction of women (an estimated 1 out of 1,000 women, or 1 out of 200 women of childbearing age) to adopt the regular birth control pill, which reduces purchases of both
condoms and over-the-counter emergency contraception. There is not strong evidence
to suggest that either policy has an impact on rates of sexually transmitted diseases,
however there is evidence that the Restrict policy causes a drop in the birthrate among
black mothers, beginning 9 months after passage. Since both the policies consistently
have eﬀects in the same direction, it is unlikely that the causal mechanism of the laws
is creating or eliminating actual instances of pharmacist refusal, but that the passage
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of the laws draws the attention of some women who then respond by adopting the
birth control pill.
2.2

Background

2.2.1

Policy Environment

In 1998 the ﬁrst emergency contraceptive Preven was made available via prescription. Between 1998 and 2006, a prescription was needed to obtain emergency
contraception, necessitating a doctor’s visit. In 2006 the FDA ruled to make Plan
B One Step available over the counter without a prescription to men and women 18
and older. Prior to the 2006 announcement making Plan B over-the-counter, 9 states
passed Collaborative Practice Agreements (CPAs) to increase timely access to the
drugs. Since emergency contraceptives must be taken as soon as possible after unprotected sex or contraceptive failure in order to be eﬀective, states created agreements
where a pharmacist collaborates with a doctors’ oﬃce to write then ﬁll prescriptions
at the pharmacy counter. This allows women to receive both an oﬃcial prescription
for emergency contraceptives and the drug itself from an open pharmacy without having to make a doctor’s appointment. Alaska, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Washington passed Collaborative Practice Agreements before Plan
B was made available over-the-counter. Maine and New Mexico passed protocols
allowing pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception at the pharmacy counter
without partnering with a doctor. For this paper, I classify Maine and New Mexico’s
state-approved protocols as CPAs because both types of legislation similarly expand
access to emergency contraceptives.
Due to the controversy surrounding Plan B, there were many highly-publicized
cases of pharmacists refusing to ﬁll prescriptions for emergency contraceptives before
and after Plan B was made over-the-counter. By 2005, twenty state legislatures
introduced bills that would protect a pharmacist’s right to refuse to ﬁll prescriptions
for contraceptives (Teliska, 2005). Starting in August 2006, women and men 18 years
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and older could purchase Plan B without a prescription, however the $50 drug was
usually kept secured behind the pharmacy counter, necessitating communication with
a pharmacist or pharmacy employee.3 There were also publicized cases of pharmacists
or pharmacy employees refusing to hand men and women Plan B from behind the
counter.4 Surveys of pharmacists suggest that between 5% and 15% of pharmacists
report they would refuse to provide emergency contraception to a patient (Davidson
et al., 2010; Richman et al., 2012).
These individual pharmacist refusal cases were often followed by lawsuits and demands from activist groups on both sides of the issue to draft pharmacist refusal
legislation. Many states adopted a balanced approach, allowing pharmacist refusal
but also protecting patient rights by requiring pharmacists to provide meaningful
referrals to accommodating pharmacies or pharmacists. Other states still passed no
signiﬁcant legislation around pharmacist refusals. This paper explores the eﬀects of
policies that were passed that were imbalanced– that is, states that ruled to favor
patient rights and prohibit pharmacist refusal, and states that ruled to favor pharmacists’ rights to refuse without providing patient protections.
I deﬁne “Expand” policies as pharmacist refusal clauses that prioritize patient
rights over the rights of pharmacists to refuse and thereby expand access to emergency contraceptives by requiring pharmacists to ﬁll valid prescriptions. California,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Nevada, Washington, and Wisconsin established
these policies between 2004 and 2010, and are listed with start dates in Table 2.1.
Illinois’ law reads “Upon... lawful prescription for a contraceptive, a pharmacy must
dispense the contraceptive... to the patient without delay.”5 The strongly-worded
law also details what a pharmacy’s responsibility is if the drug is out of stock, and
3

A 2015 study by the American Society for Emergency Contraception found that as late as 2015,
only 14% of stores have emergency contraceptives available for a customer to pick up in the aisle.
The other 86% of stores either do not stock the drug or secure it with a plastic lock-box or security
cord or store it behind a counter–all requiring assistance from an employee.
4
A mystery shopper survey conducted by Bell et al. (2014) ﬁnds that 20% of men were denied
over-the-counter Plan B at pharmacies in New York. There have also been news stories covering
individual womens’ experiences being denied OTC Plan B.
5
Illinois Administrative Code Title 68, §1330.91 (j) 2005.
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requires pharmacies to return unﬁlled prescriptions to patients if the patient asks
for it. Washington passed a law prohibiting pharmacist refusal in July 2007, but in
November 2007 several pharmacists opposed to the requirement that they provide
emergency contraception sued the state, and the law was in limbo until December
2010, when a court ruled to uphold the Expand law.
I deﬁne “Restrict” policies as pharmacist refusal clauses that prioritize the rights of
pharmacists to refuse to ﬁll prescriptions for contraceptives or other drugs that violate
personal beliefs, without also providing patient protections like the requirement of a
meaningful transfer or even the return of the unﬁlled prescription to the patient.6
Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi and South Dakota have laws
on the books allowing pharmacists and other medical professionals to refuse to provide
medical services that are in opposition to their beliefs.7
2.2.2

Emergency Contraception

Emergency contraception can prevent 75-90% of unintended pregnancies that otherwise would have occurred after unprotected intercourse or contraceptive failure. A
regimen of emergency contraceptive pill consists of high doses of a progestin hormone,
and prevents ovulation if it has not already occurred. Although the active ingredients vary across diﬀerent brands of emergency contraception, most contain a larger
dose of the same hormones that traditional oral contraceptive pills contain. Emergency contraceptives cost between $15 and $70 without insurance, and large doses
of progestins have unpleasant side-eﬀects like nausea, fatigue and vomiting, so there
is reason to believe that women typically do not use emergency contraception as a
primary contraceptive method.
6

Arizona’s pharmacist refusal clause requires the return of unﬁlled prescriptions to patients, and is
the lone exception in this group of laws that allow pharmacist refusal without requiring transfers or
other accommodations.
7
South Dakota established an abortion-related refusal clause in 1998, but updated the wording of
the law and the deﬁnition of an unborn child in 2006 in such a way that it could apply to the refusal
of emergency contraception.
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Between 1998 and 2006, the mechanism of action of the drugs were widely disputed. Plan B, the most common name-brand emergency contraceptive, stated that
the drug prevents pregnancy in one of three ways: preventing the release of an ovum
from the ovaries, preventing sperm from fertilizing an ovum, or preventing the implantation of a fertilized ovum onto the uterine wall. Religious organizations like the
Catholic Church believe that human life begins at the moment of fertilization, and
thus many viewed emergency contraception to be an abortiﬁcant because of it’s third
stated mechanism of action.
2.2.3

Related Literature

Much of the public health literature on access to emergency contraception concerns
doctor and pharmacists’ knowledge regarding the drugs. Multiple pharmacist surveys
(Borrego et al., 2006; Golden et al., 2001; Ragland and West, 2009; Richman et al.,
2012; Van, 2005) suggest that a large fraction of pharmacists in the early 2000s did not
understand emergency contraception. In Richman et al. (2012), 46% of respondents
said that Plan B can act as an abortiﬁcant, and 56% said that the drug can cause birth
defects if taken by a pregnant woman. Similarly, Gorenﬂo and Fetters (2004) also
ﬁnds that 44% of responding pharmacists believed emergency contraception could act
as an abortiﬁcant, with some pharmacists unsure of the mechanism of action. Some
of the above survey studies ask about pharmacists’ moral attitudes concerning the
drug, and between 5 and 15 percent of survey respondents say that they either do
not or are unwilling to prescribe or dispense emergency contraception due to personal
objections.
While this paper is the ﬁrst to examine the eﬀects of pharmacist refusal legislation
on patient behavior and outcomes, there is an extensive literature on the eﬀects of
increasing access to emergency contraceptives more broadly. These studies examine
the eﬀect of expanding access to emergency contraception–for example, expanding
over-the-counter access nationwide, expanding pharmacy access across diﬀerent geographies, and conducting smaller-scale random control trials where women are given
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emergency contraceptives to keep at home–and do not address pharmacist refusal. In
a review by Raymond et al. (2007), 14 randomized-control studies on emergency contraception worldwide between 1998 and 2006 ﬁnd that increasing access to emergency
contraceptives causes the treatment groups to use more emergency contraception, but
has no eﬀect on birthrates or abortion rates.
Literature on public policy regarding emergency contraceptives also ﬁnd no eﬀect
on birthrates or abortion rates, but ﬁnd increases in risky sexual behavior, like unprotected sex and rates of sexually transmitted diseases. Durrance (2013) ﬁnds that
making Plan B available over the counter in 2006 increases STD rates and instances
of unprotected sex and has no eﬀect on abortion rates. Girma and Paton (2011)
studies increased access to pharmacies that provide free emergency contraception in
Britain, and ﬁnds that free emergency contraception causes increases in teenage STD
rates.
There have been several studies on the eﬀects of Collaborative Practice Agreements (Gross et al., 2014; Koohi, 2013; Zuppann et al., 2011), which study the eﬀect
of the CPAs on outcomes such as birth and abortion rates, reports of sexual assault,
and marriage and dating patterns. Gross et al. (2014) ﬁnd that CPAs do not change
either birth rates or abortion rates, but ﬁnd that provision of Plan B is shifted from
emergency rooms to pharmacies, and rates of sexual assault reporting decrease due to
the switch. Koohi (2013) studies eﬀects of both CPAs passed by individual states and
the nationwide over-the-counter expansion of Plan B in 2006. She ﬁnds signiﬁcant
birth reductions among single black women in response to the CPA, which provides
low-income women oﬃcial prescriptions (which can then be paid for by Medicaid) at
the pharmacy counter, whereas making the $50 Plan B available over-the-counter reduces birthrates among older married women. She argues this diﬀerence is due to the
out-of-pocket price diﬀerence between Plan B obtained through the CPA (and eligible
to be paid for by Medicaid), and the $50 out-of-pocket price of Plan B to those who
obtain it without a prescription. Koohi ﬁnds that outcomes of low-income women
are responsive to pharmacy regulation of Plan B, and I also ﬁnd that Medicaid-ﬁlled
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prescriptions are responsive to pharmacist refusal policies and the CPA. Zuppann
et al. (2011) also ﬁnds that CPAs cause a decrease in the birthrates among young
single white women.
2.3

Data
In 1990 Medicaid launched the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, and required

states to report drug utilization for covered outpatient drugs paid for by state Medicaid programs. The datasets are state-by-quarter drug counts by National Drug
Code (NDC). Drugs paid for by Managed Care Organizations are dropped because
Managed Care Organizations began reporting in 2010, whereas drugs purchased via
Fee-For-Service Medicaid are recorded through the entire time period of 1990-2014.
The Medicaid drug observations are matched to over 400 brand-name and generic
birth control pill types, as well as matched to brand-name Plan B emergency contraceptive and generic emergency contraceptives.8 As seen in Table 2.3, the typical state
ﬁlls 2.08 Medicaid prescriptions for emergency contraceptives per 1,000 Medicaid enrollees per quarter, and 27 prescriptions for oral contraceptives per 1,000 enrollees.
The Medicaid data covers birth control pills and suggests that about 2.89% of female
Medicaid enrollees are on the birth control pill, whereas other studies (Hurt et al.,
2012) suggest the real number is about 11% of women of reproductive age use the
pill.9
The Nielsen Retail Scanner database tracks all purchases within participating retail establishments over time, by Universal Product Code. The data covers more
than 35,000 grocery and drug stores across the U.S., containing more than half of
8

Generics ﬁrst appear in the Medicaid data in 2012 or 2013, with many brands becoming available
in 2016 as the FDA made generic emergency contraceptives available over the counter. Prior to 2014
or so, the FDA only approved over-the-counter access for brand-name Plan B.
9
This discrepancy is probably due to the fact that only fee-for-service Medicaid prescriptions are
used, whereas many women are covered through Managed Care Medicaid, which is dropped due to
poor data quality. Also, I used all Medicaid women in the denominator of the measurement instead
of those restricted to between ages 15 and 44. In addition, I assume Medicaid women are on the pill
for the full three months in a quarter, rather than adjusting for women starting and stopping the
pill from month-to-month.

65
total sales in grocery stores across the country. A map of coverage is shown in Figure
2.1. There are sales of more than 2.4 million diﬀerent products in the data. Nielsen
categorizes products into groups, and for the purpose of this project I isolate sales of
male contraceptives (condoms), female contraceptives (emergency contraceptives, female condoms, inserts and other female contraceptives), and pregnancy tests. Within
the female contraceptive category, emergency contraception is identiﬁed by its UCR
codes and separated from the rest of female contraceptives. I use only retail establishments that have full coverage in the Nielsen database from 2006 to 2015, and I
then aggregate counts of products by county and month. Table 2.3 lists the average
sales of contraceptive product by category per county and quarter. Each county sells
about 0.77 over-the-counter doses of emergency contraceptives per 1,000 residents per
quarter beginning in November 2006 after the FDA approval. This rate is less than
half of the prescribing rate per Medicaid enrollee for emergency contraceptives within
the Medicaid data, but the Medicaid enrollee population is more young and more
female than the general population used in the denominator of Nielsen purchasing
rates. The typical county realizes sales of 8.23 packages of condoms, 0.27 female nonprescription miscellaneous contraceptives (like female condoms), and 6.61 pregnancy
tests per 1,000 residents per quarter.
Birthrates are obtained through the CDC Wonder query system, which draws
from the universe of birth certiﬁcates to those born in recent years. For analyses at
the state level, detailed birth counts from 1995 to 2014 are used. For the county level
models, birth counts are available for years 1996-2014. At the county level, monthly
birth counts are coded as zero if the number of births is less than 10, making models
on birthrates among black mothers sometimes diﬃcult and incomplete at the county
level. The CDC sensors birth counts in counties with less than 100,000 population,
but birth counts in these small counties are backed out by subtracting the sum of
large county births from state births. Analyses are also performed on these aggregated
small county birth counts. For these small county analyses, I obtain controls by taking
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a population-weighted average of controls within the small counties, aggregated at the
state level.
Table 2.3 displays birthrates per 1,000 female population per quarter at the stateby-quarter level, at the county-by-quarter level within the available large counties with
population greater than 100,000, and the birthrates from aggregated small counties at
the state level. Birthrates are consistent across geographies, with an average birthrate
of 6.7 births per 1,000 women per quarter. White women have similar birthrates to
black women (5.6 and 7.6 births per 1,000 women per quarter), and Hispanic women
have higher birthrates (11.2 births per 1,000 women per quarter).10
2.4

Empirical Methods
For the main analysis of this paper, I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression

framework on state-quarter and county-quarter panel data. The identifying assumption of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation is the parallel trends assumption that
treated and untreated states follow similar growth paths prior to the treatment and
would have continued to do so in the absence of treatment. This approach identiﬁes
changes in trends within the treated geographies that correspond to the timing of
the implementation of the policy. I adapt the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models into
an event-study framework with policy lags and leads to support the parallel trends
assumption.
2.4.1

The Eﬀect of the Policies on Medication Outcomes

Using state-by-quarter Medicaid data, I ﬁnd the eﬀect of the CPA, Expand, and
Restrict policies on sales of prescription emergency contraceptives and prescription
oral contraceptives using the following model framework:
10

Birthrates to black mothers and Hispanic mothers diﬀer at the state and county level because the
CDC redacts the number of births if there are fewer than 10 births per month in a county in a
category of mothers by race. That is, if there are between 1 and 9 births to either black or Hispanic
women in a county in a month, the observation is coded as a zero.
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Outcomeit = α + βP olicyp,i,t + ΨXit + ιi + γt + it
P olicyp,i,t is an indicator equal to one if policy p ∈ {CP A, Expand, Restrict}, is
in eﬀect within state i by quarter t. The coeﬃcient of interest is β, and it captures
the eﬀect of the policy within the treated states, using untreated states as a counterfactual. ιi represents a state ﬁxed eﬀect that captures the overall level of the outcome
variable in a state and controls for characteristics of states that are not changing over
the time period of interest. γt is the time ﬁxed eﬀect, which controls for the national
trend in the outcome variables over the period of the panel data. Xit is a matrix of
controls, capturing changes in covariates within counties over time which may otherwise confound estimates of the policy eﬀect. Controls in Xit include the fraction of the
population that is black, Hispanic, or of other non-white race, the age composition of
the population, the poverty rate, average weekly wages, the unemployment rate, and
number of pharmacies per capita.
To test the parallel trends assumption required for causal inference of the diﬀerencein-diﬀerences framework, I adapt the above equation into a dynamic diﬀerence-indiﬀerences model with policy lags and leads:

m
Outcomeit = α + Σ−1
τ =−q ξτ P olicyp,i,τ + Στ =0 λτ P olicyp,i,τ + ΨXit + ιi + γt + it

In the equation, P olicyp,i,τ are indicators equal to one if state i in time t has a
policy take eﬀect exactly τ time periods ago. The policy begins at time period τ = 0.
For example, P olicyi,t,2 is equal to one if the policy took eﬀect two time periods ago
and zero otherwise, and P olicyi,t,−3 is equal to one if the policy will take eﬀect exactly
three periods from time t and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcients λτ measure the eﬀect
of the policy through time after passage. The coeﬃcients ξτ capture the eﬀect of the
policy τ time periods before passage and should equal zero. If the coeﬃcients ξτ do
not equal zero, that is a sign that the outcome is trending diﬀerently within treated
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states than within untreated states. For the main analysis, the dynamic equation
with lags and leads is presented in the form of graphs.
To ﬁnd the eﬀect of each policy on contraceptive outcomes, the outcomes within
treated states are compared to outcomes within “control” states that do not experience any policy. Table 2.2 contains start dates by state for each of the policies in
question (CPA, Expand and Restrict), as well as listing the set of control states that
do not pass a strong pharmacist refusal policy. For each policy eﬀect, a separate
model is run; eﬀects of the policies are obtained by dropping states that adopt the
other two policies and comparing treated states with control states outlined in Table
2.2. For example, to ﬁnd the eﬀect of the CPA, only the CPA states and control
states are used in the model, and the Expand and Restrict states are dropped.
Eight states – Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington– expanded their Medicaid programs to cover over-the-counter Plan
B in January 2007. I control for the Medicaid expansion in coverage in models with
an indicator variable equal to one in these states starting in January 2007.
CPA coeﬃcients are identiﬁed using policy changes in Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico and Vermont. Models use analytic weighting, and California is weighted heaviest in this group of CPA policy states
due to its population. Results associated with the Expand policy that favors patient
rights are identiﬁed oﬀ of changes in Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada, and Wisconsin.
California, Massachusettes, and Washington also adopt Expand policies during the
time period of interest, but either already have CPAs in place or establish a CPA
shortly after the expand policy is adopted. These states are dropped from the Expand policy models because the CPA is a more far-reaching policy than the Expand
policy.
11

11

The eﬀect of the Restrict policies that favor pharmacists’ rights to refuse

I was initially concerned that CPA results may confound or mask subtle responses from the Expand
policy within states that have both policies. However, results from models run on CPA and the
Expand policy simultaneously are similar to the main results where the policies are examined in the
separate regression models.
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are identiﬁed oﬀ changes in Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi,
and South Dakota.
2.4.2

Wild Cluster Bootstrapped Inference

Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach suﬀers from
over-rejection of the null due to unaccounted-for autocorrelation in the error term,
and show that this issue is exacerbated under cases where there are few treated panel
units. Since there are few treated states that adopt Expand, Restrict, and CPA
policies, this issue is of concern for this study. To remedy the over-rejection problem,
I use the Wild Cluster Bootstrap t-statistic-percentile procedure outlined in Cameron
et al. (2008).12 P-values obtained from this procedure are included in brackets for
most of the key results in the paper. Inference is drawn from the resulting p-values.
2.5

Results

2.5.1

Medicaid Prescription Results

Table 2.4 lists the coeﬃcients of interests on CPA, Expand, and Restrict policies
from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models run on Medicaid Plan B and oral contraceptive
rates. Each entry in the table corresponds to a separate model. Column (1) contains
estimates of the eﬀect of the CPA, Expand, and Restrict policies on the rate of
Plan B prescribing through Medicaid. It should be noted that Plan B prescriptions
in the Medicaid data only appear starting in 2004, and many states do not cover
emergency contraceptives through Medicaid.13 The CPA results are identiﬁed oﬀ of
12

This procedure involves taking the residuals of a model run without the independent variables of
interest (in my case, the Expand, Restrict and CPA) and randomly reassigning them within treated
clusters. The residual randomization disrupts the autocorrelation in the error term within clusters
that causes over-rejection of the null. The procedure then runs the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression
model on the data with the randomly-ordered residuals, and, bearing similarities to a placebo test,
obtains a distribution of t-statistics under the meaningless data. The real t-statistic is compared to
the distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics and is assigned a p-value equal to its percentile within
the distribution.
13
Some states that do not oﬃcially pay for emergency contraceptives still have emergency contraceptives paid for in the state drug utilization ﬁles, and these observations are used. For example,
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changes within Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Expand results
are identiﬁed oﬀ of Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada and Wisconsin. Restrict results are
identiﬁed using changes in the already-uncommon Plan B prescribing within Georgia
and Mississippi, and are likely not very informative. The CPA is associated with an
increase in Plan B prescribing,
The Expand policy that ensures patient access to emergency contraceptives is
associated with an increase in Plan B prescriptions, equal to between 1.3 and 2.6
additional emergency contraceptive prescriptions per 1,000 Medicaid enrollees per
quarter per state, but these results are not statistically signiﬁcant. The Restrict
policy, which protects pharmacists’ rights to refuse without oﬀering patient protections, is very noisily measured and is not consistent across model speciﬁcations due to
poor data on emergency contraception prescriptions through Medicaid in the treated
states.
The Medicaid drug utilization data has much better data coverage for Medicaid
prescriptions of traditional oral contraceptive pills. The CPA does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the rate of contraceptive pills per Medicaid enrollee,
although point estimates suggest the CPA may slightly decrease the prescribing rate.
The Expand policy is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant increase in birth control pills per enrollee, equal to 0.423 additional pills per enrollee per quarter and state
in the model speciﬁcation without state-speciﬁc time trends in Column (3). The addition of state trends mitigates the result to 0.0881 additional pills per enrollee in
the preferred speciﬁcation in Column (4). 0.0881 additional pills per enrollee is equal
to about 4,020 additional 30-packs of birth control pills in the average state with
an Expand policy per quarter, or a 12% increase. Since a quarter is 3 months, the
estimates suggest that 1,340 additional Medicaid-covered women obtain birth control
prescriptions through Medicaid in the typical Expand state in response to the policy.
This is a relatively small fraction of the 1,370,000 people in the average Expand state
Mississippi does not cover emergency contraceptives according to Princeton’s Emergency Contraceptive Website, but the Medicaid data records 201 Plan B pills dispensed between 2004 and 2011.
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enrolled in Medicaid. Figure 2.314 graphs the lag and lead eﬀect coeﬃcients from
the dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences version of the models in 2.4. The ﬁgure displaying the eﬀect of the Expand policy on the birth control prescribing rate graphs lead
coeﬃcients that are close to zero (albeit fairly noisy), meaning the parallel trends assumption is not obviously violated. The rate of prescribing seems to increase slightly
after the Expand policy is put into place.
Results in Table 2.4 show that the Restrict policy is also associated with increases
in the rate of birth control pills per enrollee, with the preferred speciﬁcation in Column
(4) showing a signiﬁcant 0.0962 additional pills per enrollee. 0.0962 pills per enrollee
is equal to a 26% increase in the rate of birth control pills per enrollee in the typical
state that adopts the Restrict policy. This magnitude is equal to 2,973 additional
30-day pill prescriptions per quarter in the aﬀected states, or 990 women adopting
the pill out of an average of 930,000 Medicaid enrollees in these states. The lower
right graph in Figure 2.3 plots the lags and leads of the adapted version of the model
in Column (4). The lead coeﬃcients are close to zero until 1 and 2 quarters before the
policy is put into place. This may be indicative of an announcement eﬀect; policies
are passed in state legislatures and then go into eﬀect at a later date. This ﬁnding
helps to motivate my speculation on the mechanism of action; since there is a slight
announcement eﬀect, women may be hearing about pharmacist refusal clauses in the
news and opt to start the birth control pill. The existence of the slight announcement
eﬀect does not support the possible mechanism of pharmacist refusal having an impact
on the prescribing rate of oral contraceptives.
Figure 2.3 also graphs Google searches for Plan B in the treated states around
the time of the implementation of the policy alongside the lags and leads coeﬃcient
estimates from the dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models. With the CPA policy,
the Expand policy, and the Restrict policy, there is a spike in Google searches for Plan
B in the year leading up to the implementation of the policy. I speculate that when
state legislatures introduce pharmacist refusal clauses and other policies related to
14

Note that standard errors in the graphs are clustered at the state level, but are not corrected for
autocorrelation and are most likely small because of few treated states in each policy group.

72
emergency contraceptives, there is an increase in public interest in Plan B and birth
control, which is captured by relative increases in Google searches. The spike in
Google searches for Plan B corresponds to a decrease in birth control within the CPA
states and an increase in birth control within the states that establish Restrict policies
within one year of policy implementation, however there is not much of a relationship
between Google searches and birth control prescribing around the time of the Expand
policies within states that adopt them.
Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show the eﬀect of the CPA, Expand and Restrict Policies, respectively, on the prescribing rate of birth control pills, with individual states
dropped. These ﬁgures allow one to determine if one state in particular is driving
the measured eﬀects. This is important to explore in this paper, because there are
few states treated with each policy, and population weights are used, meaning that
large treated states may drive results. In the graphs of the eﬀect of the CPA policy
on birth control prescriptions in Figure 2.4, one can see that California is driving the
decreasing trend in prescriptions around the timing of the policy. When California is
dropped, the measured eﬀect of the policy is a noisily-measured zero eﬀect.
Illinois is the Expand state with the heaviest weight, and Figure 2.5 still shows an
increase in the rate of birth control prescriptions around the timing of the Expand policy when Illinois is dropped. Expand states see an increase in birth control prescribing
around the timing of the policy, with a possible lead eﬀect due to announcement, and
the eﬀect is not driven by a particular state.
Georgia is the most populous state to adopt a Restrict policy, however Georgia
is not driving the eﬀect of the Restrict policy on birth control prescribing. Even
when Georgia is dropped in Figure 2.6, there is an upward trend in birth control
prescriptions after the Restrict policy is implemented, again with slight evidence of
an announcement eﬀect, as the increase in prescribing appears to begin in the quarter
corresponding to 0-3 months prior to policy implementation.
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2.5.2

Eﬀects of Policies on Scanner Purchases

Table 2.5 lists the eﬀects of the Expand and Restrict pharmacist refusal policies
on contraceptive purchases and pregnancy test purchases from the Neilsen Scanner
database. Since the Neilsen scanner data begins tracking purchases in January 2006,
I am only able to analyze the eﬀects of the Expand and Restrict pharmacist refusal
policies. Models are at the county and quarter level, and outcome variables are logged
purchases per population in a county, meaning entries in the table are interpreted
as percentage changes. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) contain results from models
run with county ﬁxed eﬀects and county controls, and Columns (2), (4), (6), and
(8) add county-speciﬁc linear time trends to the model.15 Once more, each of the
eight entries in the table are from a separate model using either the states that
adopt Expand or Restrict policies and the control states and dropping CPA states.
Column (1) contains estimates of the eﬀects of policies on over-the-counter emergency
contraceptives, which ﬁrst appear in the scanner data in November 2006, a few months
after the August 2006 FDA ruling to make brand-name Plan B available over the
counter. Column (3)-(4), (5)-(6) and (7)-(8) contain the model results run on rates
of condom purchases, miscellaneous female contraceptives (e.g. female condoms and
inserts), and pregnancy tests, respectively.
The Expand policy is associated with a 16.9% decrease in the purchase rate of
over-the-counter Plan B. Since the data runs from 2006 to 2015, this result is identiﬁed oﬀ of changes in Washington and Wisconsin law. Figure 2.7 graphs the eﬀect of
the Expand policy on the scanner outcomes, but only identiﬁes oﬀ of changes within
Nevada, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin because of the relatively late time
period coverage. In the Emergency Contraceptives graph, changes are identiﬁed oﬀ
of Washington and Wisconsin alone because data coverage in this category begins in
November 2006, leaving no pre-policy results to identify oﬀ of in Nevada or New Jer15

Models run on scanner outcomes are very sensitive to the addition of trends, likely due to few
treated states. The preferred model speciﬁcations are the models without time trends, because
introducing trends also introduces pre-trends into the dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences graphs.
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sey because these states established the laws in 2006 prior to the start of Plan B data
coverage. Consequently, the measured eﬀect of the Expand policy on Emergency Contraceptive scanner purchases is noisy in the dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences graphs,
although there appears to be a decrease in over-the-counter purchases in the ﬁrst year
of passage, which does not persist through later quarters of the post-implementation
period.
The Expand policy is also associated with a 5.87% decrease in the rate of condom
purchases. A 5.87% decrease in the rate of condom purchases is equal to 0.09 fewer
condoms per 1,000 population, or about 55 fewer condom purchases per month in
retailers covered by the scanner data in the average county that adopts the Expand
policy. The dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences graph for the eﬀect of the Expand policy
on condoms in Figure 2.7 shows that the policy is associated with a slight decrease in
condom purchases after passage, although this eﬀect is not entirely clear because the
lead coeﬃcients have a noisy seasonality to them. The graph is identiﬁed oﬀ of the
four states that adopt an Expand policy after the start of the data in January 2006;
Nevada, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin.
The Expand policy does not have a large or signiﬁcant eﬀect on other female contraceptives like female condoms. Column (5) shows an imprecisely-measured 8.36%
decrease in female contraceptives in response to the policy. The policy also does not
have an eﬀect on purchases of pregnancy tests, with the point estimate of a 2.2%
decrease in pregnancy tests, which is not statistically signiﬁcant. Looking at the lag
and lead coeﬃcients in Figure 2.7, there is a downward trend in miscellaneous female
contraceptives prior to the passage of the policy, and after the policy the treated
counties seem to return to the trend of the control counties. There is a noticeable
upward trend in purchases of pregnancy tests in the treated counties leading up to
the time of passage, where purchases even out. It is not possible to tell if the return of
the treated counties to the trend of the control counties that serve as counter-factuals
has anything to do with requirements that pharmacists must ﬁll valid prescriptions.
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The eﬀect of the Restrict policy on scanner outcomes is measured oﬀ of changes
to the policy within Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, and South Dakota. Under the preferred
model speciﬁcation, the Restrict policy reduces the rate of over-the-counter emergency contraceptive purchases in the stores covered in the scanner data, and does not
have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on purchases of condoms, other female contraceptives, or pregnancy tests. Lag and lead coeﬃcients of the Restrict policy are plotted
in Figure 2.8 and display the measured eﬀect of the policy on scanner outcomes over
time. The Restrict policy is consistent with a gradual decrease in Emergency Contraceptive purchases that begins within the ﬁrst year of the policy, matching a -12.5%
estimate in Table 2.5, or about 0.042 fewer emergency contraceptive purchases per
1,000 population in a county in a quarter; 5.33 fewer over-the-counter emergency
contraceptive purchases within the covered stores in the average county within a
state that adopts a Restrict policy. There does not appear to be a pre-trend in the
emergency contraceptives graph, but the lead coeﬃcient estimates are a bit noisily
measured.
The Restrict policy decreases the rate of condom sales in aﬀected counties by
4.7% when controlling for county-speciﬁc linear time trends. In Figure 2.8, there is
a downward trend in condom sales before the passage of the policy, but there is a
clear downward shift (even within the overall downward trend) that corresponds to
the ﬁrst quarter of eﬀect. This downward shift matches the estimate of -4.7%. The
eﬀect is equal to 0.20 fewer condom purchases per month per 1,000 population in a
county. This is about 190 fewer condom purchases per month for the average aﬀected
county.
There does not appear to be an eﬀect of the Restrict policy on condom purchases
or pregnancy test purchases in either the coeﬃcient estimates in Table 2.5 nor the
time paths graphed in Figure 2.8. The graph depicting the eﬀect of the Restrict
policy on other female contraceptives appears to show a decrease in the rate of female
contraceptive purchases for about 5 quarters after the policy is passed, but the eﬀect
does not persist past a year and a half. Neither does the decrease correspond to an
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overall eﬀect as measured in the models in Table 2.5, which estimates a non-signiﬁcant
4.53% decrease in other female contraceptives.
2.5.3

Eﬀect of Policies on STD Rates

Tables 2.7 and 2.8 display estimates of the eﬀect of the CPA, Expand and Restrict
policies on logged annual STD rates among women broken down into race and age
categories. The CPA increases the gonorrhea rate among all women by a marginally
signiﬁcant 20%, and the increase in STI rates increases around the ﬁrst year that the
policy is in eﬀect, as seen in 2.9. This is equal to about 11 additional cases per 100,000
population per year, or about 860 more cases in the average adopting state. This is
similar in magnitude to estimates in Mulligan (2016), who ﬁnds that passing overthe-counter access to Plan B causes a 5% increase in combined cases of chlamydia,
gonorrhea and syphilis. Durrance (2013) also ﬁnds that the CPA in Washington
state increased the gonorrhea rate by 16% within the state. This increase in the
female gonorrhea rate looks to be driven by cases among white and black women,
and increases within women across all age groups, but especially in women ages 20
and older as seen in Table 2.8. Women aged 14-19 and 20-24 make up the bulk of
gonorrhea cases and are weighted heavily in the overall STI rate, but the estimates of
the CPA within the 14-19 and 20-29 columns are not statistically signiﬁcant. Increases
in the STI rate of women 30 and older are large in relative magnitude, but STI cases
are much more rare among women in these age groups, as seen in the summary
statistics in Table 2.3.
Both the Expand and Restrict policies are associated with decreases in the STI
rates, with marginally signiﬁcant decreases in the overall gonorrhea rate, and rates
among black and Hispanic women. However, Figures 2.10 and 2.11 do not suggest a
large eﬀect corresponding to the timing of the policies. The states that implement
Restrict policies appear to have a downward trend in STI rates beginning two years
prior to the policy, and the states that implement Expand policies do not appear to
realize a decrease in STI rates that correspond to the policy. For the expand state, the
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measured eﬀect is 8 fewer cases per 100,000 population per year, or 564 fewer cases
per state. The Restrict policy is associated with 7 fewer cases per 100,000 population,
or 96 fewer cases in the typical Restrict policy state.
2.5.4

Eﬀects of Policies on Birthrates

Table 2.9 displays coeﬃcient estimates of the eﬀect of the policies on state-level
birthrates among all women, white women, black women, and Hispanic women in
Columns (1)-(4). Each coeﬃcient is the result of a separate model of treatment
states compared with control states. The preferred model speciﬁcation in Table 2.9
includes state and time ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, state-speciﬁc polynomial time trends,
additional state-speciﬁc polynomial trends past 2007 to better ﬁt state-varying drops
in birthrates after the recession, and corresponding population analytic weights.
The CPA is associated with a slight increase in birthrates, and the point estimates
of the eﬀect of the CPA is in the same positive direction for all racial groups of mothers. The measured 1.24% increase in the overall birthrates is statistically insigniﬁcant,
but appears to be driven by a statistically signiﬁcant 2.35% increase in the birthrate
among white mothers.16 Looking at the dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences graphs in
Figure 2.12, birthrates appear to be on an upward trend for white mothers in the
treated states prior to the policy taking eﬀect. However, there appears to be an additional level increase even within the upward trend among white mothers at the time
3 quarters or 9-12 months (marked by the second line) after the CPA goes into eﬀect.
This estimate is fairly robust across model speciﬁcations. Table 2.10 shows the eﬀect
of the CPA on the birthrate among white mothers across several model speciﬁcations,
and the positive direction of the result is consistent across models, with additional
state-speciﬁc trends making the estimates more precise. This eﬀect is equal to 774
additional births to white mothers in the average CPA state, which is home to 5
million white women of child-bearing age.
16

Finding a positive eﬀect of the CPA on birthrates is in contrast to other papers, which ﬁnd either
no eﬀect on birthrates (Gross et al., 2014) or a negative eﬀect on births among black mothers (Koohi,
2013).
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The Expand policy that prioritizes patient rights over pharmacist refusal is associated with a slight decrease in birthrates, as is observable in Table 2.9 in Columns
(1) amd (2). Upon inspection of dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences graphs plotted in
Figure 2.13, one can see that the negative coeﬃcient estimate is merely capturing
a downward trend in white birthrates within states that adopt the Expand policy.
There is also no change in the downward trends at the timing of the policy, leading
me to conclude that there is no discernible eﬀect of the Expand policy on birthrates.
On the other hand, the Restrict policy that prioritizes pharmacist refusal rights
without oﬀering patient protections is associated with a marginally signiﬁcant decrease in the birthrate among black mothers. In Figure 2.14, there is a noisilymeasured drop in the overall birthrate beginning in the time period 3 quarters or
9-12 months after the policy goes into eﬀect, marked by the second vertical line. This
drop is not statistically signiﬁcant, but appears consistent across demographic groups.
The birthrate among black mothers experiences a marginally signiﬁcant 1.16% decrease in birthrates due to the Restrict policy. It should be noted that this result is
sensitive to model speciﬁcation. Table 2.11 displays estimates from diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations of the eﬀect of the Restrict policy on black birthrates. The point estimates are negative in Columns (1), (2) and in the preferred speciﬁcation in Column
(5), but are positive in Columns (3) and (4). The model with state-speciﬁc linear
and quadratic trends in addition to state-speciﬁc linear and quadratic trends after
the Great Recession is chosen as the preferred speciﬁcation. A 1.16% decrease in the
birthrate among black mothers is equal to 76 fewer births to black mothers per quarter (compared to a mean of 5,967 births to black mothers per quarter in the treated
states).
In Table 2.12, birthrates are examined at the county level across the large counties
for which birth counts are available. Table 2.13 contains estimates of the eﬀects of the
policies on birthrates within small counties, aggregated to the state level. The CPA
no longer appears to be causing an increase in the birthrate within large counties.
However, the Restrict policy is still causing a small and statistically signiﬁcant 3.63%
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drop in the black birthrate. Small counties also realize an increase in birthrates
after the passage of the CPA, matching the state-level results. Aggregated small
counties also experience a 2.25% decrease in the birthrate among black mothers after
the Restrict policy, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant, likely due to few black
births within small counties, which adds additional noise.
The model that includes state-speciﬁc linear time trends, state-speciﬁc quadratic
time trends, and state-speciﬁc post-regression linear and quadratic time trends is
the preferred speciﬁcation because of overall trends in birthrates within states. I am
identifying small changes in birthrates that correspond to the timing of policies that I
expect to have either limited or no eﬀect on birth outcomes, whereas overall patterns
of birthrates vary across states by a much larger degree. These additional ﬂexible
trends help the model ﬁt the data. To illustrate the reason why this speciﬁcation was
chosen, Figures 2.15 and 2.16 display the white birthrate within California (which
is driving the CPA results because of population weighting) and the black birthrate
within Georgia (which is driving the Restrict policy results on black women). Both
graphs show curvature within the birthrate patterns over time, in addition to a drop
in birthrates throughout the great recession. Patterns in birthrates over time across
diﬀerent demographic groups and across states vary quite a bit, which means that
national time ﬁxed eﬀects do not capture pattern variation across states. Flexible
state-speciﬁc trends are added to the models to account for these patterns that are
not correlated with the timing of the policies.
2.5.5

Discussion of Substitutions and Magnitudes

Table 2.15 summarizes the relative and absolute eﬀects of each of the policies
on diﬀerent outcomes. The CPA increases prescriptions for emergency contraceptives
through Medicaid by 20%, and may cause a 7% drop in the rate of prescriptions for the
birth control pill, but these eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant. The CPA causes a
20% increase in the rate of STIs, which is in line with other papers that explore the
eﬀect of the CPA or other large expansions of access to emergency contraception. The
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CPA does not have a clear eﬀect on birthrates, but the point estimates are positive
and small, which is in contrast to ﬁndings in Koohi (2013) and Zuppann et al. (2011).
The Expand and Restrict policies both increase the rate of birth control pill prescriptions through Medicaid, by 12% and 26%, respectively. The policies also cause
a 1-6% decrease in condom purchases and a 12-17% decrease over-the-counter emergency contraceptive purchases, perhaps due to substitution onto the birth control pill.
The policies do not aﬀect STI rates in a robust or consistent way, but the Restrict
policy is associated with a small decrease in the rate of births among black mothers.
Table 2.16 gives estimates for the overall magnitudes of the Expand and Restrict
policies. Each estimated eﬀect is a calculation using the population of child-bearingaged females in the group of states that pass either Expand or Restrict policies. The
magnitudes in Column (1) are the aggregate eﬀect of the Expand policy across the
states that implement the policy within the time frame of interest: Illinois, New
Jersey, Nevada, and Wisconsin. This accounts for about 7.1 million women of childbearing-age within these states, and their typical rates of prescriptions, condom purchases, STI rates, and births. The magnitudes in Column (2) are estimates of the
eﬀect of the Restrict policy on women between ages 14-44 within Arizona, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi and South Dakota. Restrict states are home to
about 6.4 million women of child-bearing-age.
The estimates of the eﬀects of the Expand and Restrict policies are small in
relative terms. However, tens of thousands of women begin birth control prescriptions
in response to the policy when the rate of eﬀect within the Medicaid population (5
additional quarterly prescriptions per 1,000 child-bearing-aged women) is applied to
the aggregate population of women ages 14-44. This leads to a few thousand fewer
over-the-counter Plan B purchases and condom purchases per quarter, and 280-380
fewer births per quarter. The policies may be associated with a small decrease in STI
rates (about 100 fewer cases per year) but these eﬀects are not precisely measured.
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2.5.6

Conclusion

The use of emergency contraception is controversial, and instances of pharmacists
refusing to ﬁll prescriptions for drugs like Plan B were highly publicized in the early
2000s. States passed laws strongly favoring either the refusal rights of pharmacists
or the rights of patients to receive the drugs. These policies had eﬀects on women’s
contraceptive choices. There is reason to believe the eﬀects on womens’ choices are
not due to rare cases of pharmacist refusal, but are more likely due to press coverage
and womens’ concerns that they may be denied emergency contraception.
Both the Expand policy (which emphasizes patients’ rights) and Restrict policy
(which allows pharmacist refusal without key patient protections) both cause small
increases in the rate of birth control prescribing in the states that pass them, equal to
about 1 in 1,000 women on Medicaid responding to the policies by adopting the pill.
The pharmacist refusal clauses also cause decreases in over-the-counter emergency
contraceptive purchases, condom purchases, and non-pill female contraceptives, perhaps because women who are sensitive to the policies have substituted onto the birth
control pill. In response to the Expand pharmacist refusal policy, covered grocery
stores are experiencing 165 fewer condom purchases per county per quarter (or 55
fewer per month); in response to the Restrict policy, covered grocery stores are experiencing 570 fewer purchases per county per quarter (or 190 fewer purchases per
month).
Since more women adopt the birth control pill and fewer condoms are sold due to
the pharmacist refusal policies, one may expect that rates of risky sex would increase.
However, there is not evidence that rates of STIs are increasing in response to the
policies. If anything, there may be a slight negative eﬀect of the policies on STI rates,
although the measurements are imprecise. To speculate, this may be because women
who respond to new knowledge of pharmacist refusal clauses are more informed,
prepared and cautious.
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Although birthrates are mostly unresponsive to the policies, there is evidence that
the Restrict policy is associated with a small decrease in pregnancies among black
mothers. This result is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, and is robust under
many models at the state, large-county, and aggregated small-county levels, as well
as across model speciﬁcations, albeit with varying noise in measurement. This robust
measured eﬀect of the Restrict policy is small in magnitude, with a 1.16% decrease
corresponding to 76 fewer births to black mothers in the average quarter within the
typical state that adopts the Restrict policy. There is not evidence that the Expand
policy has an eﬀect on birthrates.
The Expand and Restrict policies were passed in various states, typically along
political party lines, in order to please diﬀerent groups of people. Pharmacists who
were against the drug wanted to express their religious beliefs at work and refuse to
provide drugs that were viewed as an abortiﬁcant. Reproductive rights activists and
women who had been refused the drugs wanted to preserve access to FDA-approved
medication, and protect the doctor-patient relationship. Strangely, the ultimate eﬀect
of the policies was to cause concerned women to adopt the birth control pill, forgoing
the controversial drug and causing a decrease in purchases of over-the-counter Plan
B.
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Table 2.1.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Medicaid Plan B
and Birth Control Pills
Policy
CPA

Expand

State
Alaska
California
Hawaii
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Vermont
Washington

April 2002
January 2002
June 2003
July 2004
September 2005
June 2005
December 2002
March 2006
February 1998

California
Illinois
Massachusetts

September 2005
April 2005
May 2004

Nevada
New Jersey
Washington
Washington
Wisconsin
Restrict

Date

Arizona
Arkansas
Georgia
Idaho
Kansas
Mississippi
South Dakota

Law

Cal. Bus&Prof. Code §733
Ill. Admin. Code tit. 68, §1330.500
Pharmacy board interpretation (2004) of
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 19(a)
May 2006
Nev. Admin. Code §639.753
November 2006
N.J. Stat. Ann. §45:14-67.1
July 2007-November 2007 Wash. Admin. Code §246-869-010
December 2010 – present
August 2008
Wis. Stat. Ann. §450.095
September 2009
1973
September 2001
March 2010
March 2012
June 2004
July 2006

Ark. Code Ann. §20-16-304(4)
GA Comp. R.& Regs. r. 480-5-.03(n)
ID Code §18-611
MS Code Ann. §41-107-1 to 13
SD Codiﬁed Laws §36-11-70
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Table 2.2.
Eﬀective Dates of Expand, Restrict, CPA, and Medicaid Policies
State
Alaska
Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
Montana
North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Vermont
Washington

CPA
Apr 2002

Expand

Restrict

Medicaid ’07 Control
Control

1973
Sep 2009
Jan 2004

Sep 2005
Control
Control
Control
Control
Sep 2001

June 2003

Jan 2007
Control
Mar 2010
Apr 2005

Jan 2007
Mar 2012
Control
Control

Sep 2005

May 2004
Jan 2007

Jul 2004
Control
Control
Control
Jun 2004
Control
Control
Control
Control
June 2005
Nov 2006

Jan 2007

Dec 2002
May 2006
Jan 2007
Control
Jan 2007
Jan 2007
Control
Control
Control
Mar 1998
Control
Control
Control
Mar 2003
Feb 1998

Jul 2007-Nov 2007,
Dec 2010
Aug 2008

Jan 2007

Wisconsin
West Virginia
Control
Wyoming
Control
CPAs or Collaborative Practice Agreements allow pharmacists to write and dispense oﬃcial emergency
contraceptive prescriptions at the pharmacy counter. Expand require pharmacists to ﬁll valid prescriptions.
Restrict policies legally allow pharmacists to refuse to ﬁll emergency contraceptive prescriptions on the basis
of their personal values or beliefs without oﬀering patient protections. Refuse-Accommodate policies allow
pharmacists and pharmacy employees to refuse to ﬁll prescriptions for emergency contraceptives, but legally
require the pharmacy to make accommodations for the patient.
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Table 2.3.
Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables
Outcome

Mean and
Std. Dev.

Medications and Contraceptives
Medicaid Prescriptions Per 1,000 Enrollees Per State Per Quarter
Plan B
2.08 (3.89)
Oral Contraceptives
27.01 (17.05)
Scanner Purchases Per 1,000 Population Per County Per Quarter
Emergency Contraceptives
0.77 (0.93)
Condoms
8.23 (7.33)
Female Non-Rx Contraceptives
0.27 (0.28)
Pregnancy Tests
6.61 (4.10)
Birthrates – Births Per 1,000 Female Population* Per Quarter
State Level Birthrate
Total
White
Black
Hispanic
County Level Birthrate – Large Counties
Total
White
Black
Hispanic
County Level Birthrate – Aggregate Small Counties
Total
White
Black
Hispanic

6.74 (0.92)
5.60 (0.76)
7.63 (1.44)
11.19 (3.03)
6.68
5.48
4.94
8.49

(1.41)
(1.22)
(3.68)
(5.31)

6.25 (0.81)
5.67 (0.70)
5.58 (2.68)
11.12 (3.64)

Female STI Rate Per 100,000 Population
State Level Female STI Rate Per 100,000 Population* Per Year
Total
116.3 (59.9)
White
28.4 (14.0)
Black
450.1 (211.9)
Hisp
53.9 (29.96)
Age 10-19
619.5 (350.1)
Age 20-29
577.5 (291.5)
Age 30-39
114.9 (52.4)
Age 40+
8.5 (4.1)

Standard deviation of variables in parentheses, weighted by population.
∗
Each white/black/Hispanic birthrate is calculated using the white/black/Hispanic female population or the fema
population in each age category.
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Table 2.4.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Medicaid Plan B
and Birth Control Pills
(2)
Plan B Rate
Pills Per 1000 Enrollees
0.420
1.239
(0.869)
(1.068)
[0.570]
[0.780]

(3)
(4)
Birth Control Rate
Pills Per Enrollee
-0.143
-0.0261
(0.0501)
(0.104)
[0.124]
[0.410]

2.626
(1.469)
[0.880]

1.273
(0.800)
[0.875]

0.423**
(0.183)
[0.953]

0.0881
(0.0670)
[0.879]

-1.473
(1.113)
[0.152]
X
FE
X
Controls
Trends

0.175
(0.274)
[0.770]
X
X
X

0.0708
(0.135)
[0.760]
X
X

0.0962*
(0.0536)
[0.909]
X
X
X

(1)

CPA

Expand

Restrict

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Inference is drawn from the Wild
cluster bootstrap T-test proposed in Cameron et al. (2008) and
bootstrapped p-values are in brackets.

Table 2.5.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Purchased Contraceptives, at County Level

Expand

Restrict
FE
Controls
Trends

(1)
(2)
Emergency
Contraceptives
-0.169*** -0.0347*
(0.0476) (0.0179)
[0.010]

-0.0613**
(0.0199)
[0.025]

0.009
(0.0184)

-0.125**
(0.0401)
[0.046]
X
X

-0.0109
(0.0387)
[0.458]
X
X

-0.047**
(0.0218)

0.0036
(0.0373)
X
X
X

(3)
(4)
Condoms

X
X
X

(5)

(6)
Female
Contraceptives
-0.0577
-0.005
(0.0565) (0.0733)
[0.171]

(7)

(8)
Pregnancy
Tests
-0.0457
0.0235***
(0.0172)
(0.00810)
[0.377]

-0.0453 -0.111***
(0.0313) (0.0159)
[0.371]
X
X
X
X
X

0.0336
(0.0976)
[0.617]
X
X

-0.0371*
(0.0215)
X
X
X

Table contains estimates from models run at the county and month level, with logged rates of contraceptive purchases
as the outcome variable.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Inference is drawn from the Wild cluster bootstrap T-test proposed
in Cameron et al. (2008) and bootstrapped p-values are in brackets.
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Table 2.6.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Purchased Contraceptives, at County Level: Large Counties With Population Greater
Than 100,000

Expand

Restrict
FE
Controls
Trends

-0.0628*
(0.0278)
[0.052]

(5)
Female
Contraceptives
-0.0247
(0.0537)
[0.377]

(7)
Pregnancy
Tests
-0.0600***
(0.0166)
[0.005]

-0.0458
(0.0211)
[0.106]
X
X

-0.0174
(0.0385)
[0.395]
X
X

-0.0466
(0.0401)
[0.239]
X
X

(1)
Emergency
Contraceptives
-0.137***
(0.0397)
[0.010]

(3)
Condoms

-0.1327**
(0.0402)
[0.018]
X
X

Models in the above table only use counties with population greater than
100,000 for which birthrate counts are available.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Inference is drawn from the
Wild cluster bootstrap T-test proposed in Cameron et al. (2008) and
bootstrapped p-values are in brackets.

Table 2.7.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on STD Rates by Race
(1)
All
0.201*
(0.108)
[0.915]

(2)
White
0.117
(0.138)
[0.717]

(3)
Black
0.107
(0.139)
[0.681]

(4)
Hispanic
-0.0396
(0.153)
[0.450]

Expand

-0.0978*
(0.059)
[0.068]

-0.0238
(0.098)
[0.412]

-0.0305
(0.084)
[0.392]

-0.0640
(0.162)
[0.373]

Restrict

-0.0495
(0.0108)
[0.252]

-0.124
(0.097)
[0.145]

-0.119*
(0.0542)
[0.086]

-0.311*
(0.143)
[0.057]

CPA

Table includes models run on state logged yearly female
gonorrhea rates per 100,000 females.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on STD Rates by Age Group
(1)
All
0.201
(0.108)
[0.915]

(2)
10-19
0.0834
(0.126)
[0.701]

(3)
20-29
0.166
(0.100)
[0.879]

(4)
30-39
0.339**
(0.118)
[0.977]

(5)
40+
0.345***
(0.107)
[0.995]

Expand

-0.0978*
(0.059)
[0.068]

-0.0578**
(0.074)
[0.211]

-0.134***
(0.047)
[0.015]

-0.195
(0.062)
[0.004]

-0.232**
(0.093)
[0.015]

Restrict

-0.0495
(0.070)
[0.252]

-0.044
(0.0642)
[0.266]

-0.0114
(0.069)
[0.433]

-0.140
(0.101)
[0.115]

-0.153*
(0.106)
[0.095]

CPA

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Inference is drawn from the
Wild cluster bootstrap T-test proposed in Cameron et al. (2008) and
bootstrapped p-values are in brackets.

Table 2.9.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Birthrates by Race
(2)
White
0.0235**
(0.010)
[0.959]

(3)
Black
0.0097
(0.021)
[0.628]

(4)
Hispanic
0.0171
(0.010)
[0.825]

Expand

-0.0062* -0.0116**
(0.005)
(0.004)
[0.032]
[0.075]

0.0111
(0.010)
[0.861]

0.0032
(0.007)
[0.668]

Restrict

-0.0060
(0.005)
[0.128]

-0.0116*
(0.006)
[0.067]

0.0065
(0.019)
[0.392]

CPA

(1)
All
0.0124
(0.007)
[0.751]

-0.0051
(0.006)
[0.301]

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Inference is drawn
from the Wild cluster bootstrap T-test proposed in
Cameron et al. (2008) and bootstrapped p-values are
in brackets.
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Table 2.10.
The Eﬀect of the CPA on White Birthrates, Across Model Speciﬁcations

CPA

(1)
FE

(2)
Controls

-0.0151
(0.0191)

0.0125
(0.0271)

X

X
X

FE
Controls
State Linear Trends
State Polynomial Trends
Recession Trend Controls

(3)
LTT

(4)
PTT

(5)
Recession

0.0329** 0.0230** 0.0235**
(0.0156) (0.0109) (0.0103)
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 2.11.
The Eﬀect of the Restrict Policy on Black Birthrates, Across Model Speciﬁcations

Restrict
FE
Controls
State Linear Trends
State Polynomial Trends
Recession Trend Controls
Drop 2011-2014
IFE Factor

(1)
FE

(2)
Controls

(3)
LTT

-0.0380
(0.0291)

-0.0044
(0.0292)

0.0196
(0.0135)

X

X
X

X
X
X

(4)
PTT

(5)
(6)
Recession 1996-2010

-0.0046 -0.0166*
(0.0152) (0.0059)
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
h̄: The IFE Factor Model nests ﬁxed eﬀects, and state-speciﬁc curvature over time.

(7)
Factor

-0.0095
(0.0117)

-0.0490
(0.0316)

X
X
X
X
X
X

h̄
X
h̄
h̄
h̄
X
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Table 2.12.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Birthrates by Race
Within Large Counties, at County Level
(1)
All
-0.0086
(0.0067)

(2)
White
-0.0644
(0.0417)

(3)
Black
0.0904
(0.0216)

(4)
Hispanic
-0.0018
(0.0261)

Expand

-0.0072
(0.0057)
[0.253]

-0.0061
(0.0068)
[0.222]

-0.0166
(0.0355)
[0.365]

-0.0035
(0.0094)
[0.520]

Restrict

-0.0036
(0.0047)
[0.371]

-0.0010 -0.0363**
(0.0056) (0.0338)
[0.018]
[0.505]

-0.0011
(0.0432)
[0.570]

CPA

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 2.13.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Birthrates by Race
within Aggregated Small Counties
(1)
All
0.0291
(0.0230)
[0.856]

(2)
White
0.0348
(0.0223)
[0.830]

(3)
Black
–
(–)
[–]

(4)
Hispanic
0.265
(0.0232)
[0.999]

Expand

-0.0059
(0.0063)
[0.265]

-0.0081
(0.0049)
[0.118]

-0.0103
(0.0167)
[0.425]

-0.0134
(0.0079)
[0.164]

Restrict

-0.0061
(0.0108)
[0.382]

0.0077
(0.0080)
[0.224]

-0.0225
(0.0163)
[0.318]

0.0028
(0.0379)
[0.532]

CPA

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.14.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Purchased Contraceptives, at County Level: IFE Factor Model
(1)
Emergency
Contraceptives
0.0255
Expand
(0.0265)
-0.0220
Restrict
(0.0151)
FE
X
Controls
X
Trends
h̄

(3)
Condoms

(4)
Other Female
Contraceptives
0.0559
-0.0192**
(0.0197)
(0.0097)
-0.104
-0.0767
(0.0104)
(0.0186)
X
X
X
X
h̄
h̄

(7)
Pregnancy
Tests
0.00778
(0.0099)
0.0531
(0.0090)
X
X
h̄

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
Standard errors are not bootstrapped, and inference is not drawn.
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
h̄: The IFE Factor Model nests linear time trends.

Table 2.15.
The Eﬀect of Emergency Contraceptive Policies on Purchased Contraceptives, at County Level: IFE Factor Model
CPA
(1)
Medicaid Rx Pills Per Quarter
Rx EC
+20%
Rx Birth Control
-6.9%

Expand

Restrict

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

+0.42 /1,000
-143 /1,000

+52.6%
+12%*

+1.27 /1,000
+88 /1,000

+416.6%
+26%*

+0.175/1,000
+96 /1,000

-16.9%**
-6.13%**
-5.77%
-4.57%

-0.21
-0.27
-0.03
-0.44

-12.5%**
-1.1%**
-4.5%
+3.36%

-0.09 /1,000
-0.60 /1,000
-0.02 /1,000
+0.29 /1,000

Scanner Purchase Outcomes Per Quarter
OTC EC
Condoms
Misc. Female BC
Preg. Tests

/1,000
/1,000
/1,000
/1,000

STI Rates Per Year
STI Rate
White STI Rate
Black STI Rate
Hispanic STI Rate

+20.1%*
+11.7%
+10.7%
-3.96%

+11.4 /100,000
+1.3/100,000
+27.3 /100,000
-1.4 /100,000

-9.78%*
-2.38%
-3.05%
-6.40%

-8.12 /100,000
-0.52/100,000
-18.5 /100,000
2.7 /100,000

-4.95%
-12.4%
-11.9%*
-31.1%*

-7.14 /100,000
-4.0 /1,000
+70.0 /100,000
-22.6 /100,000

Birthrates Per Quarter
All Births
White Births
Black Births
Hispanic Births

+1.24%
+2.35%
+0.97%
+1.71%

+.086 /1,000
+0.122 /1,000
+0.068 /1,000
+0.184 /1,000

-0.62%
-1.16%
+1.11%
+0.32%

-0.042 /1,000
-0.061 /1,000
+0.083 /1,000
+0.035 /1,000

-0.6%
-0.51%
-1.16%**
+0.65%

-0.043 /1,000
-0.31 /1,000
-0.093 /1,000
+0.084 /1,000

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16.
A Comparison of the Magnitudes of Eﬀects from the Expand and Restrict Policies
(1)
Eﬀect of Expand Policy

(2)
Eﬀect of Restrict Policy

+5 quarterly prescriptions /1,000 Women
35,615 women aﬀected
out of 7.1 million

+5 quarterly prescriptions /1,000 Women
32,013 women aﬀected
out of 6.4 million

OTC Plan B

-0.5 quarterly purchases /1,000 Women
3,561 fewer purchases per quarter
out of 55,400

-1 quarterly purchases /1,000 Women
6,402 fewer purchases per quarter
out of 42,400

Condom Purchases

-1.3 quarterly purchases /1,000 Women
9,260 fewer purchases per quarter
out of 478,000

-1.3 quarterly purchases /1,000 Women
20,488 fewer purchases per quarter
out of 320,000

-0.016 annual cases /1,000 Women
112 fewer cases per year
out of 17,622

-0.014 annual cases /1,000 Women
111 fewer cases per year
out of 21,392

-0.04 quarterly births /1,000 Women
281 fewer births per quarter
out of 94,330

-0.04 quarterly births /1,000 Women
318 fewer births per quarter
out of 116,799

Outcome
Birth Control Pill

STI Rates

Births

Rates are per 1,000 women of child bearing age; ages 10-44. Magnitudes are obtained by scaling the rates
of the eﬀect to the population of females of child bearing age across all states that adopt Expand policies or
Restrict policies; about 7 or 8 million women within the aﬀected states.
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Fig. 2.1. Counties with Grocery Stores Tracked in the Nielsen Scanner Database

Fig. 2.2. Counties with Birth Counts Available
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Fig. 2.3. The Eﬀect of the Policies on Medicaid Prescription Plan B
and Oral Contraceptives
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Fig. 2.4. The Eﬀect of the CPA on Medicaid Oral Contraceptives,
Dropping Individual States
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Fig. 2.5. The Eﬀect of Expand on Medicaid Oral Contraceptives,
Dropping Individual States

97

Fig. 2.6. The Eﬀect of Restrict on Medicaid Oral Contraceptives,
Dropping Individual States
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Fig. 2.7. The Eﬀect of Expand on Scanner Outcomes
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Fig. 2.8. The Eﬀect of Restrict on Scanner Outcomes
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Fig. 2.9. The Eﬀect of Restrict on Scanner Outcomes
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Fig. 2.10. The Eﬀect of Restrict on Scanner Outcomes

102

Fig. 2.11. The Eﬀect of Restrict on Scanner Outcomes
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Fig. 2.12. The Eﬀect of CPA on Birthrates
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Fig. 2.13. The Eﬀect of Expand on Birthrates
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Fig. 2.14. The Eﬀect of Restrict on Birthrates
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Fig. 2.15. Rate of Births to White Mothers in California Over Time
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Fig. 2.16. Rate of Births to Black Mothers in Georgia Over Time
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3. THE EFFECT OF OPIOID SUPPLY-SIDE
INTERVENTIONS ON OPIOID-RELATED BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENTS
3.1

Introduction
Currently in the U.S., the number of deaths from drug overdoses surpasses the

number of deaths from car accidents and gun homicides combined. The drug overdose
death rate doubled between 1999 and 2014, and 75 percent of this increase is due to
rising deaths from prescription opioids and their close substitute, heroin. Sales of
prescription opioids in the U.S. quadrupled over the same period, with health care
providers writing 259 million prescriptions for opioid painkillers in 2012 (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention Report 2014). Prescription opioid painkillers are
morphine-like drugs eﬀective for treating acute pain, but are habit-forming and cause
breathing to slow at high dosages.
State lawmakers have passed many types of policies targeting the supply side of
the market for prescription opioids to curb abuse and overdose rates. Because of
reports of drug-seeking patients visiting many doctors to obtain several overlapping
prescriptions at once (a practice called “doctor-shopping”) all 50 states have passed
prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) that track patient prescription histories. PDMPs only track prescription histories for drugs classiﬁed by the Drug
Enforcement Administration as controlled substances, and doctors are not required
to query the system. After the passage of the initial PDMPs, 12 additional states implemented usage mandates (“Mandates”) applying to the PDMP that require health
providers to query patient controlled substance histories in certain circumstances. 8
states have also cracked down on over-prescribing doctors and their pain clinics, where
the doctors over-prescribe opioids for proﬁt. They often dispense prescription opioids
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through an on-site pharmacy, prompting legislators to pass “Pill Mill Bills” designed
to limit excessive opioid prescribing. Purdue Pharma, the makers of brand-name
OxyContin, reformulated the oxycodone drug in August 2010 to be more diﬃcult to
crush and dissolve, deterring the main avenues for its abuse.
While the economics literature on opioid policies is expanding, almost all papers
have focused on policy eﬀects on patients or abusers. This paper is one of the ﬁrst
to focus primarily on four policies’ eﬀects on businesses, and is the ﬁrst paper to
consider business establishments at the national level. The policies examined are
PDMPs, Mandates, “Pill Mill Bills”, and the Reformulation of Oxycontin. This
paper uses a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy to study the eﬀect of the
aforementioned supply-side intervention policies on the rate of opioid-related medical
establishments at the county and state levels. I examine the eﬀect of the policies on
rates of three categories of opioid related businesses: rehabilitation facilities, doctors’
oﬃces, laboratories, and clinics, and prescription drug retailers and wholesalers.
I ﬁnd that “Pill Mill Bills” decrease establishments in the industry category of “all
other outpatient care centers,” (“All Other Centers and Clinics” or “AOC clinics”
from here on) which includes pain therapy centers and clinics in addition to sleep
therapy centers and clinics and community centers and clinics. The legislation leads
to a statistically signiﬁcant 6.54% decrease in AOC clinics (including pain clinics),
which is about 1.7 fewer AOC clinics in the average county covered by the data, and
17 fewer of these centers at the state level. Pill Mill legislation also may decrease the
number of pharmacies, equal to about 5 fewer pharmacies (out of 188 total) in the
average county that passes the law, but this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
I also ﬁnd that adding a “must access” Mandate to existing PDMPs is associated
with an increase in residential rehabilitation facilities, like sober living homes, in
the states that pass them. After the Mandate, the typical treated state realized 4.3
additional facilities.
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3.2

Descriptions of Policies and Related Literature
To curb opioid abuse, lawmakers in each state have passed various types of supply-

side opioid interventions. This paper examines the eﬀects of PDMPs and their Mandates, “Pill Mill Bills,” and the OxyContin reformulation on counts of opioid-related
business establishments. Research on supply-side policies have shown the laws reduce oxycodone prescriptions and amounts dispensed (Bao et al. (2016), Buchmueller
and Carey (2018), Kilby (2015), Mallatt (2017)) and have many other eﬀects on opioid users. The policies decrease many measures of opioid abuse, including opioid
admissions to substance abuse facilities (Dave et al., 2017), reduce doctor shopping
behavior in Medicare recipients Buchmueller and Carey (2018), reduce prescription
opioid overdoses (Meinhofer, 2017), and reduce violent crime (Deza and Horn, 2017).
On the other hand, supply-side policies have been shown to increase heroin overdoses
(Alpert et al., 2017; Evans and Power, 2017) and heroin drug crime (Mallatt, 2017).
All 50 states have implemented prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs)–
statewide electronic systems that track patient controlled substance prescription histories. A patient is entered into the statewide system each time he or she receives
an opioid at the pharmacy, and prescribers have access to the system. This allows
doctors, dentists, and other prescribers within the state to search for a patient if they
suspect opioid misuse. Due to low doctor usage rates, 12 states1 passed additional
usage mandates on top of existing PDMPs (referred to as “Mandates” from here on)
requiring doctors to query the databases under certain circumstances.2 PDMPs and
their Mandates have been shown to eﬀect the quantity of opioids dispensed (Kilby
2015, Mallatt 2017) and abuse outcomes such as overdoses (Kilby, 2015; Meinhofer,
2016)(Kilby 2015, Meinhofer 2017B), admissions to substance-abuse treatment facilities (Dave, Grecu and Saﬀer 2017, Radarkrisnan 2014), heroin crime rates (Mallatt
2017), and non-drug crime rates (Deza and Horn 2017).
1

Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia
2
Mandates legally require doctors to check when they’re suspicious that a patient is abusing, to
check with new patients or new opioid regimens, or to check before every opioid prescription.
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Whereas PDMPs and their Mandates provide practitioners with additional information regarding patients, eight states3 have passed menus of legislation, referred to
as “Pill Mill Bills,” to regulate and prosecute unscrupulous opioid prescribing. “Pill
mills” are doctors oﬃces, clinics and pain management centers that dispense opioids
and other scheduled drugs inappropriately or for non-medical reasons. These clinics are often cash-only, dispense opioid painkillers on site, and write prescriptions
with few questions asked. “Pill Mill Bills” speciﬁcally target over-prescribing practices. Details of the bills vary; some legislations require new state licensing for clinics
that dispense pain medication, some require establishments to register with state
department of health, others require physicians to have oﬃcial pain management certiﬁcation from reputable agencies, and many require physician-owners to be on site
at least half the time, or limit quantities of opioids permitted to be dispensed on site.
In the case of Florida, the “Pill Mill Bill” was accompanied by law enforcement
action and additional prosecution of over-prescribing doctors and practitioners. “Pill
Mill Bills” have not been widely studied with the exception of Meinhofer (2017A)
who examines the eﬀect of Florida’s pill mill crackdown. Florida was widely known
as the epicenter of the opioid crisis in the late 2000s. Drug-seekers from around
the nation traveled to Florida with conﬁdence that they could ﬁnd doctors willing
to prescribe painkillers to them. The legislation in Florida’s “Pill Mill Bill” of July
2011 prohibited doctors from dispensing painkillers on the site of the pain clinic
and revoked or suspended state medical licenses and DEA registrations of many
prescribers. As a result, the number of active pain clinic licenses dropped from
988 in 2010 to 407 in 2012. Oxycodone quantities decreased 59%, opioid substance
abuse treatment facilities increased by 33%, and opioid overdose rates fell. Besides
controlling for Florida’s Pill Mill Bill, this paper also accounts for similar (but smallerscale) crackdowns in Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and
West Virginia.
3

Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia
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This paper also examines the eﬀect of the OxyContin reformulation. In August
2010, Purdue Pharmaceuticals reformulated its best-selling OxyContin to be more
diﬃcult to crush into a powder. OxyContin contains the active ingredient oxycodone,
a powerful and widely-abused opioid. OxyContin is a 12-hour “continuous release”
drug due to its patented wax coating, which Purdue claimed prevented a cycle of
euphoria and subsequent crash that fosters addiction. Because of this continuousrelease mechanism, OxyContin was approved in extremely large doses of oxycodone,
including 80 milligram and discontinued 160 mg pills.4 Prior to the reformulation,
determined opioid abusers could crush OxyContin, circumventing the wax coating,
in order to snort, smoke or inject the resulting powder. Crushing the reformulated
OxyContin turns it into mush-like chunks, and mixing it with water creates a viscous
gel that clogs up syringe needles. The reformulation had serious ramiﬁcations among
the prescription-opioid addicted population. Studies by Alpert, Pacula and Powell
(2017) and Evans, Lieber, and Power (2017) ﬁnd that the August 2010 reformulation
of OxyContin explains much of the increase in heroin overdoses in the 2010s.
PDMPs and their Mandates, “Pill Mill Bills” and the OxyContin reformulation
have all been shown to have had signiﬁcant eﬀects on opioid abusers’ behavior. Since
these three types of supply-side legislative policies had signiﬁcant eﬀects on opioid
abusers, there is reason to believe there might be spillover eﬀects onto opioid-related
business establishments, including rehabilitation centers and clinics, doctors’ oﬃces,
and pharmacies. Meinhofer (2016) ﬁnds that pain clinic establishments in Florida
plummet after the Pill Mill crackdown, and in this paper I show that Pill Mill legislation causes clinics to close in the other states that implement them as well.
3.3

Data
The outcomes in question are opioid-related business establishments. State and

county counts of businesses, employees and wages by NAICS-code industry are taken
4

In contrast, commonly-prescribed, non-continuous release Percocet contains 5-10 mg of oxycodone.
Quick release pills are available in a maximum of 30 milligrams per pill.
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from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) dataset from 2004 to 2015. The QCEW is reported at the quarterly level
and contains counts of establishments by NAICS 6-digit industries. While the QCEW
has good coverage of establishment counts, it only contains employee counts and
wages for US counties containing 75,000 employees or more. NAICS codes of interest
cover businesses pertaining to the opioid crisis, including drug wholesalers, pharmacies, doctors oﬃces, outpatient mental health and substance abuse centers (excluding
hospitals), AOC clinics, medical laboratories, inpatient mental health and substance
abuse hospitals, and residential mental health and substance abuse facilities. AOC
clinics and medical laboratories are included in the analysis because some pain clinics
and pain management centers fall under the umbrella of these broad categories. The
drug wholesaler outcome is included because its covers prescription drug wholesalers.
Analyses using the QCEW are restricted to more populated counties with complete
panel counts throughout the 2004 to 2015 period.5
Table 3.13 lists the 6-digit NAICS codes used to obtain counts of the relevant
businesses, as well as the number of counties that have complete data of establishment counts from 2004-2015, and provides examples of businesses that fall into each
industry category. The category of residential mental health facilities includes smaller
residential drug addiction rehabilitation facilities as well as halfway homes and sober
living homes. Inpatient mental health and substance abuse hospitals applies to large
medical facilities dedicated to drug addiction and mental health treatment. Outpatient mental health and substance abuse hospitals encompass outpatient treatment
centers like methadone clinics where patients do not reside at the establishment. Doctors’ oﬃces is a wide category, including oﬃces of physicians, specialists, and surgeons.
Medical laboratories include pain management centers, but also many other medical
labs. The industry category of all other outpatient clinics (AOC clinics) includes out5

There are missing observations in the QCEW and only counties without any missing observations
of the NAICS-code of interest between 2004 and 2015 are used in each separate model. For example,
761 counties contain complete panel information on counts of residential rehabilitation facility establishments, so only those 761 counties are used to calculate the eﬀect of the policies on residential
rehab rates.
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patient pain clinics, which are most likely to include Pill Mills, however this category
also includes sleep disorder clinics and community health clinics which are not directly
tied to the opioid crisis. The pharmacy business category captures apothecaries, drug
stores and pharmacies, whereas the category of drug wholesalers covers a wide range
of businesses from the relevant prescription drug merchant wholesalers and the less
relevant razor blade merchant wholesalers.
Table 3.2 includes mean counts and counts per 100,000 population among each
outcome’s complete county panel. Covered counties for each NAICS code of interest are mapped in Figures 3.1 through 3.8. Note that complete county panels are
restricted to more populous counties that have complete information on counts of
establishments in each NAICS category between 2004 and 2014.6 Medical facilities
within the categories of interest are fairly uncommon; for reference, the there are
about 36 gas stations per 100,000 population and 12 supermarkets or grocery stores
per 100,000 across the entire US. Within the sample of counties that have residential
rehab clinics, the average county has about 4.8 clinics, or a rate of 5.54 clinics per
100,000. The average county of the 53 counties containing a inpatient rehabilitation
hospital has 10.49 hospitals on average, with most smaller counties containing one or
two hospitals and large metro counties in California, Illinois and Texas driving up the
average. 391 counties nationwide contain outpatient rehab centers, with an average
of 5 centers per county, equaling 7.23 establishments per 100,000 in those counties.
Pharmacies and doctors oﬃces are more widespread, with the majority of US counties
having complete panel information on the outcomes. Within this larger subsample
of the US, there are an average of 20.6 pharmacies per county (18.23 pharmacies
per 100,000 population) and 72 doctors oﬃces per county (42.30 doctors oﬃces per
100,000). Drug wholesalers, AOC clinics and medical labs are less widespread.
Table 3.14 contains analyses using County Business Patterns (CBP) data. The
CBP has wider geographic coverage of businesses by NAICS code, but interpolates
establishment counts when data is not available and is known to be less reliable than
6

More populous counties have higher concentrations of the medical establishments than the country
as a whole, which includes smaller counties in the denominator.
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the QCEW for business counts. The CBP is collected through surveys conducted
by the Business Registrar, whereas the QCEW is constructed using actual business
counts via unemployment insurance information. A later section contains results of
models using CBP data rather than QCEW data and explains the diﬀerence between
the QCEW and CBP in more detail.
To diﬀerentiate counties’ levels of oxycodone over time, I use the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) data. The ARCOS tracks all shipments in kilograms of oxycodone to each
3-digit zipcode by quarter. Each county’s/state’s 2009 level of oxycodone milligrams
per capita is used to ﬁnd the magnitude of the OxyContin reformulation on business
establishments. In addition, models of heterogeneous eﬀects across counties depending on their 2004 level of oxycodone milligrams per capita use data from the ARCOS.
3.4

Methodology

3.4.1

Diﬀerences-In-Diﬀerences

County level models run on each outcome variable only use data from counties
with a complete panel of the outcome variable between 2004-2015, and state level
models include all 50 states. I also include results from models run on the entire
panel of 3,200 counties, which codes missing observations as zero. The main results
are in the same direction and similar magnitudes under each approach.
To ﬁnd the eﬀect of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on local opioidrelated industries, I implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model. The parallel trends
identifying assumption of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences assumes treated and non-treated
counties are trending similarly before the implementation of the PDMP, and would
have continued to do so in the absence of the policy treatment. The models are as
follows:
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Outcomeit =α + ωP ostRef ormulationit + τ P ostRef ormulationit ∗ P reRef ormOxycodone
+ βP DM Pit + ηM andateit + φP illM illBillit
+ ΨXit + ιi + γt + ιi ∗ t + it
(3.1)
Outcomeit is county (state) i’s logged number of Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages residential rehabs, inpatient rehabs, outpatient rehabs, drug wholesalers,
pharmacies, doctors oﬃces, AOC clinics, or medical labs per 100,000 population in
quarterly time period t.7
P ostRef ormit and P ostRef ormit ∗ P reRef ormOxycodone control for changes in
the outcome variables in response to the OxyContin reformulation, which has been
shown to have a large impact on abusers’ outcomes (Evans and Power, 2017; Alpert
et al., 2017). P ostRef ormit is an indicator equal to one if the OxyContin reformulation has occurred–August 2010 or later.8 P ostRef ormit ∗ P reRef ormOxycodone
is an interaction term, multiplying a Post-August-2010 indicator by the county’s
(state’s) normalized mean 2009 level of quarterly oxycodone per capita from the ARCOS data.9 τ captures a level shift in the data after the OxyContin reformulation
that is proportional to a county’s (state’s) pre-reformulation oxycodone density, measuring intensity of treatment. τ is interpreted as the additional eﬀect on outcomes
that a county one standard deviation above the mean 2009 oxycodone level experiences compared to a county with the mean 2009 oxycodone per capita level. P DM Pit ,
M andateit and P illM illBillit are dummy indicator variables equal to one if county
(state) i has a PDMP, Mandate, or Pill Mill legislation bill in place at quarterly time
7

Logged establishments per 100,000 population plus one is used to account for zeros.
If not included, this would be nested in the time ﬁxed eﬀects and would not aﬀect results, but
is included in the model to see the overall level shift in outcome variables at the timing of the
reformulation.
9
The mean county (state) 2009 oxycodone per capita is subtracted from each county’s (state’s) 2009
level of oxycodone per capita and then divided by the standard deviation of the distribution of
county oxycodone per capita.
8
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period t. The coeﬃcients of interest are ω, τ , β, η, and φ which measure eﬀects of
the supply-side policies on the outcome variable.
Xit is a county (state) and quarter set of controls, including the fraction of the
population in the county (state) in the age groups: 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59,
60-69 and 70+. I also control for the fraction of the county (state) population that is
black, Hispanic, or of other non-white race, as well as the gender ratio, unemployment
rate, average weekly wage rate, fraction of the workforce working in manufacturing,
and fraction of the workforce working in agriculture within each county (state). ιi is a
county (state) ﬁxed eﬀect, which controls for each county’s average level of outcome
variable. γt is a time ﬁxed eﬀect, controlling for national trends in the outcome
variable. ιi ∗ t accounts for county (state) linear time trends. Models use analytic
county (state) population weights.
I extend the equation above into an event study diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model
with policy lags and leads, in the form:

Outcomeit =α + ωP ostRef ormit + τ P ostRef ormit ∗ P reRef ormOxycodone
+ Σ10
p=−5 βp P DM Pi,t+p + ηM andateit + φP illM illBillit

(3.2)

+ ΨXit + ιi + γt + ιi ∗ t + it
P DM Pi,t+p is an indicator equal to one if the policy started in county (state) i in
the time t + p, and is zero for all other time periods. The coeﬃcients βp capture the
measured eﬀect of the PDMP p periods after passage. For example, if p = 2, βi,t+2
would capture the eﬀect of the policy on the outcome variable 2 periods after passage.
Negative values of p correspond to “leads”, which capture the eﬀect of the policy
before it is implemented and should be zero under the parallel trends assumption
of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology. Event studies for the Mandate and Pill
Mill Bills are adapted from Equation 3.2, replacing lags and leads of P DM Pi,t+p with
M andatei,t+p or P illM illBilli,t+p .
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3.5

Results
Table 3.4 displays coeﬃcient results from the model in equation 3.1 on logged

opioid-related establishments per 100,000 population conducted at the state level.
The model speciﬁcation includes state and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects, state controls, and
state-speciﬁc linear time trends. Table 3.5 displays coeﬃcient results from the model
in equation 3.1 on logged establishments per 100,000 population plus one at the county
level, accounting from county and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects, controls and county-speciﬁc
linear time trends. Table 3.6 list results at the county level using the full panel of
data, where missing observations have been coded as zeros. The main ﬁndings are
robust across these diﬀering methods. Each column in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 correspond
to a separate model.
Columns (1) through (8) display policy eﬀects on residential substance abuse
facilities, inpatient mental health and substance abuse centers, outpatient mental
health and substance abuse centers, doctors oﬃces, medical laboratories, AOC clinics
(including pain therapy clinics), pharmacies, and drug wholesalers, respectively.
Each column displays coeﬃcient estimates of the OxyContin reformulation. The
average eﬀect across counties of the reformulation is nested in the time ﬁxed effects. The models allow for heterogeneous intensity-of-treatment eﬀects in “PostReformulation x OxyDense,” which is interpreted as the additional eﬀect of the reformulation on a state (county) with oxycodone density one standard deviation above
the mean. For example, Column (2) of Table 3.4 shows a “Post-Reform x OxyDense”
coeﬃcient of 0.0302, which means a state with oxycodone density one standard deviation above the mean level experiences a 3.02% increase in inpatient mental health
and drug abuse hospitals after the OxyContin reformulation in comparison to states
with the mean level of oxycodone per capita. The “PDMP,” “Mandate,” and “Pill
Mill Bill” list coeﬃcients on policy indicators.
Column (1) of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 list the estimates of the results for residential
rehab establishments, which include “sober living” homes, substance abuse homes,
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and drug addiction rehabilitation facilities that are not hospitals. Neither the OxyContin reformulation nor the PDMPs without mandates appear to have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on residential rehabilitation facilities. The Mandate is associated with a 1.5%
increase at the state level and a 2.5% increase at the county level in the rate of residential rehabs, but the estimated eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant. Examining
Figure 3.9, there is not a clear eﬀect of the PDMP, but there is an increase in the
rate of facilities around the timing of the Mandate, and there is not evidence that
the parallel trends assumption is violated. The treated states and counties are experiencing an increasing rate of residential facilities even before the Pill Mill Bill is
passed, and there is not visual evidence that the trend is changing in response to the
policy. The Mandate may be causing a 2.5% increase in residential facilities at the
county level, which is equivalent to 0.065 additional residential rehabs per 100,000
population, or about 1 additional facility in the (typically more populous) counties
that have a complete panel on residential rehabilitation facilities. The 1.5% increase
at the state level is equal to 0.033 additional facilities per 100,000 population or 4.3
extra businesses for the typical state. In Table 3.6, the Mandate is associated with a
0.99% increase in the rate of residential rehab facilities across the full panel of 3,200
counties. This is equal to 0.24 additional facilities in the typical aﬀected county.
In Column (2), the results for inpatient hospital rehabilitation centers are listed.
This industry category includes drug addiction rehab hospitals, mental health hospitals, and detoxiﬁcation hospitals. These facilities are very uncommon and only consistently recorded in 346 populous counties. None of the policies consistently eﬀect
rehabilitation hospitals. Coeﬃcients for the Mandate and Pill Mill Bill are statistically
signiﬁcant on hospitals, Figure 3.10 shows violations in the parallel trends assumption. The post-policy eﬀect appears to follow trends already present in the treated
states. The interaction between the OxyContin reformation and pre-reformulation
levels of oxycodone is statistically signiﬁcant at the state and county level. The coefﬁcients of 0.0302 and 0.0154 imply that states or counties with an oxycodone density
one standard deviation above the mean experience 3.02% or 1.54% more rehabilita-
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tion hospitals after the reformulation in comparison to a county with an average level
of oxycodone. The average county has 68 milligrams of oxycodone per capita shipped
to it per quarter, and a county one standard deviation above the mean has 114 milligrams per capita in oxycodone shipments.10 1.5% or 3% is equivalent to 0.013-0.026
additional hospitals per 100,000 population, or 0.24-0.48 additional hospitals in the
counties with complete panel data.
Column (3) contains estimates of the policy eﬀects on outpatient rehab centers,
which include methadone clinics and other alcohol and drug rehabilitation clinics with
outpatient treatment. There are neither consistent nor large eﬀects of the policies on
the rate of outpatient clinics. Examining Figure 3.11, one can see that the PDMP is
implemented amidst an upward trend in the rate of clinics, and Mandates and Pill
Mill Bills also have trends in the outcome variable prior to the policies taking eﬀect.
Eﬀects are noisily measured. I cannot conclude that outpatient treatment clinics are
responsive to supply-side policies.
Column (4) lists policy coeﬃcients from the model run on the rate of doctors’
oﬃces, including those of physicians, specialists and surgeons. The policies do not affect the rate of doctors’ oﬃces. The PDMP is associated with positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient estimates, but upon viewing Figure 3.12, one can attribute this estimate
to an overall downward trend in the rate of doctor’s oﬃces within treated states that
does not appear to have anything to do with the timing of the PDMP.
Column (5) displays estimates of eﬀects on medical laboratories, which is a broad
category of medical facilities, but can include pain management centers. The coefﬁcient on the PDMP policy is consistent at the state and county level, but appears
to violate the parallel trends assumption across all policies as seen in Figure 3.13.
I cannot conclude that any policy has an eﬀect on the rate of medical labs because
treated states and counties are trending diﬀerently than untreated states and counties. Even within the trend, there does not appear to be a change in the downward
trends around the timing of any of the policies.
10

A Percocet contains 5-10 milligrams of oxycodone per pill, and OxyContin comes in doses ranging
from 5 milligrams to 160 milligrams per pill.
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Column (6) shows results for “All Other Clinic” (AOC) clinics, which include
outpatient pain therapy centers and clinics as well as sleep disorder clinics and community health centers. These clinics respond strongly to the implementation of the
Pill Mill Bills, which speciﬁcally target doctors’ oﬃces that prescribe opioids on-site.
At both the state and county levels, the Pill Mill Bill is causing a statistically signiﬁcant and robust 6-7% decrease in the rate of these clinics.11 This is equivalent to
1.7 fewer AOC clinics in the average county and 17 fewer AOC clinics in the average
state. 17 fewer AOC clinics in the average state is a relatively small estimate when
compared to the eﬀect of the Florida pill mill crackdown in 2011. The number of
active pain clinic licenses fell from 988 to 407 (Meinhofer 2017A), a decrease of 581
clinics. The PDMP is associated with a slight 2.05% increase in the rate of AOC
clinics, but this result is less precisely measured. This is equal to 0.74 additional
clinics in the average county, or 6-7 additional clinics in the typical state. In Figure
3.14, the policy eﬀects of the PDMP and Pill Mill Bill seem to take eﬀect at the
start of the implementation of the policies. The graphs for the PDMP at the state
and county level show a level shift in the rate of clinics consistent with the start of
the policy. The graphs for the Pill Mill Bill show a slight downward trend in clinics
before the policy goes into eﬀect, but the trend steepens sharply after the policy takes
eﬀect. In 3.6, Column (6) also shows a signiﬁcant decrease in the rate of AOC clinics
in response to the Pill Mill Bill. The coeﬃcient -5.16% is equal to 0.95 fewer clinics
in the typical aﬀected county, slightly smaller than the estimate from the models run
on the selection of counties with a complete panel.
Column (7) lists the coeﬃcients measuring the eﬀect of policies on the rate of
pharmacies within the covered counties. Neither models at the state nor county levels
ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the policies on the rate of pharmacies. Figure
3.15 suggests that the PDMP and Pill Mill Bill may have a slight negative eﬀect on
pharmacies (equal to a 2.6% and 2.9% decrease, respectively) at the state and county
11

This result is robust under an interactive ﬁxed eﬀects model speciﬁcation, robust to bootstrapping
standard errors, and robust to the removal of any one Pill Mill Bill state from the models (including
the removal of Florida).
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levels, but these eﬀects are noisily measured and cannot be statistically diﬀerentiated
from a zero eﬀect. This is equivalent to 0.43 fewer pharmacies per 100,000 population
or about 5 fewer pharmacies (out of 188 pharmacies) in the average covered county.
When all counties are included in Table 3.6, a similar 2.65% decrease in pharmacies
is equal to 4.8 fewer pharmacies (out of 187) in the typical county.
Column (8) contains results for the models on drug wholesalers, which covers
prescription drug merchant wholesalers which may be inﬂuenced by the policies, as
well as vitamin merchant wholesalers, razor blade merchant wholesalers, and many
other businesses that are not likely aﬀected by the policies. In both Tables 3.4 and 3.5,
estimates of policy eﬀects are around zero. The exception is the Mandate policy; at
both the state and county levels, the Mandate policy is associated with a decreasing
rate of drug wholesalers, but this is the product of an overall downward trend in
drug wholesalers within the treated states and counties, as can be seen in Figure
3.16. There is not a notable eﬀect of the policies on this broadly deﬁned category of
businesses.
In summary, the Mandate causes an increase in the rate of residential rehabilitation facilities (which include sober homes and substance abuse halfway homes),
however this result is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The Pill Mill Bill is causing
AOC clinics (a category that contains counts of pain clinics) to close, and has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect that is consistent across many speciﬁcations. Robustness
tests of these results across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations are listed in Tables 3.8 and
3.7.
3.5.1

Robustness of Main Results

Table 3.7 lists coeﬃcients of the Pill Mill Bill on AOC clinics across diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations. The Pill Mill Bill eﬀect on the rate of AOC clinics is robust,
but under the model speciﬁcations without county-speciﬁc linear time trends, the
point estimate reverses signs. Figure 3.17 graphs the eﬀect of the Pill Mill Bills on
AOC clinics over time under the model with ﬁxed eﬀects and controls but no linear
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trends, and suggests the positive point estimate is due to an upward trend in AOC
clinics over time within treated states that is ﬁltered out with the addition of countyspeciﬁc trends. The rate of AOC clinics decreases as soon as the Pill Mill legislation
goes into eﬀect.
The eﬀect of a Mandate added to existing PDMPs on the rate of residential
rehabilitation facilities is more noisy, as seen in Table 3.8. Point estimates are typically
between 0.01 and 0.03, with Column (6) containing a notable exception. Figure 3.18
graphs the lags and leads of a model of the eﬀect of the Mandate on rehabs over
time under the speciﬁcation which includes ﬁxed eﬀects and controls while leaving
out county-speciﬁc linear time trends. The rate of residential rehab centers begins a
noisy upward trend after the Mandate goes into eﬀect.
While from Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the Pill Mill Bills have a negative but insigniﬁcant
eﬀect on the rate of pharmacies, the measured eﬀect is sensitive to model speciﬁcation.
Results in Table 3.9 display coeﬃcients of Pill Mill Bills under diﬀerent models.
The measured eﬀect is sensitive to the addition of county-speciﬁc time trends and
switches from a positive eﬀect to a negative eﬀect once linear trends are accounted
for. Event study graphs of the eﬀect of the Pill Mill Bill excluding and including
county-speciﬁc linear time trends are plotted in Figure 3.19. When linear time trends
are not included, the treated counties experience an upward trend in the rate of
pharmacies per capita, and the upward trend ﬂattens out around the time the Pill
Mill Bill goes into eﬀect. The point estimate of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model
corresponding to the left graph is signiﬁcant and positive because of the pre-existing
trend. Adding county-speciﬁc trends in the right graph accounts for the upward trend
in treated counties prior to treatment, and the rate of pharmacies decreases after the
passage of the law. Under both speciﬁcations, the Pill Mill Bill is associated with a
decrease in the rate of pharmacies.
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3.5.2

Heterogeneity of Policy Eﬀects Across Counties

Previous studies that examine the eﬀects of supply side policies on opioid-related
outcomes ﬁnd the interventions have concentrated eﬀects within counties with a
higher rate of oxycodone milligrams per capita (Alpert et al., 2017; Evans and Power,
2017; Mallatt, 2017). To investigate whether or not supply-side policies have stronger
eﬀects on business establishments within more opioid-dense counties, I perform analyses on establishments within the top 25% of counties in terms of oxycodone milligrams
per capita in 2004, obtained from the ARCOS dataset. Table 3.11 lists coeﬃcients
from the model including ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, and county-speciﬁc linear time trends
within oxycodone-dense counties in each outcome’s complete panel selected sample.
Table 3.12 lists coeﬃcients for models run across the top 25% of oxycodone dense
counties across the entire sample of 3,200 counties, using 800 counties in each model.
Results are similar across samples.
Column (1) shows that within the most opioid-dense counties, the Mandate significantly increases the rate of residential rehabilitation facilities by 4.76%. This eﬀect is
both more statistically signiﬁcant and larger than the 1.5-2.5% increase in residential
rehabs in the main result tables. Column (6) suggests that the Pill Mill Bill is associated with a 6.7% decrease in AOC clinics, which is similar to the 6-7% decrease in
clinics in the main analyses across all counties. Column (7) shows a statistically signiﬁcant 5.9% drop in the rate of pharmacies within opioid-dense counties, compared
to the insigniﬁcant 2.15-2.85% drop in pharmacies across all counties.
3.5.3

Analyses Performed on County Business Patterns Establishment
Counts

At the county level, the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
and County Business Patterns (CBP) have a few diﬀerences. The QCEW has more
accurate counts of establishments, but more missing counts than the CBP, requiring
incomplete counties to be dropped from the main analysis. In addition, the QCEW
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and CBP list diﬀerent counts of businesses by industry at the county level for complete
counties. The CBP conducts censuses through the Business Registrar, and suﬀers
from nonsampling errors. The QCEW, in contrast, is constructed from unemployment
insurance claims and includes actual business counts rather than estimates obtained
from census surveys. The QCEW is more reliable at the county level, but counties
do not have complete panels of counts of establishments.12
Table 3.13 displays summary statistics of establishments per 100,000 population
in the QCEW data used in the main text and in the CBP data. The CBP rate
covers more counties and draws from fewer establishments, which helps explain why
the CBP rate is always lower than the QCEW rate of establishments. The most
dramatic diﬀerence between the datasets is across inpatient rehabilitation hospitals,
likely because only 346 highly-populated counties contain inpatient establishments.
The QCEW drops many counties containing zero inpatient facilities.
Table 3.14 lists the estimates for the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on business
establishments in the CBP. Consistent with the results in the main text, Pill Mill Bills
are found to decrease the rate of AOC clinics, a category which encompasses pain
therapy clinics, by a signiﬁcant 3.1%. This is equivalent to 1.13 fewer AOC clinics
within the average county, which is a similar magnitude to the 1.7 fewer AOC clinics
in the average QCEW-covered county. It’s reasonable that the CBP estimate is closer
to zero because many small unaﬀected counties are included in the CBP model that
never have AOC clinics and do not respond to the policies.
In contrast to the results in the main text, Table 3.14 does not show signiﬁcant
eﬀects of the PDMP on doctors’ oﬃces nor signiﬁcant eﬀects of the Mandate on
inpatient hospitals. These discrepancies may be due to the under-sampling errors
within the CBP.
12

Diﬀerent statistical disclosure limitation methods are used in the QCEW and CBP as well, with
CBP censoring individual establishments then aggregating and QCEW aggregating establishments
and then censoring certain aggregate counts. QCEW workplace is an establishment in the Quarterly
Workforce Indicator (QWI) data, produced by the Longitudinal Emplyoer-Household Dynamics
program at the US Census Bureau, which tabulates measures from UI wage records. The CBP are
published by the Census Bureau from inputs based on its employer Business Registrar.
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3.6

Conclusion
While there is a considerable and rapidly-expanding literature on the eﬀects of

opioid supply policies on health and behavioral outcomes of patients and abusers, little is known about the eﬀect of such policies on opioid-related industries. This paper
measures the eﬀects of PDMPs, “must access” Mandates, “Pill Mill Bills,” and the
2010 reformulation of OxyContin on the number of businesses in several industry categories, covering rehabilitation centers, doctors’ oﬃces and clinics, and drug retailers
and wholesalers. Opioid-related business establishment counts per 100,000 population by industry are obtained from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.
Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, I show that Pill Mill Bills cause a signiﬁcant
decline the number of “All Other Clinics” (which encompasses pain therapy centers)
per capita, causing an estimated 17 clinics to close per treated state. In addition, the
Pill Mill Bills are associated with a more noisily-measured 2.9% decrease in the rate
of pharmacies per capita, equal to 5 fewer pharmacies (out of 188 total pharmacies)
in the average county.
Adding “must-access” Mandates to PDMPs may cause an increase in the rate of
residential rehabilitation facilities in the aﬀected states, to the tune of 4 additional
facilities in the average treated state, a 1.5%-2.5% increase. This eﬀect is more
pronounced and more precisely measured within counties that are more opioid-dense
prior to the policies.
The sweeping Pill Mill Bill in Florida was found to be highly eﬀective at closing
down doctors’ oﬃces licensed to dispense pain medication (Meinhofer, 2017), causing
the number of licensed facilities to fall from approximately 900 to less than 400
over two years. I ﬁnd that Pill Mill Bills passed in Florida as well as Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia were eﬀective at
reducing the number of establishments in the NAICS6-classiﬁed industry covering
“All Other Clinics,” and may also cause some pharmacies to close. Since Pill Mill
Bills speciﬁcally target over-prescribing doctors and pharmacies, my ﬁndings suggest

127
that these policies are eﬀective at shutting down or deterring business establishments
within relevant, but somewhat broadly-deﬁned industry sectors across several aﬀected
states.
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Table 3.1.
Outcome Variables from Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
NAICS Code Outcome
Panel A: Rehabilitation Facilities
623220
Residential Mental Health
and Substance Abuse Facilities

Complete Counties Example List of Business
761

• Alcoholism and drug addiction rehabilitation
facilities (except licensed hospitals)
• Psychiatric convalescent homes or hospitals
• Substance abuse halfway homes
• “Sober living” homes
• Residential group homes for the emotionally
disturbed

622210

Inpatient Mental Health
346
and Substance Abuse Hospitals

• Drug addiction rehab hospitals
• Mental health hospitals
• Detoxiﬁcation hospitals

621420

Outpatient Mental Health
and Substance Abuse Centers
(excludes hospitals)

• Outpatient drug addiction treatment centers
and clinics
• Outpatient alcoholism treatment centers
and clinics

1165

Panel B: Doctor’s Oﬃces, Laboratories, and Clinics
621111
Doctors Oﬃces
2,342

• Physicians’ Oﬃces
• Specialists’ Oﬃces
• Surgeons’ Oﬃces

621511

Medical Laboratories

662

• Pain Management Centers
• Blood analysis laboratories
• Laboratory testing services, medical

621498

All Other Outpatient Clinics

708

• Outpatient pain therapy centers and clinics
• Outpatient sleep disorder centers and clinics
• Outpatient community health centers and clinics

Panel C: Prescription Drug Retailers and Wholesalers
446110
Pharmacies
2,404
424210

c

Drug Wholesalers

589

• Apothecaries, drug stores, and pharmacies
•
•
•
•

Prescription drug merchant wholesalers
Vitamins merchant wholesalers
Deodorants, personal merchant wholesalers
Blades, razor merchant wholesalers
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Table 3.2.
Mean Number of Establishments by NAICS Type in Covered Counties
Outcome

Counties

Establishment Rate
Per 100,000 in
Covered Counties

Panel A: Rehabilitation Facilities
Residential Rehabilitation
761 4.814
Inpatient Rehab Hospitals
346 2.270
Outpatient Rehab Centers
1,165 6.056
Panel B: Doctor’s Oﬃces, Laboratories, and Clinics
Doctors Oﬃces
2,342 47.041
Medical Labs
662 3.967
Other Outpatient Clinics
708 4.663
Panel C: Prescription Drug Retailers and Wholesalers
Pharmacies
2,404 19.429
Drug Wholesalers
589 3.865

Establishments
in Average
Covered County
25.81
14.54
22.00
910.09
50.31
20.86
187.46
38.36

Table 3.3.
Summary Statistics Of Control Variables By County
Control
Fraction Age 10-19
Fraction Age 20-29
Fraction Age 30-39
Fraction Age 40-49
Fraction Age 50-59
Fraction Age 60-69
Fraction Age 70+
Fraction Female
Fraction Black
Fraction Hispanic
Fraction Other Non-White Race
Fraction Workforce Manufacturing
Fraction Workforce Agriculture
Average Weekly Wage
Fraction Unemployed
Oxycodone Density 2004

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

150,792 0.138
0.016
150,792 0.139
0.031
150,792 0.132
0.018
150,792 0.142
0.016
150,792 0.134
0.015
150,792 0.093
0.021
150,792 0.092
0.027
150,792 0.508
0.013
150,792 0.128
0.129
150,792 0.160
0.164
150,792 0.061
0.074
150,792 0.122
0.087
150,792 0.014
0.073
150,792 $834.28 $233.56
150,792 0.056
0.023
150,768 35.47
23.67

Age, race, and gender data from Census Bridged Population Estimates, workforce
and wage data from QCEW, unemployment statistics from BLS Local Area Unemployment
Statistics, and oxycodone density from DEA ARCOS.
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Table 3.4.
Eﬀect of Policies on Establishments Per 100,000 Population, State Level
(1)
Res. Rehab
-0.0366∗∗
(0.0156)

(2)
Inpatient
0.0302∗
(0.0158)

(3)
Outpatient
0.0214∗
(0.0122)

(4)
Doc. Oﬃce
0.00183
(0.00411)

(5)
Med. Labs
-0.0251
(0.0181)

(6)
AOC Clinics
0.0229
(0.0154)

(7)
Pharmacies
0.00566
(0.0226)

(8)
Drug Wholesale
0.0260
(0.0163)

PDMP

-0.000140
(0.0108)

0.0137
(0.0146)

0.0128
(0.00993)

-0.00668∗
(0.00358)

-0.0279∗X
(0.0166)

0.0205∗
(0.0110)

-0.0300
(0.0191)

-0.000870
(0.0165)

Mandate

0.0156
(0.0182)

0.108∗∗∗
(0.0321)

0.00389
(0.0149)

0.00758
(0.00677)

-0.0368
(0.0322)

0.00437
(0.0314)

-0.0146
(0.0220)

-0.0384
(0.0235)

Pill Mill Bill

0.00878
(0.0222)

-0.0247∗X
(0.0147)

0.00316
(0.0159)

-0.00850
(0.00560)

-0.0254
(0.0354)

-0.0764∗∗∗
(0.0220)

-0.0215
(0.0140)

-0.0243
(0.0204)

Observations

2163

2163

2163

2163

2163

2163

2163

2163

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Post-Reformulation
x OxyDense

FE
Controls
LTT
Standard errors in parentheses.

∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01;

∗X

,

∗∗X

, or

∗∗∗X

indicates signiﬁcance with a failure of the parallel trends assumption.

Table 3.5.
Eﬀect of Policies on Establishments Per 100,000 Population, County Level
Post-Reformulation
x OxyDense

(1)
Res. Rehab
0.00166
(0.00513)

(2)
(3)
Inpatient Outpatient
0.0154*
0.0001
(0.00641)
(0.0045)

(4)
(5)
Doc. Oﬃce Med. Labs
0.0010
-0.00964
(0.0016)
(0.00687)

(6)
AOC Clinics
0.0145*
(0.00817)

(7)
Pharmacies
-0.00597
(0.00544)

(8)
Drug Wholesale
0.0001
(0.0078)

PDMP

-0.00854
(0.0110)

-0.00634
(0.0111)

0.0223*
(0.0122)

-0.00767*
(0.0040)

-0.0319
(0.0204)

0.0206
(0.0166)

-0.0261
(0.0215)

0.0154
(0.0151)

Mandate

0.0248
(0.0169)

0.0716**
(0.0310)

-0.0156
(0.0152)

0.00331
(0.00897)

-0.00912
(0.0328)

-0.0144
(0.0399)

0.0168
(0.0216)

-0.0539**
(0.0245)

Pill Mill Bill

0.0191
(0.0152)

-0.0424*
(0.0223)

0.0150*
(0.0089)

-0.00373
(0.00584)

-0.00045
(0.0317)

-0.0654***
(0.0220)

-0.0285
(0.0215)

0.0051
(0.0183)

35,631
761

16,159
346

54,170
1,165

108,760
2,342

30,936
662

33,053
708

111,629
2,404

27,589
589

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Observations
Counties Used
FE
Controls
LTT

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6.
Eﬀect of Policies on Establishments Per 100,000 Population, County
Level Using Full Panel
Post-Reformulation
x OxyDense

(1)
Res. Rehab
-0.0000592
(0.00531)

(2)
(3)
Inpatient Outpatient
∗
0.00888
0.00240
(0.00526) (0.00458)

(4)
Doc. Oﬃce
0.00142
(0.00164)

(5)
Med. Labs
-0.00565
(0.00586)

(6)
(7)
AOC Clinics Pharmacies
0.0108
-0.00610
(0.00735)
(0.00507)

(8)
Drug Wholesale
0.00513
(0.00660)

PDMP

-0.00888
(0.0128)

-0.00506
(0.0144)

0.0193
(0.0127)

-0.0133∗∗
(0.00608)

-0.0142
(0.0288)

0.0196
(0.0146)

0.0138
(0.0158)

0.0149
(0.0141)

Mandate

0.00993
(0.0150)

0.0882∗∗
(0.0427)

0.00136
(0.0160)

0.00465
(0.0101)

-0.0227
(0.0289)

0.0151
(0.0330)

0.0155
(0.0211)

-0.0453∗∗
(0.0182)

Pill Mill Bill

0.0257
(0.0176)
121419
3,200

-0.0172
(0.0290)
121419
3,200

0.00892
(0.0116)
121419
3,200

-0.00245
(0.00556)
121419
3,200

-0.0130
(0.0354)
121419
3,200

-0.0516∗∗
(0.0239)
121419
3,200

-0.0265
(0.0281)
121419
3,200

0.00467
(0.0171)
121419
3,200

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Observations
Counties Used
FE
Controls
LTT

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 3.7.
Testing Robustness of Pill Mill Bill on AOC Clinic Facilities

Pill Mill Bill

(1)
FE

(2)
Controls

(3)
LTT

(4)
No Wt

(5)
Drop FL

(6)
No Log

(7)
Drop Zeros

0.0323
(0.0313)

0.0145
(0.0274)

-0.0656***
(0.0219)

-0.0207
(0.0187)

-0.0544*
(0.0296)

-0.0207
(0.0187)

-0.102***
(0.0341)

Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models include ﬁxed eﬀects,
controls, analytic weights and county-speciﬁc linear time trends.

Table 3.8.
Testing Robustness of the Mandate on Residential Rehabilitation Facilities

Mandate

(1)
FE

(2)
Controls

(3)
LTT

(4)
No Wt

(5)
Drop FL

(6)
No Log

(7)
Drop Zeros

0.0171
(0.0272)

0.0161
(0.0290)

0.0248
(0.0169)

-0.002
(0.0158)

0.0316
(0.0162)

-0.124
(0.143)

0.0102
(0.0196)

Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models include ﬁxed eﬀects,
controls, analytic weights and county-speciﬁc linear time trends.
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Table 3.9.
Testing Robustness of Pill Mill Bill on the Rate of Pharmacies

Pill Mill Bill

(1)
FE

(2)
Controls

0.0811*
(0.0379)

0.0771*
(0.0290)

(3)
LTT

(4)
No Wt

(5)
Drop FL

(6)
No Log

(7)
Drop Zeros

-0.0284 -0.0378*
(0.0216) (0.0145)

-0.0092
(0.0207)

-0.0378*
(0.0145)

-0.0293
(0.0235)

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models include ﬁxed eﬀects,
controls, analytic weights and county-speciﬁc linear time trends.

Table 3.10.
Eﬀect of Policies on Establishments per 100,000 Population within
Top 25% of Counties by Oxycodone Milligrams Per Capita

Post-Reformulation
x OxyDense

(1)
(2)
Res. Rehab AOC Clinics
0.0022
0.0217**
(0.0077)
(0.0106)

(3)
Pharmacies
-0.0079
(0.0075)

PDMP

-0.0036
(0.0213)

0.0169
(0.0243)

0.0163
(0.0181)

Mandate

0.0476**
(0.0222)

-0.0064
(0.0492)

0.0114
(0.0293)

Pill Mill Bill

0.0409
(0.0312)
14261

-0.0670
(0.0459)
12744

-0.0592***
(0.0147)
33188

N
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Table 3.11.
Eﬀect of Policies on Establishments per 100,000 Population within
Top 25% of Counties by Oxycodone Milligrams Per Capita
Post-Reformulation
x OxyDense

(1)
Res. Rehab
0.00186
(0.00754)

(2)
(3)
Inpatient Outpatient
0.0147∗∗
-0.00336
(0.00580) (0.00648)

(4)
Doc. Oﬃce
0.000455
(0.00277)

(5)
Med. Labs
-0.0231∗∗∗
(0.00750)

(6)
(7)
AOC Clinics Pharmacies
0.0248∗∗
-0.00785
(0.00996)
(0.00756)

(8)
Drug Wholesale
-0.0193∗
(0.00999)

PDMP

-0.00152
(0.0205)

-0.0336∗
(0.0168)

0.0294∗∗
(0.0130)

-0.0180∗∗∗
(0.00445)

-0.0349
(0.0346)

0.0274
(0.0265)

0.0116
(0.0199)

0.0240
(0.0273)

Mandate

0.0346
(0.0218)

0.0522∗∗
(0.0230)

-0.0324
(0.0255)

0.00783
(0.00868)

0.0232
(0.0378)

0.00634
(0.0481)

0.0224
(0.0316)

-0.0651∗∗∗
(0.0219)

Pill Mill Bill

0.0500
(0.0328)
15744

-0.0518∗
(0.0275)
7776

0.0156
(0.0155)
23712

0.00848
(0.00874)
39744

0.0363
(0.0603)
14496

-0.0805
(0.0507)
13872

-0.0742∗∗∗
(0.0238)
40176

0.00226
(0.0376)
11616

N

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 3.12.
Eﬀect of Policies on Establishments per 100,000 Population within
Top 25% of Counties by Oxycodone Milligrams Per Capita, Full Panel
of Counties
Post-Reformulation
x OxyDense

(1)
Res. Rehab
0.00716
(0.0102)

(2)
(3)
Inpatient Outpatient
∗
0.00719
-0.00368
(0.00404) (0.00643)

(4)
Doc. Oﬃce
0.000828
(0.00273)

(5)
Med. Labs
-0.0234∗∗∗
(0.00554)

(6)
(7)
AOC Clinics Pharmacies
0.0108
-0.00775
(0.00875)
(0.00761)

(8)
Drug Wholesale
-0.00635
(0.00756)

PDMP

0.0232
(0.0174)

-0.0168
(0.0204)

0.0360∗∗
(0.0152)

-0.0188∗∗∗
(0.00454)

-0.0375
(0.0333)

0.0345
(0.0223)

0.0112
(0.0200)

0.0263
(0.0233)

Mandate

0.0207
(0.0216)

0.0517∗
(0.0276)

-0.0232
(0.0276)

0.00838
(0.00859)

0.0203
(0.0351)

0.0210
(0.0406)

0.0223
(0.0316)

-0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0203)

Pill Mill Bill

0.0233
(0.0308)
42816

-0.0339
(0.0342)
42816

0.0158
(0.0189)
42816

0.00863
(0.00881)
42816

0.00290
(0.0572)
42816

-0.0639
(0.0480)
42816

-0.0748∗∗∗
(0.0235)
42816

-0.00448
(0.0306)
42816

N

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.13.
Information on Counties in the Top Quartile of Oxycodone Milligrams Per Capita
Outcome

QCEW Covered
Counties

QCEW Rate
Per 100,000 in
Covered Counties

Panel A: Rehabilitation Facilities
Residential Rehabilitation
761 4.814
Inpatient Rehab Hospitals
346 2.270
Outpatient Rehab Centers
1,165 6.056
Panel B: Doctor’s Oﬃces, Laboratories, and Clinics
Doctors Oﬃces
2,342 47.041
Medical Labs
662 3.967
All Other Outpatient Clinics
708 4.663
Panel C: Prescription Drug Retailers and Wholesalers
Pharmacies
2,404 19.429
Drug Wholesalers
589 3.865

CBP Rate
Per 100,000 in
3,187 Counties
1.648
0.173
3.543
42.49
1.060
4.185
16.916
1.191

The CBP covers more counties, but the QCEW covers more establishments within
covered counties.

Table 3.14.
The Eﬀect of Supply Side Policies on Opioid-Related Establishments,
County Business Pattern Data
(1)
Res. Rehab
-0.0376
(0.0408)

(2)
Inpatient
0.0186
(0.0197)

(3)
Outpatient
0.0206
(0.0703)

(4)
Doc. Oﬃce
-0.0477∗∗
(0.0215)

(5)
Med. Labs
0.267∗∗∗
(0.0526)

(6)
AOC Clinics
0.209∗∗∗
(0.0437)

(7)
Pharmacies
-0.0540∗∗
(0.0250)

(8)
Drug Wholesale
-0.0680
(0.0501)

PostReformulation
x OxyDense

0.000727
(0.00910)

-0.000205
(0.00218)

-0.000110
(0.00636)

0.00409∗∗
(0.00166)

-0.0162∗∗∗
(0.00465)

0.00984∗
(0.00548)

-0.000917
(0.00429)

0.00398
(0.00478)

PDMP

-0.00112
(0.0142)

0.000986
(0.00561)

0.0223
(0.0175)

-0.00115
(0.00421)

0.0217∗
(0.0121)

-0.00256
(0.0126)

0.00937∗
(0.00501)

0.0232∗
(0.0118)

Mandate

0.0159
(0.0143)

0.00617
(0.0102)

-0.0391
(0.0245)

0.00115
(0.0115)

0.0146
(0.0163)

0.0119
(0.0188)

-0.00171
(0.00744)

-0.0295∗∗
(0.0144)

Pill Mill Bill

0.0200∗
(0.0109)
119393

0.00744
(0.00881)
119393

0.0103
(0.0211)
119393

0.000449
(0.00387)
119393

-0.00343
(0.0172)
119393

-0.0308∗∗
(0.0150)
119393

0.0175∗
(0.00898)
119393

-0.0103
(0.0269)
119393

PostReform

N

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Fig. 3.1. Counties with Complete Panel of Residential Rehabilitation Facilities
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 761 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of residential rehabilitation facilities per 100,000 population. Data:
QCEW 2004-2015.

Fig. 3.2. Counties with Complete Panel of Inpatient Rehabilitation Hospitals
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 346 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of inpatient rehabilitation hospitals per 100,000 population. Data:
QCEW 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.3. Counties with Complete Panel of Outpatient Rehabilitation Centers
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 1,165 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of outpatient rehabilitation centers per 100,000 population. Data:
QCEW 2004-2015.

Fig. 3.4. Counties with Complete Panel of Doctors Oﬃces
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 2,342 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of doctors oﬃces per 100,000 population. Data: County Business
Patterns 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.5. Counties with Complete Panel of All Other Outpatient Care Centers
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 662 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of AOC clinics per 100,000 population. Data: QCEW 2004-2015.

Fig. 3.6. Counties with Complete Panel of Medical Laboratories
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 7708 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of medical laboratories per 100,000 population. Data: QCEW
2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.7. Counties with Complete Panel of Pharmacies
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 2,404 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
PDMP on the rate of pharmacies per 100,000 population. Data: QCEW 2004-2015.

Fig. 3.8. Counties with Complete Panel of Drug Store Wholesalers
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 589 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the PDMP
on the rate of drug store wholesalers per 100,000 population. Data: QCEW 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.9. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Residential Rehabilitation Establishments
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.10. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Inpatient Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Hospitals
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.11. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Outpatient Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Establishments
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.12. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Doctors’ Oﬃces
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.13. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Medical Laboratories
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.14. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on All Other Outpatient Care Centers, Including Pain Therapy Clinics
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.15. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Pharmacies
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.16. Supply-Side Intervention Policy Eﬀects on Drugstore
Wholesaler Establishments
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the supply-side policies on logged
establishments per 100,000 population. The top three graphs plot coeﬃcients from models
at the state level, and the bottom three graphs show results at the county level. Data:
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.17. The Eﬀect of the Pill Mill Bill on AOC Clinics, No LTT
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the Pill Mill Bill on logged AOC
clinics per capita. The model depicted in the left graph includes ﬁxed eﬀects and county
controls, but not county-speciﬁc linear time trends. The graph on the right adds
county-speciﬁc linear time trends. Data: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.18. The Eﬀect of the Mandate on Residential Rehab Centers, No LTT
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the Mandate on logged residential
rehabs per 100,000 population. The model depicted in the left graph includes ﬁxed eﬀects
and county controls, but not county-speciﬁc linear time trends. The graph on the right
adds county-speciﬁc linear time trends. Data: Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages 2004-2015.
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Fig. 3.19. The Eﬀect of the Pill Mill Bill on Pharmacies, Excluding
and Including County Trends
The ﬁgure displays event study graphs of the eﬀect of the Pill Mill Bill on logged
pharmacies per 100,000 population. The model depicted in the left graph includes ﬁxed
eﬀects and county controls, but not county-speciﬁc linear time trends. The graph on the
right adds county-speciﬁc linear time trends. Data: Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages 2004-2015.

Fig. 3.20. Counties with Complete Panel of County Business Patterns Outcomes
The ﬁgure displays the location of the 3,187 counties used to identify the eﬀect of the
policies on the rate of business establishments using the CBP data. Data: County
Business Patterns 2004-2015.
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4. APPENDIX
A

Additional Robustness and Model Speciﬁcations: Prescription Outcomes
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, and A6 list the eﬀects of the PDMP, Mandate and

Pill Mill Bills on Medicaid oxycodone, Medicaid weak oxycodone, Medicaid strong
oxycodone, Medicaid hydrocodone, ARCOS oxycodone, and ARCOS hydrocodone
usage, respectively, under diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. In each table, the speciﬁcations include simple ordinary least squares in Column (1) in each of the tables, then
the addition of ﬁxed eﬀects, controls, and linear time trends in Columns (2) through
(4). Column (5) in each table drops analytic weights from the models, Column (6)
drops data past 2012 to eliminate any possible confounding inﬂuences posed by the
implementation of the Aﬀordable Care Act, Column (7) excludes Florida (the state
that was considered the “pill mill capital” of the US in the 2000s) from the model, and
Column (8) lists coeﬃcients from the interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model applied to
prescription outcomes. Results are fairly consistent across model speciﬁcations, with
Medicaid oxycodone, strong oxycodone, and ARCOS oxycodone responding to the
policies across speciﬁcation. However, PDMP estimates lose both power and magnitude when Florida is excluded from models, although magnitudes of coeﬃcients are
still negative. Results of the PDMP on heroin incidents in the NIBRS do not use
Florida for identiﬁcation.
Turning to the Mandate policy, Figure A1 graphs its eﬀects on prescription outcomes under a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcations with ﬁxed eﬀects and controls
but not including state-speciﬁc linear time trends. Non-zero lead coeﬃcients characterize all six graphs, which is a problem. The addition of linear time trends does
not bring the lead coeﬃcients to zero. Therefore each of the graphs in Figure A1
suggest a violation of the parallel trends assumption required for causal inference in
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diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models. As the lead coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, the treated counties did not trend similarly to untreated counties
in the time prior to the mandate. Because of this failure of the parallel trends assumption, I cannot draw causal inferences regarding the eﬀects of the Mandates on
outcomes.
Table A1.
PDMP on Log Medicaid Oxycodone Across Model Speciﬁcations
(1)
OLS
-0.257∗∗∗
(0.0413)

(2)
(3)
FE
Controls
-0.223
-0.246∗
(0.160) (0.128)

(4)
(5)
(6)
LTT
NoWt NoACA
-0.188 -0.236
-0.221
(0.144) (0.152) (0.147)

(7)
DropFL
-0.116
(0.142)

(8)
Factor
-0.148∗
(0.0858)

Mandate

0.915∗∗∗
(0.111)

0.431∗∗
(0.170)

0.342∗∗
(0.145)

0.141
0.133
(0.153) (0.278)

0.133
(0.134)

0.0718
(0.143)

0.217
(0.141)

Pill Mill Bill

-0.666∗∗∗
(0.131)
2791

-0.366∗
(0.206)
2791

-0.190
(0.154)
2783

-0.186
(0.165)
2783

0.0258
(0.223)
2783

-0.118
(0.152)
2582

-0.0589
(0.160)
2727

-0.031
(0.253)
2714

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
h̄

X

X
X
X
X

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Weights
Drop 2014 on
Drop Florida
Factor Model

X

X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. h̄: The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model ﬂexibly nests time trends.

X
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Table A2.
PDMP on Log Medicaid Weak Dose Oxycodone, Across Model Speciﬁcations
(1)
OLS
-0.289∗∗∗
(0.0417)

(2)
FE
-0.0438
(0.167)

(3)
(4)
Controls
LTT
-0.0813 -0.0341
(0.146) (0.153)

(5)
NoWt
-0.0760
(0.171)

(6)
NoACA
-0.0523
(0.163)

(7)
DropFL
-0.0240
(0.147)

(8)
Factor
-0.050
(0.047)

Mandate

-0.253∗∗∗
(0.165)

-0.348∗∗
(0.164)

-0.350∗∗
(0.164)

-0.247
(0.159)

-0.282∗
(0.272)

-0.300∗
(0.165)

-0.160
(0.157)

0.0891
(0.114)

Pill Mill Bill

-1.042∗∗∗
(0.174)
2790

-0.359∗∗
(0.158)
2790

-0.115
(0.110)
2782

-0.0462 -0.00389
(0.137) (0.190)
2782
2782

-0.0132
(0.119)
2581

-0.0307
(0.159)
2726

-0.007
(0.177)
2713

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
h̄

X

X
X
X
X
X

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Weights
Drop 2014 on
Drop Florida
Factor Model

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. h̄: The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model ﬂexibly nests time trends.

Table A3.
PDMP on Log Medicaid Strong Dose Oxycodone, Across Model Speciﬁcations
(1)
OLS
-0.253∗∗∗
(0.0417)

(2)
FE
-0.348∗∗
(0.167)

(3)
Controls
-0.350∗∗
(0.146)

Mandate

0.790∗∗∗
(0.0953)

0.409∗∗
(0.177)

Pill Mill Bill

-0.572∗∗∗
(0.121)
2766

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Weights
Drop 2014 on
Drop Florida
Factor Model

X

(4)
(5)
(6)
LTT
NoWt NoACA
-0.247 -0.282∗ -0.300∗
(0.153) (0.171) (0.163)

(7)
DropFL
-0.160
(0.147)

(8)
Factor
-0.172∗∗
(0.077)

0.344∗∗
(0.145)

0.120
(0.155)

0.0807
(0.234)

0.0301
(0.145)

0.0390
(0.138)

0.106
(0.166)

-0.341
(0.212)
2766

-0.238
(0.173)
2758

-0.226
(0.190)
2758

0.110
(0.249)
2758

-0.157
(0.172)
2557

-0.0831
(0.184)
2702

-0.072
(0.225)
2692

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
h̄

X

X
X
X
X

X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. h̄: The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model ﬂexibly nests time trends.

X

153

Table A4.
PDMP on Log Medicaid Hydrocodone, Across Model Speciﬁcations
(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS
FE
Controls
0.0833 -0.0740 -0.0530
(0.0544) (0.216) (0.135)

(4)
LTT
-0.111
(0.115)

(5)
(6)
NoWt NoACA
-0.0817 -0.0618
(0.101) (0.107)

(7)
DropFL
-0.150
(0.111)

(8)
Factor
0.067
(0.090)

Mandate

-0.582∗∗
(0.243)

-0.380
(0.344)

-0.208
(0.184)

-0.308∗
(0.184)

-0.297
(0.195)

-0.471∗
(0.242)

-0.266
(0.185)

-0.355∗
(0.194)

Pill Mill Bill

-0.0384
(0.117)
2782

-0.187
(0.300)
2782

0.0843
(0.192)
2782

-0.0575
(0.142)
2782

-0.156
(0.232)
2782

-0.0165
(0.133)
2581

-0.160
(0.179)
2726

-0.121
(0.208)
2714

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
h̄

X

X
X
X
X

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Weights
Drop 2014 on
Drop Florida
Factor Model

X

X
X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. h̄: The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model ﬂexibly nests time trends.

Table A5.
PDMP on Log ARCOS Oxycodone, Across Model Speciﬁcations
(1)
OLS
0.124∗∗∗
(0.0436)

(2)
FE
-0.0894∗
(0.0499)

(3)
Controls
-0.0814
(0.0509)

(4)
LTT
-0.0847∗∗
(0.0401)

(5)
NoWt
-0.0584∗∗
(0.0291)

(6)
NoACA
-0.124∗∗
(0.0510)

(7)
DropFL
-0.0256
(0.0221)

(8)
Factor
-0.032∗
(0.017)

Mandate

0.428∗∗∗
(0.0593)

0.193∗∗
(0.0785)

0.157∗∗
(0.0589)

-0.0862
(0.0556)

-0.0935∗∗
(0.0445)

-0.0591
(0.0549)

-0.145∗∗∗
(0.0376)

-0.037
(0.041)

Pill Mill Bill

-0.197∗∗∗
(0.0760)
3264

-0.290∗∗∗
(0.107)
3264

-0.276∗∗∗
(0.101)
3153

-0.210∗∗
(0.0970)
3153

-0.115
(0.117)
3153

-0.173
(0.105)
2594

-0.0575
(0.0495)
3090

-0.024
(0.063)
3070

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
h̄

X

X
X
X
X

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Weights
Drop 2014 on
Drop Florida
Factor Model

X

X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. h̄: The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model ﬂexibly nests time trends.

X
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Table A6.
PDMP on Log ARCOS Hydrocodone, Across Model Speciﬁcations
(1)
OLS
0.414∗∗∗
(0.0274)

(2)
FE
0.0580
(0.0354)

(3)
Controls
-0.00409
(0.0263)

(4)
LTT
0.0180
(0.0183)

(5)
NoWt
0.0264
(0.0159)

(6)
NoACA
0.0121
(0.0200)

(7)
DropFL
0.0247
(0.0184)

(8)
Factor
-0.021
(0.014)

Mandate

-0.372∗∗∗
(0.0735)

-0.148
(0.0940)

-0.165∗∗∗
(0.0390)

-0.125∗∗∗
(0.0355)

-0.0905∗∗∗
(0.0309)

-0.0936∗
(0.0471)

-0.119∗∗∗
(0.0345)

-0.060∗∗
(0.028)

Pill Mill Bill

0.534∗∗∗
(0.0561)
3260

0.000350
(0.102)
3260

-0.0129
(0.0506)
3149

-0.00830
(0.0297)
3149

-0.0198
(0.0298)
3149

-0.00362
(0.0171)
2590

0.0175
(0.0343)
3086

-0.0225
(0.031)
3066

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
h̄

X

X
X
X
X

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Linear Trends
Weights
Drop 2014 on
Drop Florida
Factor Model

X

X

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. h̄: The interactive ﬁxed eﬀects factor model ﬂexibly nests time trends.

X
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Fig. A1. The Eﬀect of Mandated PDMPs on Medicaid and ARCOS
Prescription Outcomes
The graphs display coeﬃcients on Mandate lag and lead indicators in a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model including state and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects and controls, but
not including state-speciﬁc trends. Note the non-zero lead coeﬃcients.
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B

Additional Model Robustness: Heroin Results
The main text divides counties into “high oxycodone density” and “low oxycodone

density” by cutting on the 90th percentile of the distribution of oxycodone per capita.
Figure B2 tests the robustness of the signiﬁcant increase in heroin incidents using
diﬀerent high density and low density cutoﬀs (other than the 90th percentile). To
clarify, the top graph plots policy coeﬃcient estimates on the bottom percentage
of counties classiﬁed as “low” oxycodone-density counties, with the horizontal axis
plotting which percentage cutoﬀ was used to determine which counties were classiﬁed
as “low” oxycodone-dense counties. The measured eﬀect of the PDMP on the bottom
80-90% (excluding more oxycodone-dense counties) of the data is about zero. The
lower graph plots the PDMP eﬀect on heroin incidents within “high” oxycodonedensity counties. The PDMP coeﬃcients become signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level at about the 70th percentile, so using the top 30% of counties as “high density”.
These show 1-1.75 additional heroin incidents per 100,000 population each month in
the top 30% of oxycodone-dense counties.1
Figure B3 tests the robustness of the PDMP eﬀect on heroin incidents on counties
with low versus high oxycodone, under the IFE factor model speciﬁcation. Similarly
to Figure B2, the top graph plots coeﬃcients on the bottom 5 through 50 percent of
counties cut on oxycodone density, measuring a zero eﬀect of the PDMP. The bottom
graph plots the coeﬃcients for IFE factor models run on the top 50 to 95 percent of
counties cut on oxycodone density, and measures an increase of 0.2 to 0.6 additional
heroin incidents per 100,000 population per month as a result of the PDMP.
Figure B4 plots the event study of the PDMP on heroin incidents across all counties and in the top 10% of counties based on oxycodone-density using the IFE factor
model. This graph is the IFE factor model analog to Figure 1.6 (which plots coeﬃcients from a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model) in the main text. The IFE factor model
graphs show similar results to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences graphs in the main text,
1
Each plotted point is from a diﬀerent model run on a diﬀerent subset of counties in the data,
depending on the high/low oxycodone cutoﬀ.
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but display lead coeﬃcient points closer to zero, with less of a possible pre-trend. Figures still display an increase in the heroin incident rate within the most opioid-dense
counties after implementation of the PDMP.
C

The Eﬀect of PDMPs on Oxycodone by Strength of Pill
The Medicaid drug data comprises state-by-quarter counts of drugs, classiﬁed by

NDC code. The NDC code speciﬁes the strength of drug by dosage units. Oxycodone
comes in pills ranging from 2.5 milligrams to 100 milligrams in the Medicaid data.
Table C7 gives summary statistics of oxycodone amounts dispensed through Medicaid,
speciﬁed by strength of pill. The table lists the mean amount of oxycodone per
enrollee by pill strength. It also lists number of pills per enrollee by pill strength.
The 5-milligram pills are most common, making up 44.6% of dispensed pills, but only
makes up 17.5% of active-ingredient oxycodone dispensed through Medicaid. The 30,
40, and 80 milligram pills make up a small fraction of dispensed pills by number of
pills (6.5%, 5.1%, and 3.7% of pills, respectively); however the large-dose pills make
up 14.2%, 12.5%, and 17.3% of oxycodone dispensed.
Figure C5 graphs PDMP coeﬃcients from separate diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models
on logged milligrams of oxycodone per Medicaid enrollee as grouped pills of each
strength. The size of each plotted circle is determined by how much of the total
dispensed oxycodone comes in each form of pill. The largest circles–associated with
5, 10, 30, 40, and 80 milligram pills–correspond to pills that each make up 10% or more
of the oxycodone dispensed, medium-sized points correspond to pills that each make
up between 5 and 10% of oxycodone dispensed, and small points are for pills that each
make up less than 5% of dispensed oxycodone milligrams. The points are diﬀerent
sizes so that a viewer can determine which pill strengths are most responsible for the
aggregated coeﬃcient estimates in Table 1.7 in the main text. That table shows a
24.6% reduction in overall oxycodone dispensed, and a 35% decrease in strong-dose
oxycodone (pills with > 10 milligrams of oxycodone) in response to the PDMP. The
large reduction in pills with more than 10 milligrams is driven by large, marginally
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Fig. B2. Sensitivity of the Estimated Eﬀects on Heroin Incident Rate
Using Diﬀerent Thresholds to Deﬁne High/Low Oxycodone Density
Counties
The top ﬁgure plots the PDMP estimated coeﬃcients in the less oxycodone dense
counties, depending on the threshold (in oxycodone per capita distribution percentile)
used to classify counties as “low oxycodone dense” counties. The bottom ﬁgure plots the
PDMP coeﬃcients for the more oxycodone dense counties, depending on the threshold (in
oxycodone per capita distribution percentile) used to classify counties as “high oxycodone
dense” counties. The main tables use the 90th percentile as the cutoﬀ. Coeﬃcients are
obtained by running a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression (including county and month
ﬁxed eﬀects, controls and analytic weights) on heroin incidents on subsets of counties that
are below or above the thresholds.
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signiﬁcant decreases in the prescription rate of oxycodone dispensed in the form of
30, 40, and 80 milligram pills in response to the PDMP.
Table C7.
Summary Statistics on Medicaid Oxycodone Pills by Milligrams
Pill Strength Mean Mg Per Enrollee

2.5 mg
5 mg
7.5 mg
10 mg
15 mg
20 mg
30 mg
40 mg
50 mg
60 mg
80 mg
100 mg

0.004
(0.008)
6.14
(5.03)
1.02
(1.14)
5.05
(4.70)
2.47
(3.91)
3.05
(3.31)
5.10
(8.69)
5.41
(5.68)
0.356
(0.751)
0.760
(0.929)
7.29
(7.10)
0.498
(1.03)

Mean Pills Per Enrollee

Fraction of
Oxycodone Mg

Fraction of
Oxycodone Pills

0.0016
(0.003)
1.228
(1.006)
0.137
(0.153)
0.505
(0.470)
0.164
(0.261)
0.153
(0.166)
0.170
(0.290)
0.135
(0.142)
0.007
(0.015)
0.013
(0.154)
0.091
(0.089)
0.005
(0.010)

0.0001

0.000

0.1746

0.446

0.0295

0.052

0.1638

0.218

0.0684

0.0592

0.0775

0.061

0.1421

0.065

0.1248

0.051

0.0113

0.003

0.0223

0.006

0.1727

0.0365

0.0122

0.002

Oxycodone comes in pills of varying strength. The table contains summary statistics on the mean milligrams of oxycodone
per Medicaid enrollee within each pill strength, the mean number of pills per Medicaid enrollee in each pill strength,
the fraction of total Medicaid oxycodone milligrams administered in each pill strength, and the fraction of total
oxycodone pills given out in each strength. For example, the average Medicaid enrollee receives 6.14 milligrams of
oxycodone in the 5 milligram pill form, equal to 1.228 5-mg-pills per Medicaid enrollee. 5 milligram pills make up 17.5%
of oxycodone milligrams of active ingredient and 44.6% of oxycodone pills covered by Medicaid.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: Medicaid prescription data.

D

The Eﬀect of PDMPs on Heroin Crimes: Oﬀender Characteristics
Results in Table 1.8 of the main text show that PDMPs increase the rate of heroin

incidents in the top 10% of counties in the distribution of oxycodone per capita.
The increase of 1.745 additional heroin incidents per 100,000 population per month
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is equal to an 87% increase. This appendix section uses additional detail from the
NIBRS incident-level dataset to identify characteristics of the heroin oﬀenders aﬀected
by the policies. The NIBRS dataset shows that at the baseline, the most common
locations for heroin incidents are discount and department stores, parking lots and
garages, homes and residences, and roads including highways, alleys, streets and
sidewalks. These four location categories make up 84% of heroin incident locations,
whereas the broad category of “other locations” accounts for the other 16% of heroin
incidents.2 Table D8 suggests that the PDMPs are causing heroin incidents that
occur mainly in parking lots and garages (an 84% increase) and on roads (a 71%
increase). Anecdotally, heroin sales take place in parking lots and on roadways, often
with a simple drive-by transaction or a hand-oﬀ exchange between vehicles, and the
increase in parking-lot and roadway incidents in response to the PDMP may be a sign
of police encountering more heroin transactions in these locations. Also, police may
also be encountering more erratic driving as a result of heroin use and may possibly
be pulling over greater numbers of under-the-inﬂuence oﬀenders in parking lots and
on roadways.
Table D9 breaks down the heroin incidents in the most opioid-dense counties by
race. It appears the increase in heroin incidents is driven by increases in the rate
of heroin incidents among white and black oﬀenders, but the measured increases in
heroin incidents split up by race of oﬀender are not individually statistically signiﬁcant. Table D10 divides heroin incidents into those committed by male oﬀenders and
those committed by female oﬀenders, and shows a statistically signiﬁcant increase in
the male heroin incident rate in the most oxycodone-dense counties in response to the
PDMP. The point estimate of the increase in female oﬀender heroin incidents is large
in magnitude but is not statistically signiﬁcant. Table D11 classiﬁes heroin incidents
by age of oﬀender, and shows that PDMPs aﬀect heroin incidents involving oﬀenders
between the ages of 20 and 29, 30 and 39, and 40 and 49. The increases in heroin
incidents among 30-39 year-olds and 40-49 year-olds are statistically signiﬁcant at the
2

The “other locations” category includes 54 other types of location categories in the NIBRS and are
not listed here.
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5% level. Overall, white males of a fairly wide range of ages are responding to the
PDMP.
Finally, Table D12 breaks down heroin incident rates by both race of oﬀender and
across the four most common locations of heroin incidents. This is to examine the
eﬀect of the PDMP on oﬀenses by race and location. The PDMP causes an increase
in heroin incidents with white oﬀenders occurring in parking lots, within homes, and
on roadways. The 0.256 and 0.487 increase in parking lot and roadway incidents
add to a combined 0.743 additional heroin incidents by white oﬀenders, which makes
up the bulk of the increase of 1.114 additional white-oﬀender incidents, recorded in
previous Table D9. Heroin incidents involving black oﬀenders in parking lots and
roadways also increase in response to the PDMP, with a combined eﬀect of 0.457
additional heroin incidents, accounting for the bulk of the measured 0.667 additional
black-oﬀender incidents in Table D9. In addition, there is a small but statistically
signiﬁcant increase in the rate of heroin incidents involving Hispanic oﬀenders in
parking lots.
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Table D8.
Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents in High Oxycodone Density
Counties: By Location of Oﬀense
(1)
(2)
Disc. Store Parking Lot
-0.00228
0.504∗
(0.0102)
(0.255)

PDMP

(3)
Home
0.0579
(0.0621)

(4)
Road
0.724∗∗
(0.331)

(5)
Other
0.121
(0.123)

Mandate

0.0330∗∗∗
(0.00709)

0.484∗∗∗
(0.112)

0.142∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.0424) (0.147)

0.313∗∗∗
(0.0827)

Pill Mill Bill

-0.0557∗∗∗
(0.0114)

-0.764∗∗
(0.284)

-0.249∗∗
(0.107)

-0.999∗∗
(0.360)

-0.537∗∗∗
(0.153)

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Popln. Weight
Linear Time Trends
Mean Rate Per 100,000 Pop

9588
X
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X
X

0.0347

0.600

0.1702

1.014

0.278

∗

∗∗

∗∗∗

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10,
p < 0.05,
p < 0.01.
The most common locations of crimes in the NIBRS are residences/homes, highways/roads/alleys,
department/discount stores, and parking lots/garages, which make up 71% of oﬀenses, and 84%
of heroin incidents. The “other” location category makes up the remaining 29% of oﬀenses or 16%
of heroin incidents, respectively.
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Fig. B3. Sensitivity of the Estimated Eﬀects on Heroin Incident Rate
Using Diﬀerent Thresholds to Deﬁne High/Low Oxycodone Density
Counties: Unweighted Factor Model
Notes: Graphs plot the coeﬃcients on PDMP lags and leads indicators in an interactive
ﬁxed eﬀects factor model on heroin incidents per 100,000 in a county-month pair. The top
graph shows the event study of the PDMP on heroin incidents across all counties. The
lower graph shows the event study of the PDMP eﬀects in the most oxycodone-dense
counties. These event study models include controls and ﬁxed eﬀects by month and
county. The county data span 735 counties over 26 states monthly from 2004-2014. Heroin
incident data: NIBRS. Oxycodone density data: DEA ARCOS.
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Fig. B4. The Eﬀect of the PDMP on Heroin Incidents Across All
Counties and in Most Oxycodone Dense Counties: Factor Model
Notes: The ﬁgure plots event studies of the PDMP on the rate of heroin incidents per
100,000 population per month across all counties (top graph) and across the most
oxycodone-dense counties (bottom graph) under the IFE factor model speciﬁcation.
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Fig. C5. The Eﬀect of the PDMP on Medicaid Oxycodone by Strength
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of the PDMP on logged Medicaid oxycodone per
enrollee disaggregated by pill strength. Each plotted point is associated with a separate
regression on milligrams per enrollee restricted to pills of each strength. Points are sized
by the relative frequency of pills in the Medicaid data, which corresponds to the fraction
column in Table C7. “Uncommon Pills” are pills that make up less than 5% of oxycodone,
“Common Pills” make up between 5% and 10% of oxycodone, and “Most Common Pills”
are pills that make up for greater than 10% of oxycodone.
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Table D9.
Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents in High Oxycodone Density
Counties: By Race of Oﬀender

(1)
White
1.114
(0.666)

(2)
Black
0.667
(0.469)

(3)
(4)
Hispanic Other
0.156
0.0161
(0.101) (0.0115)

Mandate

1.472∗∗∗
(0.278)

0.496∗
(0.240)

0.0412
(0.0947)

0.0355∗∗
(0.0160)

Pill Mill Bill

-2.432∗∗∗
(0.788)

-1.080∗∗
(0.472)

-0.109
(0.138)

-0.0484∗
(0.0241)

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

1.595

0.781

0.379

0.126

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Popln. Weight
Linear Time Trends
Mean Rate Per 100,000 Pop
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D10.
Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents in High Oxycodone Density
Counties: By Sex of Oﬀender

(1)
Male
1.432∗
(0.753)

(2)
Female
0.508
(0.293)

Mandate

1.559∗∗∗
(0.307)

0.444∗∗∗
(0.132)

Pill Mill Bill

-2.634∗∗
(0.907)

-1.002∗∗
(0.334)

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

2.208

0.574

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Popln. Weight
Linear Time Trends
Mean Rate Per 100,000 Pop
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D11.
Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents in High Oxycodone Density
Counties: By Age of Oﬀender
(1)
10-19
0.143
(0.0900)

(2)
20-29
1.067
(0.614)

(3)
30-39
0.479∗∗
(0.218)

(4)
40-49
0.174∗∗
(0.0735)

(5)
50-59
0.0213
(0.0179)

(6)
60+
0.0124
(0.00770)

Mandate

0.0519 1.131∗∗∗
(0.0411) (0.255)

0.454∗∗∗
(0.110)

0.202∗∗∗
(0.0510)

0.0808∗∗∗
(0.0161)

0.0222∗∗∗
(0.00378)

Pill Mill Bill

-0.212∗
(0.115)

-2.141∗∗
(0.720)

-0.854∗∗
(0.293)

-0.219∗∗∗
(0.0702)

-0.0855∗∗∗
(0.0220)

-0.0226∗∗
(0.0101)

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

9588
X
X
X

0.232

1.252

0.668

0.393

0.130

0.026

PDMP

Observations
Fixed Eﬀects
Controls
Popln. Weight
Linear Time Trends
Mean Rate Per 100,000 Pop
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table D12.
Eﬀect of PDMP on Heroin Incidents by Race and Location Of Offender: Across High Oxycodone Density Counties

PDMP on White
PDMP on Black
PDMP on Hispanic
PDMP on Other/Unrecorded
N
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

(1)
(2)
Disc. Store Parking Lot
-0.00474
0.256∗∗
(0.0101)
(0.0982)
0.00180
0.230∗∗
(0.00368)
(0.0895)
0.000133
0.0490∗
(0.00184)
(0.0255)
-0.000961
0.00444
(0.000923)
(0.00469)
9588
9588

(3)
(4)
(5)
Home
Road
Other
0.0591∗∗
0.487∗∗∗
0.0604
(0.0269)
(0.146)
(0.0599)
0.00467
0.227∗∗∗
0.0655∗
(0.0239) (0.0846) (0.0373)
0.000709
0.0580
0.00482
(0.00437) (0.0508) (0.00598)
0.000218
0.00387
0.00615
(0.00298) (0.00238) (0.00727)
9588
9588
9588
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